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On 30th June 2012 Mohamed Morsi was elected as the first post-revolutionary 
Egyptian President, marking the first time in the country’s history that an Islamist 
organisation legitimately ascended to power. This event dramatically changed political 
calculations across the region, and came with significant implications for both the 
Muslim Brotherhood and for the wider understanding of Political Islams. However, the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s rule was short-lived, as Morsi was deposed by a coup d’etat on 
3rd July 2013. Since then, many have taken his deposition as proof of the 
incompatibility of Islamism and democratic governance, building on Oliver Roy’s 
argument of The Failure of Political Islam.  
 
This thesis explores the Muslim Brotherhood’s year in power to demonstrate that their 
removal is attributable to more than simply “undemocratic” choices and authoritarian 
tendencies, and analyses the sources of their political behaviour to highlight the 
importance of understanding Political Islam’s heterogeneous nature. This 
heterogeneity sets up a range of different ways in which groups engage with politics 
and state institutions – which is why the ideology cannot be reduced to a monolithic 
set of beliefs and practices. This understanding is key to the re-thinking of 
contemporary foreign policies towards the region, which are currently shaped by a 
homogenous view of Islamism and by its equation to extremism and violence. 
 
This thesis employs primary sources and data obtained from interviews with Egyptian 
activists and Muslim Brotherhood members, which investigated their role throughout 
the 2011 uprisings and up to July 2013. It provides a genealogy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s evolution from a grassroots movement into an Islamist political party, 
and analyses the organisation’s understanding of Political Islam to assess the 
implications of its deposition for the perception of the ideology as a whole. Ultimately, 
this thesis argues that the Muslim Brotherhood’s removal does not equal the end of 
Political Islam, but rather underlines the need for an understanding of the doctrine 
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1882 - British troops defeat the Egyptian Army and take control of country. 
 





1922 - Fuad I becomes King and Egypt gains independence, although British influence 
remains significant until mid-1950s. 
 
1928 - The Muslim Brotherhood is founded by Hassan al Banna, who was killed in 1949. 
Its aims included reorienting Egypt and the whole Muslim Middle East away from 
Western influence. 
 
1948 - Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria attack the new state of Israel. The Egyptian Army's 
poor performance increases the unpopularity of King Farouk. 
 
1949 - The Committee of the Free Officers' Movement is formed with the aim of 
overthrowing the corrupt monarchy. 
 
1952 (July) - Coup by the Free Officers' Movement. King Farouk abdicates in favour of 
his infant son Ahmed Fuad II. 
 
The Rise of Nasser 
 
1953 (June) - Coup leader Muhammad Najib becomes president as Egypt is declared a 
Republic. 
 
1954 - Fellow coup leader Gamal Abdel Nasser becomes prime minister and in 1956 
president, ruling unchallenged until his death in 1970. 
 
1954 - Evacuation Treaty signed. British forces, who began a gradual withdrawal under 
1936 Treaty, finally leave Egypt. 
 
1958 - President Nasser steps up campaign to promote pan-Arab unity, the most 
visible signs of which were embodied by the brief creation of the United Arab Republic 
unitary state, which included Syria (1958-61). He also supports friendly elements in 
Lebanese and North Yemen conflicts to little avail. 
 
                                                 
1 BBC News, “Egypt’s Profile: Timeline”, (June 2017) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
13315719  
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1961-66 - President Nasser adopts socialist policies, including nationalisation of 
industry and an ambitious welfare programme, combined with the repression of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and leftist opponents, in an unsuccessful attempt to boost the 
economy and the popularity of his government. 
 
1967 (June) - Israeli pre-emptive attack defeats Egypt, Jordan and Syria, leaving it in 
control of Sinai up to the Suez Canal and Egyptian-occupied Gaza. Emergency Law 
largely suspends civil rights. It remains in force with a brief break in the early 1980s 




Anwar Sadat’s Presidency 
 
1970 (September) - Nasser dies, having never recovered his leading role among Arab 
states after the 1967 defeat, and is succeeded by Vice-President Anwar al-Sadat. 
 
1972 - President Sadat expels Soviet advisers and reorients Egypt towards the West, 
while launching an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to open the economy to market 
forces and foreign investment. 
 
1973 (October) - Egypt and Syria go to war with Israel to reclaim the land lost in 1967. 
Egypt begins negotiations for the return of Sinai after the war. 
 
1975 (June) - The Suez Canal is re-opened for first time since the 1967 war. 
 
1977 (January) - "Bread riots" take place in major cities against the end of subsidies 
on basic foods and necessities, stipulated under agreements with the World Bank and 
with the International Monetary Fund. 
 
1977 (October) - President Sadat visits Israel, beginning a process that leads to the 
1979 peace treaty, the return of the occupied Sinai Peninsula, and Egypt's suspension 
from the Arab League until 1989. Egypt becomes a major beneficiary of US financial 
aid. 
 
1981 (October) - President Sadat is assassinated by Islamist extremists a month after 
the government’s clampdown on private press and opposition groups, in the wake of 
more anti-government riots. He is succeeded by Vice-President Hosni Mubarak. 
 
 
Hosni Mubarak’s Presidency 
 
1981 - President Mubarak re-imposes the State of Emergency, which restricts political 
activity, freedom of expression and assembly. 
 
2005 (May) - Referendum backs constitutional amendments allowing multiple 
candidates at presidential elections, after months of opposition protests. 
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2005 (December) - Parliamentary polls end with clashes between police and 
supporters of the opposition Muslim Brotherhood, who win record 20% of seats by 
standing as independents. 
 
2008 (April) - Military courts sentence 25 leading Muslim Brotherhood members to jail 
terms in a crackdown targeting the organisation's funding. More than 800 are arrested 
over a month. The Brotherhood boycotted municipal elections after only 20 
candidates were allowed to stand. 
 
The Fall of Mubarak 
 
2010 (February) - Former UN nuclear chief Mohammed ElBaradei returns to Egypt 
and, together with opposition figures and activists, forms a coalition for political 
change. 
 
2010 (June) - The Muslim Brotherhood fails to win any seats in elections to the Shura 
consultative upper house of parliament; and alleges vote was rigged. 
 
2010 (November) - Parliamentary polls are followed by protests against the alleged 
rigging of votes. The Muslim Brotherhood fails to win a single seat, though it held a 
fifth of the places in the last parliament. 
 
2011 (January) - Anti-government demonstrations begin on January 25th, inspired by 
the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor that triggered the “Jasmine Revolution”, 
which prompted the sudden departure of President Ben Ali. 
 
2011 (February) - President Mubarak steps down and hands power to the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces. Mubarak goes on trial in August, and is charged with ordering 
the killing of demonstrators during the protests. 
 
2011 (April-August) - Protests continue in Cairo's Tahrir Square over the slow pace of 
political change. Islamist groups come to the fore. The Army finally disperses 
protestors in August. 
 
2011 (November) – Violence breaks in Cairo's Tahrir square as security forces clash 
with protesters accusing the military of trying to keep their grip on power. The violence 
escalates in the “Mohamed Mahmoud” protest on 19th November 2011, during which 
the Muslim Brotherhood sides with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. 
 
2011 (December) - A national unity government, headed by new Prime Minister Kamal 
al-Ganzouri, takes office. 
 




2012 (May) - Military leaders announce the end of the State of Emergency in place 
since Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in 1981. 
Mohamed Morsi’s Presidency 
 
2012 (June) - Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi narrowly wins 
presidential election. Court sentences ex-President Hosni Mubarak to life in prison for 
complicity in the killing of protesters during the 2011 uprisings. 
 
2012 (August) - New prime minister Hisham Qandil appoints a cabinet dominated by 
figures from the outgoing government, technocrats and Islamists, but excluding 
secular and liberal forces. President Morsi dismisses Defence Minister Tantawi and 




Tensions over the New Constitution 
 
2012 (November) - President Morsi issues a constitutional decree stripping the 
Judiciary of the right to challenge his decisions, but rescinds it in the face of popular 
protests. 
 
2012 (December) - Islamist-dominated constituent assembly approves draft 
constitution that boosts the role of Islam and restricts freedom of speech and 
assembly. Public approve it in a referendum, prompting extensive protest by secular 
opposition leaders, Christians and women's groups. Government paralysis weakens 
the currency and delays a $4.8bn (£3bn) IMF loan. Violent clashes between Muslim 
Brotherhood’s supporters and secular protesters take place 5th and 6th December, and 
are referred to as the “Battle of Ittihadiya”. 
 
2013 (January) - More than 50 people are killed during days of violent street protests. 
Army chief Abdul Fattah al Sisi warns that political strife is pushing the state to the 
brink of collapse. 
 
2013 (June) - President Morsi appoints Islamist allies as regional leaders in 13 of 




2013 (July) - An Army-led coup d’etat overthrows President Morsi amid mass 
demonstrations calling on him to quit. 
 
2013 (August) - Hundreds are killed as security forces storm pro-Morsi protest camps 
in Cairo, in what is now called the “Raba’a Massacre”. 
 
2013 (October) - US suspends large part of $1.3bn (£810m) in aid. 
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2013 (December) - Government declares Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group after 
a bomb blast in Mansoura kills 12. 
 
2014 (January) - New constitution bans parties based on religion. 
 
 
Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s Presidency 
 
2014 (May) - Former army chief Abdul Fattah al Sisi wins presidential election. 
 
2014 (June) - International outcry as three al Jazeera journalists are jailed after being 
found guilty of spreading false news and supporting the banned Muslim Brotherhood. 
They are freed in February 2015. 
 
2015 (May) - Ousted President Morsi is sentenced to death over 2011 mass breakout 
of Muslim Brotherhood prisoners, along with more than 100 others. He was sentenced 
to 20 years in prison in April over the arrest and torture of protesters during his 2012-
2013 rule. 
 
2016 (November) - Egypt's Appeals Court overturns the death sentence of former 
president Mohamed Morsi and orders a retrial in connection with a mass prison break 
in 2011. 
 
2017 (April) - State of Emergency declared after suicide bombers kill dozens at two 


















The ‘Failure’ of Political Islam? The Muslim Brotherhood’s 







“We have a big war, but we are a peaceful movement and we want to go through it 
peacefully, doing the best for our people, and we will never give up, we need to 
save our history and our country too. We don’t want the power. We never wanted 
the power, we have always looked to have a better lifestyle for our people.”2 
 
 
Six years after the Arab Springs, Islamist groups that seek to operate within the 
boundaries of institutional politics, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), are finding 
themselves removed from power, brutally repressed, and internally fractured. 
Conversely, groups such as Da’esh3, which focus on “state-building” through militia-
based governance rather than participatory politics, have come to embody Political 
Islam in the eyes of international observers and policy makers. This shift in the regional 
(dis)order underlines the rise of a trend that began with the declaration of the War on 
Terror in September 2001, arguing for a military, legal, and conceptual struggle against 
Islamic terrorism and the groups and countries associated with it.4 This has intensified 
after the rise of Da’esh and the deposition of the MB, both being events that have 
challenged mainstream Islamist models of political change. Islam has always been 
                                                 
2 Interview with Mohamed Soudan, Freedom and Justice Party’s Foreign Relations Secretary 
3 Also “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”, self-declared as a transnational caliphate under the 
leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in June 2014. Mabon, S., Ardovini, L., “Daesh, Geopolitics and the 
Resurgence of Pan Arabism?”, in The Foreign Policy Centre, (March 2015), p. 3 
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/1691.pdf  




politicised.5 However, its understanding as deen wa dawla, “a faith and a state”, has 
never been as challenged as of today.6  
 
The case of Egypt has perhaps been the most striking. The 3rd July Coup posed an end 
to Egypt’s first freely and fairly elected government, ousted the rule of the MB, and 
has been perceived by many as the confirmation of Political Islam’s inadequacy to 
legitimately govern. However, the MB’s political behaviour and the justifications 
behind it have been left largely unanalysed, and so have the tensions originating from 
specific aspects of Political Islam (or Islamism) that are clearly identifiable within the 
group after a more focused analysis. This thesis puts forward the argument that there 
is more to the Brotherhood’s deposition than simply “undemocratic” choices and 
authoritarian tendencies, and that the group’s affiliation with a specific understanding 
of Political Islam needs to be examined in order to identify the sources of their political 
choices and perceived “failure”. 
 
Mohamed Morsi was elected as the first post-revolutionary Egyptian President on 30th 
June 2012, marking the first time in the country’s history an Islamist legitimately 
ascended into power through the ballot box. Such an unprecedented and significant 
event did not go unobserved, as critics inside and outside the region associated the 
electoral results to a renewal of the infamous “Islamist Threat”, while supporters 
across the Arab World cheered the political rise of the Islamist organisation. The MB 
election was indeed unprecedented and to some degrees divisive, but the 
organisation’s time as head of the Egyptian government was remarkably short. 
Following from accusations of being exclusively serving the organisation’s aims and of 
returning to some of Hosni Mubarak’s repressive methods, Morsi was deposed and 
arrested on 3rd July 2013 by a coup d’etat7 staged by the Egyptian Army, which claimed 
to be acting in the name of the people. Such actions made the country descend into 
                                                 
5 Osman, T., Islamism: what it means for the Middle East and the World (New Haven: Yale University 
press, 2016), p. 254 
6 ibid. 




chaos again, while the Brotherhood’s failure and removal was read by many as the 
ultimate example of Political Islam’s inadequacy to legitimately rule. However, while 
many were quick to associate such events to the “failure” of Political Islam, it is also 
necessary to note that there are many elements that have been overlooked and left 
unaccounted for. This thesis will analyse the sources of the Brotherhood’s political 
behaviour and examine their relation with a certain understanding of Political Islam, 
with the aim of challenging the assumption that their deposition represents the 
ultimate failure of Islamism. 
 
This thesis does so with the aim of assessing the wider implications of the MB’s 
removal from power for the regional and international understanding of Political Islam 
as a whole. It therefore begins by analysing its roots, and argues that Islamism is best 
understood as a multifaceted, heterogeneous doctrine, whose manifestations and 
practices vary depending upon national and socio-economic circumstances. However, 
while Political Islam is far from being monolithic, events such as the Global War on 
Terror and more recently the rise of Da’esh have certainly promoted its framing as 
such. The mainstream view shared by politicians and policy makers alike is therefore 
one that equates Islamism with violence and authoritarianism, contributing to the rise 
of Islamophobia and to the construction of Muslims as the “other”.  
 
Donald Trump’s presidency is further highlighting the popularity of this trend, with the 
call for a “Muslim Ban” and the declaration that the “fight against Islamism” is the US’s 
number one priority.8  It follows that, in such a political climate, the MB’s deposition 
was conveniently perceived as the ultimate proof of the incompatibility of democracy 
and the Islamic faith. This thesis challenges such view and argues that there is much 
more to the MB’s deposition than just the Islamist component of their governance. 
Regardless of the way in which the events of July 30th are framed, it is undeniable that 
they came with fundamental repercussions for the perception of both the MB and of 
                                                 
8 Halper, D., “Trump vows to defeat ISIS”, in The New York Post, (February 2017) 
http://nypost.com/2017/02/06/trump-pledges-to-defeat-isis-rebuild-military-with-beautiful-new-
equipment/    
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Islamism as whole, which are best understood and analysed after having investigated 
both the roots of the doctrine and the significance of the organisation. 
 
Such a task is of particular relevance and indeed necessary in the contemporary 
political climate. After being ousted from power in July 2013, the MB was officially 
proscribed as a terrorist organisation in Egypt, causing its members to suffer 
unprecedented persecution and repression.9 The authoritarian nature of the Al Sisi 
regime means that the country is currently in the midst of its worst Human Rights crisis 
so far, with highly restrictive associations laws limiting the possibility for opposition, 
while the silencing and imprisonment of native and international journalists has 
become common practice.10 In addition, several countries followed Egypt’s lead in 
proscribing the MB as a terrorist organisation, therefore negatively influencing the 
understanding of both the group and of Political Islam more broadly.  These include 
Kazakhstan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria and Russia, with the Trump 
administration recently launching an investigation aimed at declaring the MB a 
terrorist movement, and consequently subjecting it to US sanctions, revealing a 
worrying international trend.11   
 
While the UK has not officially proscribed the group, the “Muslim Brotherhood 
Review” published in December 2015 revealed some conclusions that appear to have 
been largely influenced by this international trend, such as “aspects of Muslim 
Brotherhood ideology and tactics, in this country and overseas, are contrary to our 
values and have been contrary to our national interests and our national security”.12 
These findings have been challenged to some degree by the House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee, “Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood Review”, 
                                                 
9 ibid.  
10 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: consolidating repression under al Sisi”, in Human Rights Watch, 
(January 2017)  https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/egypt-consolidating-repression-under-al-sisi  
11 Hosenball, M., “Trump administration debates designating Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist group”, 
in Reuters, (January 2017) http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-muslimbrotherhood-
idUKKBN15D0VV  
12 “Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons”, (17 December 2015), in Muslim 
Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. 
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published in November 201613, but little has changed in the UK’s attitude towards the 
group. With Islamophobia rising steadily and the recent waves of terrorist attacks 
across Europe claimed by Da’esh, it is now more important than ever to stress the 
heterogeneity and diversity of Political Islam. The Egyptian MB, with its long history of 
political involvement, it is the best example to build this argument on. 
 
However, much of what has been written about the MB in recent years and especially 
since their electoral performance in 2005, has been in response to preoccupation 
about their intentions and mostly driven by policy questions. Therefore, part of the 
original contribution of this thesis is going beyond such approach, as it seeks to unveil 
and analyse the root causes of their political behaviour, and to understand how they 
operate within a political system or rather, how operating in politics shapes their 
actions and narratives. This is a necessary process as the sources of the MB’s political 
behaviour have been left largely unanalysed, together with the tensions characteristic 
of the group that originate from of Political Islam. This thesis argues that the 
Brotherhood’s failed attempt at governing is attributable to more than simply 
“undemocratic” choices and authoritarian tendencies, and that it is necessary to 
obtain a comprehensive understanding of events before assessing their relevance and 
consequences. 
This thesis is based on a particular understanding of Political Islam, outlined in Chapter 
1, and that is so because of the aim to build an analytical framework from which to 
examine the political behaviour of the MB while in power. In particular, the thesis will 
apply Historical Sociology as an analytical framework as this approach moves away 
from the traditional understanding of “Islam” or the “Arab mind” as explanatory 
elements of the region’s geopolitics, and instead focuses on how institutions of both 
political and socio/religious power are established and maintained, recognising states, 
ideologies and societies as the core components of political and social order.14 
                                                 
13 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood 
Review”, Sixth Report of Session 2016-2017, (November 2016) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/118/118.pdf 
14 Halliday, F., The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics, and Ideology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 36 
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Therefore, it is most suited to the study of how the MB’s political evolution has 
historically shaped the country’s institutions, civil society, and politics. Through the 
analysis of the MB’s political ascent, this thesis aims at investigating whether Political 
Islam really has ‘failed’ or is instead slowly adapting its narrative and aims to 
contemporary times, inevitably encountering obstacles along the way.  
 
To conclude, the thesis’ original contribution is two-fold, as it offers a framework to 
analyse and better understand Political Islam, while exploring the recent political 
behaviour of the MB and filling a considerable gap in the literature by doing so. To do 
so the thesis looks closely at the relationship between ideology and the Islamist group, 
as it seeks to unveil and analyse the root causes of their behaviour, and to understand 
how they operate within the political system or rather, how operating in politics 
shapes their actions and narratives. Moreover, another contribution is the 
presentation of the MB’s version and perceptions of what happened from 2011 up to 
June 30th as, while these appear to have been somewhat documented in the Arabic 
media, they have been left largely unanalysed in the English language literature so far. 
 
Historical Context 
Mohamed Morsi was sworn in on 30th June 2012, as Egypt’s first democratically 
elected president and as a representative of what is now regarded as one of the few  
Islamist organization gaining power in the region through a democratic process.15 
These conditions made it clear from the start that the President-elect was set to face 
unprecedented expectations and challenges, including the task of governing a post-
revolutionary country while also guiding it through its democratic transition, and 
facing the remnants of Mubarak’s deep state16 that had not been wiped out by the 
events of January 25th. In addition, the organisation’s historical role as one of the 
country’s most influential civil society actors and its history of internal divisions meant 
                                                 
15 BBC News, “Muslim Brotherhood’s Mursi declared Egypt’s President”, (June 2012) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-18571580 
16 In this context the concept of “deep state” can be loosely understood as a network of individuals and 
groups who are in actual charge of a government. In the case of Egypt, that refers individuals and groups 
within the institutions of the state who had remained faithful to Mubarak, such as the Armed Forces. 
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that, while the MB was fully equipped to be a powerful opposition movement, its 
members had very little experience when it came to directly engaging with politics.   
 
After the fall of Mubarak the MB emerged as one of the key political forces in Egypt, a 
position that was aided by the organization’s long history as one of the country’s oldest 
and most organised grassroots movements. Since its foray into electoral politics at the 
start of the 1990s, the MB had widened its already impressive amount of popular 
support, and was seen by many as the only alternative to Mubarak’s dictatorial regime. 
The organisation’s influence and ability to mobilise a significant amount of the 
population is something that had always shaped its troubled relationship with the 
various Egyptian regimes, which had historically seen the MB as either a source of 
legitimacy or as a potential threat. This meant that, despite being engaged in civil 
society activities, the organization has spent most of its history in a climate 
characterised by illegality and repression, with its members routinely persecuted and 
targeted by the country’s security apparatus. Therefore, Mubarak’s removal and the 
subsequent political vacuum that followed represented the first real opportunity for 
the MB to not only achieve legal status, but also to first fully engage with politics 
without fear of repression and repercussions.  
 
While there are contradicting accounts analysing the ways in which the MB 
increasingly politicised after January 2011, quickly moving from the periphery to the 
core of Egyptian politics, it is undeniable that the organization underwent major 
reformation in order for its presidential candidate to be rightfully elected in June 2012, 
whether intentional or unintentional. Therefore, before trying to assess whether the 
Freedom and Justice Party’s (FJP) deposition can really be understood as a “failure” of 
Political Islam, a working definition of “failure” needs to be provided, and the MB’s 
politicisation process and its implications for the organization’s ideology and practices 
need to be carefully analysed. 
 
In order to understand the organisation’s historical significance, Chapter 2 employs 
Historical Sociology to examine the MB’s relationship with a specific understanding of 
Political Islam, and places it within Egypt’s unique socio-political context. The chapter 
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focuses on the MB’s history and political development as intrinsically tied to that of 
Egypt itself, in order to underline and analyse the mutually dependent relationship 
existing between the state and the Islamist group. The chapter provides a short but 
comprehensive analysis of Egyptian religious and political significance, followed by a 
detailed examination of the MB’s history and evolution into one of the most influential 
Islamist groups in the region, and a review of Egypt’s geopolitical importance that 
further justifies the choice of the country as a case study. Following this, Chapter 3 
examines the role that the organisation played during the January 2011 uprisings and 
at the very start of the transitional period, which culminated in the creation of the FJP 
in June 2011. Understanding such a watershed event as the beginning of the MB’s 
experience in government, the chapter examines the significance of the creation of 
the FJP and of Mohammed Morsi’s election, by focusing on the implications that this 
had for the mainstream organization and for its ideology. 
 
Having set both a theoretical and historical understanding of the organisation’s 
significance and main characteristics, Chapter 4 critically analyses the MB’s time in 
government, focusing on its policies, political choices, and varying relationships with 
the other political actors in Egypt, in order to understand what ultimately led to the 
premature departure of Morsi from the presidency. The MB’s performance while in 
government is indeed inseparable from the party’s troublesome foundation process. 
This will become clear as this chapter tracks internal and external tensions that, arisen 
at the time of the FJP formation, carried on to be become distinctive features of the 
MB rule. Following from this, the chapter sets a framework for the analysis of the four 
main factors contributing to the downfall of the MB that will be examined in Chapter 
5, these being: the MB’s legacy of internal divisions, its “arrogance” and refusal to 
cooperate with revolutionary groups, its miscalculations regarding the extent of power 
the group actually held, and failure to take into account the prominent and historical 
role of the Army within the Egyptian context.  
 
Chapter 5 subsequently looks at the events leading up to Morsi’s deposition and 
examines the reasons behind popular discontent and perceived failure of the MB. 
Once again, the legacy of division characteristic of the organisation and certain 
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perceptions of Political Islam played a major role in the unravelling of these 
occurrences. Justifications, accusations, and political actions are examined within the 
framework of Political Islam and that of Egypt itself, with the aim to identify the extent 
to which history and ideology influenced them. Ultimately, Chapter 5 critically engages 
with Roy’s account of the “Failure of Political Islam”, in order to assess whether or not 
it is applicable to the case of the FJP’s removal in July 2013. 
 
Overall, Morsi’s removal can be understood as sending a very powerful message: 
winning an election is not sufficient to govern Egypt. The country’s historical and socio-
political background means that the acceptance of both the population and the 
Military Apparatus are key to gain the legitimacy needed to govern, and the MB 
overestimated just how much power they had over these two entities. Following from 
this, the thesis proposes that together with the misunderstanding of the domestic 
balance of power, the MB’s underestimation of the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces’ (SCAF) significance and intentions, its apparent refusal to cooperate with 
secular and revolutionary groups, and internal divisions are the main explanations for 
the FJP’s deposition. 
 
Political Islam(s) 
There is a vast amount of literature on Political Islam that has been produced over the 
years and, more recently, as a direct response to the so-called democratic wave of the 
“Arab Springs” that swept across the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) in 
2011. With many fearing the rise of an “Islamist Winter”17 after the deposition of long-
standing dictators and the rise to power through the ballot box of Islamist groups such 
as the MB in Egypt and the Ennahda in Tunisia, there has been a rise in the literature 
that seeks to understand Islamism as a monolithic ideology, in order to make sense of 
events in the region. Similarly, the deposition of the MB from power in July 2013 was 
widely perceived as the confirmation that Islamism had indeed failed in its experiment 
with governance, and as a proof of the incompatibility of the ideology and democratic 
                                                 
17 Totten, M., Schenker, D., Abdul-Hussain, H., “Arab Spring or Islamist Winter? Three Views”, in 
World Affairs, Vol. 174, No. 5, (January 2012), pp. 23-42 
 22 
rule. While both these positions are grounded in existing research, this thesis argues 
that it is necessary to move away from the understanding of Political Islam as a 
monolithic movement and instead focus on the diversity of Islamist groups across the 
region. This is fundamental to understand how their ideologies and practices relate 
back to a more case-specific understanding of Islamism, and to assess the broader 
consequences of the MB’s toppling for Political Islam as a whole. 
 
This thesis provides an original and comprehensive insight into Political Islam and the 
MB. More specifically, this thesis makes a considerable contribution to the emerging 
literature focusing on Islamism after the Arab Springs, positioning itself at the 
vanguard of contemporary debates. The framework for this contribution is set up in 
Chapter 1, which focuses on the analysis and review of the existing body of literature 
on the topic, with the aim to identify gaps that need to be addressed. Chapter 1 
therefore begins from the discussion of what makes Islam an inherently political 
religion, by reviewing the core tenets of Political Islam and looking into its origins, 
taking into consideration the Sunni-Shia schism, in order to challenge its monolithic 
perception and argue that it is more appropriate to talk about Political Islams. While 
remaining conscious of the ideology’s vast diversity, Chapter 1 examines the works of 
the “founding fathers” of (Sunni) Political Islam, namely Hassan al Banna and Ala 
Mawdudi, in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of how two of its most 
influential thinkers shaped its practice and comprehension. The works of other Islamist 
thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb are also examined in order to start bringing out the 
tensions within Political Islam, and to show how different interpretations of the 
original thought behind it have led to conflicting narratives and aims.  
 
Similarly, the unique case of post-revolutionary Iran is analysed to bring Shi’a political 
thought into the picture, and once again stress the incredibly heterogeneous nature 
of Islamism. Following from this, Chapter 1 focuses on the works of James Piscatori 
and Dale Eickelman to further stress the comprehension of Political Islam as an 
evolving, modern phenomenon, and sets the framework for outlining Political Islam’s 
relevance to recent times and governments by reviewing John Esposito’s and Fred 
Halliday’s positions. The chapter concludes by reviewing two new emerging trends in 
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the literature concerning the nature of post-revolutionary Middle Eastern states, 
based on the works of Tarek Osman, Quinn Mecham and Muqtedar Khan. These 
emerging trends embody the debates between those who see the post-2011 context 
as an “Islamists’ Winter” and those who instead interpret it as a chance for Islamist 
groups to self reflect and re-invent themselves in the light of the new regional 
(dis)order. In particular, this thesis makes a considerable contribution to the latter of 
these positions, therefore positioning itself at the vanguard of contemporary debates. 
  
The thesis particularly focuses on Oliver Roy’s account of the failure of Political Islam, 
as his work skilfully underlines the tensions within the doctrine as a whole and 
presents an interesting argument for its (contemporary) inadequacy to govern. 
Chapter 1 engages with “failure” as a concept, analysing Roy’s understanding of the 
term and providing a working definition of it for the purposes of this thesis. While 
Roy’s ideas have been widely criticised in the past, little work has been done examining 
his positions and reactions to recent event across the region. Therefore, in Chapter 5 
his theory is applied to the examination of the MB’s behaviour while in power, with 
the aim to investigate whether the FJP perceived “failure” reinforces his arguments or 
has to be understood in a different way instead. Asef Bayat’s account of Post Islamism 
is also similarly assessed, as it is an approach that Roy himself refers to, and that is 
gaining increasing traction in the post 2011 context. Arguably, the confusion of ideals 
and aims that historically characterise the manifestations of this ideology can be held 
partially responsible for the Brotherhood’s “failure” while in government, and for the 
lack of continuity and unifying narrative that has been characteristic of the 
organisation since its inception. It is also necessary to fully acknowledge these tensions 
in both the theory and practice of Political Islam before embarking on the research 
that this thesis conducts, in order to avoid generalisation and to recognize the striking 
heterogeneity of Islamism. 
 
While a substantial amount of work has been produced on the FJP’s performance 
during its twelve months in power and while the actions taken by President Morsi 
have been widely criticized, there has not been sufficient attention paid to the 
reasons behind the Brotherhood’s political “failure”. This thesis does not attempt to 
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justify the political behaviour of the MB, but it does offer an understanding of the 
reasons why its transition from a grass-roots opposition movement into a legal 
political party has been so traumatic and unsuccessful. One thing that needs to be 
kept in mind while embarking on this study is that despite the decades-long history 
of the Brotherhood’s narrative, the movement has spent most of its existence being 
an illegal organization, therefore lacking knowledge and experience of how to govern 
a country. This lack of institutional experience is clearly reflected into the group’s 
incapability to effectively translate their narrative into policies and reforms, and this 
is something this thesis particularly looks at in details, to assess whether or not it 
represents a “failure” of the notion of Islamic governance. This comes with substantial 
policy implications, especially given the current political climate, as a deeper 
understanding of both the doctrine and the MB is necessary to challenge the rise of 
Islamophobia and of aggressive foreign policies towards the region. 
 
Within this thesis there will be a specific focus on certain actors and groups, the names 
of which will be be abbreviated for the purposes of clarity and brevity. These are: 
 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP): (Ḥizb al-Ḥurriya wa al-'Adala) the FJP was an 
Egyptian Islamist political party and represented the political wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The head of the party Mohamed Morsi served as President of Egypt in 
2012-2013, before being removed by a coup d’etat. The party was banned and legally 
dissolved by the current Egyptian regime in 2014.18 
 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB): (Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) also referred to in the 
thesis as “Brotherhood” and “Ikhwan”. The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational 
Sunni Islamist organisation funded in 1928 in Egypt by Islamic scholar and 
schoolteacher Hassan al Banna. After decades of governmental crackdowns and 
repression, it governed Egypt through the Freedom and Justice Party from 30th June 
2012 to 30th June 2013, when it was removed by a coup d’etat staged by the Egyptian 
                                                 
18 Shehata, S., “Profile: Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party”, in BBC News, (November 2011) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15899548  
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Armed Forces.19 As of 2015, it is considered a terrorist organisation by the 
governments of Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Russia. 
 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF): (al-Maǧlis al-ʾAʿlā lil-Quwwāt al-
Musallaḥa) It is a statutory body composed by 20-25 senior Egyptian Military 
Officers.20 The Council assumed power on 11th February 2011 after Hosni Mubarak’s 
removal by the January 25th popular uprisings, and officially relinquished it on 30th 
June 2012 upon the start of Mohamed Morsi’s presidency. Field Marshal Abdul Fatah 
al Sisi and Chief Justice Adly Mansour played a key role in the coup d’etat that removed 
Morsi from power on 30th June 2013. 
 
Research Questions 
The research at the core of this thesis follows a precise set of research questions, 
which have been developed and expanded in the course of interviews, the answers to 
which are drawn from both secondary and primary sources. They are divided between 
primary questions and secondary questions. 
 
The main questions that this thesis asks are: 
1) Is the MB’s recent deposition evidence of Political Islam’s inadequacy to 
legitimately govern? 
2) What does the MB’s deposition mean for Political Islam as a whole? 
3) The Egyptian MB is often regarded as the Islamist organization par excellence. 
How can their recent political behaviour and difficulties with governance be 
explained in relation to their adherence to Political Islam? 
 
In order to answer these main questions, some secondary queries have been 
addressed in the course of the thesis, these being: 
                                                 
19 Laub, Z., “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood”, in Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991 
20 Abul-Magd, Z., “Understanding SCAF”, in The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, (Summer 2012) 
https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/understanding-scaf/  
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 Why is the election of an Islamist party in Egypt such an unprecedented 
event? 
 What policies did the Brotherhood put forward while in power? How are 
these related to Political Islam? 
 What are the tensions in Political Islam? How do they manifest in the MB? 
Ultimately, through the analysis of the MB’s time in government, the thesis seeks to 
answer the overarching question of what their removal means for the understanding 
of Political Islam as a broader, heterogeneous movement, and whether the FJP’s 
removal represents the failure of Political Islam as a whole. 
 
Claims to Originality 
The pairing of primary and secondary sources is essential when trying to make sense 
of the post-2011 geopolitical situation in the MENA region, and especially so when 
trying to understand what the broader implications of the FJP’s removal are for the 
wider field of Political Islam and for the foreign policies currently directed at the 
region. This thesis therefore brings together the existing research with primary data 
obtained through interviews with both Egyptian secular activists and MB members and 
supporters, with the aim of identifying the tensions and obstacles that led to the 
abrupt end of its political experience. This thesis argues that there is more to the 
Brotherhood’s political behaviour than what has been shown, and investigates 
whether Political Islam really has ‘failed’ or is instead slowly adapting its narrative and 
aims to contemporary times, inevitably encountering obstacles on the way.  
 
Therefore, this thesis’s original contribution is two-fold, as it offers a framework to 
analyse and better understand domestic and international approaches to Political 
Islam in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, while also exploring the MB’s recent 
political behaviour and filling a considerable gap in the English-language literature by 
doing so. The thesis looks closely at the relationship between ideology and the Islamist 
group, unveiling and analysing the root causes of their behaviour, to understand how 
they operate within the political system or rather, how operating in politics shapes 
their actions and narratives. The thesis also uses Historical Sociology to examine the 
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troubled history of the MB and various Egyptian regimes, as that is essential to 
understand the organisation’s politicisation process and the way in which decades of 
repression and persecution have affected the MB’s ideology and practices. Moreover, 
another contribution of this thesis is putting forward the MB’s version and perceptions 
of what happened from 2011 up to June 30th as, while these appear to have been 
somewhat documented in the Arabic media, they have been left unanalysed in the 
English-language literature thus far. 
 
This particular aspect, when combined with the examination of the MB’s political 
behaviour, represents one of the most original contribution of this thesis. This is the 
case as most of the existing literature covering the removal of the MB focus solely on 
the manifestations, or symptoms, of the MB political “failure”, such as their 
authoritarian tendencies and evident lack of political experience. Instead, the research 
conducted by this thesis focuses on the very source of these political choices, 
identifying the root causes of the MB political choice and placing them within the 
context of Egyptian domestic politics, therefore filling a considerable gap in the 
literature by doing so. Relying on the combination of primary and secondary sources 
this thesis identifies four main reasons that led to the July 2013 coup d’etat, these 
being the MB’s legacy of internal divisions, its “arrogance” and refusal to cooperate 
with revolutionary groups, its miscalculations regarding the extent of power the group 
actually held, and failure to take into account the prominent and historical role of the 
Army within the Egyptian context. 
 
Ultimately, in terms of assessing its implications for the broader understanding and 
interpretation of Political Islam, many were quick to point to the removal of the FJP as 
the ultimate proof of the incompatibility of Islamism and democratic governance.21 
While this assumption is not inherently incorrect, it needs to be acknowledged that it 
might be true only in specific countries, and under specific circumstances. This is why 
accounts such as Roy’s “Failure of Political Islam” and Bayat’s “Post Islamism” need to 
be applied with caution, as they are both very context-specific in their prerequisites 
                                                 
21 Nafi, B., “The Failure of Political Islam?”, in Middle East Eye, (July 2015) 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/failure-political-islam-1791846098 
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and do not really take into account the wide diversity of belief and practices that fall 
under the broader category of “Political Islam”. Therefore, there is a need to move 
towards an understanding of Political Islam that not only recognises the diversity of 
the groups that fall under this label, but that also acknowledges  the importance of its 
comprehension as modern, evolving phenomenon.  
 
Following from this, the thesis makes a considerable contribution to the contemporary 
literature focusing on Political Islam in the post-2011 regional context, as it positions 
itself at the vanguard of contemporary debates. This literature will be examined in 
details later on, but it is roughly divided between two main trends led by scholars such 
as Tarek Osman, Quinn Mecham and Muqtedar Khan. In particular, these trends 
develop along the lines of those who understand the post-2011 context as an 
“Islamists’ Winter” and those who instead interpret it as a chance for Islamist groups 
to self reflect and re-invent themselves in the light of the new regional (dis)order. By 
identifying four domestic factors that led the removal of the MB government this 
thesis aligns with the latter of these trends, as it will be shown.  
 
Specifically in the case of the MB, this thesis proposes that it is highly inaccurate to 
equate Morsi’s rule to the more general failure of Political Islam. This is the case as the 
conditions that characterised the MB’s politicisation and rise to power are unique to 
Egypt, and so are the organization’s practices linked to their own understanding of 
Islamism. Overall, the MB was not removed from government purely because it was 
an Islamist party; rather, almost all of my interviewees agreed that the Armed Forces 
would have somehow regained power regardless of who was in charge of the 
transitional government. This is the case as the MB did not operate in a vacuum, and 
Egypt’s unique socio-political conditions mean that in the past few decades the Armed 
Forces have come to be the unofficial ruler of the country, strengthening the power 
and influence of the deep state. As such, in order to understand the reasons that led 
to the MB’s perceived failure, we must locate the analysis away from a monolithic 
understanding of Political Islam, and within the context of Egypt’s historical political 
and social actors. 
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1. Political Islams 
 
 “I went to the West and saw Islam, but 
no Muslims; I got back to the East and 
saw Muslims, but not Islam.” 
                      (Muhammad Abduh, 1988) 
 
 
The 3rd July 2013 coup d’etat posed an end to the first Islamist government coming to 
power through the ballot box in the country, and ousted the rule of the MB while the 
Armed Forces took control of Egypt once again. Morsi’s removal has been perceived 
by many as the confirmation of Political Islam’s incompatibility with democracy and 
legitimate governance. However, the MB’s political behaviour while in power and the 
justifications behind it have been left largely unanalysed, together with the tensions 
originating from specific aspects of Political Islam that are clearly identifiable within 
the group after a more focused analysis. This thesis argues that the Brotherhood’s 
failed attempt at governing is attributable to more than simply “undemocratic” 
choices and authoritarian tendencies, and that there is the need to obtain a full picture 
of the events before speculating about their significance for the country and the 
region.  
 
It follows that an understanding of Political Islam as a heterogeneous and dynamic 
ideology is necessary to fully understand and analyse the significance of the MB’s 
short-lived rule for both the country and the region, and for the understanding of the 
ideology as whole. The aim of this thesis is to explore the MB’s political behaviour 
while in power in 2012-2013, focusing on the way in which some key aspects of Morsi’s 
governance were built upon the organisation’s understanding of Political Islam. It will 
do so with the intention to identify the various tensions and obstacles that led to the 
failure of its political project, which can be found both within the organization and its 
ideology, and within Egypt’s state institutions. The thesis identifies specific aspects of 
Political Islam with the aim of building an analytical framework from which to examine 
the political behaviour of the MB while in power. Ultimately, the thesis relies on 
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Historical Sociology to investigate whether Political Islam really has failed in its quest 
for governance or is instead slowly adapting its aims and narratives to contemporary 
times, inevitably encountering challenging obstacles along the way. 
 
There is a vast amount of literature covering the subject of Political Islam, upon which 
this chapter builds an analytical framework. Most of the scholarly work on the subject 
has been challenged by the events that took place across the region in 2011; therefore, 
this thesis also contributes to the literature by examining perceptions of Political Islam 
in the contemporary political framework.22 In order to provide a comprehensive 
understanding and background of both Islamism and the Brotherhood, this chapter 
begins by providing a short but comprehensive discussion of what makes Islam an 
inherently political religion. When doing so it also reviews the core tenets of Political 
Islam and looks into its origins, taking into consideration the Sunni-Shia schism, in 
order to challenge its monolithic perception from the very start and argue that it is 
more appropriate to talk about Political Islams. The chapter then focuses on the main 
literature relevant to the notion of Islamic political thought, while remaining conscious 
of its vast diversity.  
 
To begin with, the works of the “founding fathers” of (Sunni) Political Islam, namely 
Hassan al Banna and Abu Ala Mawdudi, is be examined along with their 
interpretations, with the aim of obtaining a strong background on the origins of such 
an influential ideology. The work of other Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb is also 
reviewed in order to bring out the tensions within Political Islam, and to show how 
different interpretations of the original thought have led to conflicting narratives and 
aims. To conclude, the Chapter then focuses on the unique case of post-revolutionary 
Iran in order to bring Shi’a political thought into the picture, and to do so will take into 
account the work and influence of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini over one manifestation 
                                                 
22 See for example: Ayoob, M., The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim 
World (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2008); Ayubi, N., Political Islam: Religion and Politics 
in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991); Eickelman, D., Piscatori, J., Muslim Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); Esposito, J., The Islamic Threat: Myth of Reality? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 
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of the ideology. Having set up a comprehensive background, the chapter then focuses 
on the understanding of Political Islam as an evolving, modern phenomenon, 
presented by Beverly Milton-Edwards and both James Piscatori and Dale Eickelman in 
many of their works.23 In order to outline the relevance of Islamism to recent times 
and governments the works of John Esposito is also taken into consideration, along 
with those of Fred Halliday.  
 
Finally, the chapter focuses on Oliver Roy’s account of the failure of Political Islam, as 
his work underlines the tensions within the doctrine as a whole and presents a 
compelling argument for its (contemporary) inadequacy to governance. Most of all, 
his theory will be applied to the examination of MB’s behaviour while in power, with 
the aim to analyse whether their failure reinforces his arguments or has to be read in 
a different way. Asef Bayat’s account of Post Islamism will also be analysed, as it is an 
approach that Roy himself refers to, and that is gaining increasing traction in the post 
2011 context. Arguably, the confusion of ideals and aims that historically characterise 
the manifestations of this ideology can be held partially responsible for the 
Brotherhood’s failure while in government, and for the lack of continuity and unifying 
narrative that has been characteristic of the organisation since its inception. It is also 
necessary to fully acknowledge these tensions in both the theory and practice of 
Political Islam before embarking on the research that this thesis seeks to conduct, in 
order to avoid generalisation and to recognize the striking heterogeneity of the 
ideology. 
 
To conclude, this research identifies and focus on a clear gap in the literature that is 
important to the understanding of the topic of this thesis. Doing so will also bring 
about the originality of the argument and novelty for the subject of analysis in 
question. While a lot has been written on what the FJP did during its 12 months in 
power and while the actions taken by President Morsi have been widely criticized, 
there has not been sufficient attention paid to the reasons behind the Brotherhood’s 
political failure. The research does not attempt to justify the political behaviour of the 
                                                 
23 See for example: Eickelman, D., Piscatori, J., Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996) 
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MB, but seeks to understand the reasons why its transition from a grass-roots 
opposition movement into a legal political party has been so traumatic and 
unsuccessful. One thing that needs to be kept in mind while embarking in this study 
is that despite the decades-long history of the Brotherhood’s narrative, the 
movement has spent most of its existence being an illegal organization, therefore 
lacking the knowledge and experience of how to govern a country. This lack of 
institutional experience is clearly reflected into the group’s inability to effectively 
translate their narrative into policies and reforms, and this is something this thesis 
particularly looks at in detail to assess whether it represents a failure of the notion of 
Islamic governance or not. 
 
1.1 The dual nature of the Islamic faith: the religious and the political 
A notion central to the analysis put forward in this thesis is that Islam is in itself a 
political religion, and that it cannot be fully understood if either of these two spheres, 
the religious and the political, is separated from the other. This is particularly 
important when seeking to examine the MB’s political behaviour, as many of their 
policies can only be understood fully when placed in an Islamist context. The origins 
of Islam as a political as well as religious movement date back to the times of the 
Prophet and to the first notion of the “Islamic State” (dawlah islāmiyah)24 that 
Mohamed established in Medina, founded on a formal agreement with the families 
and tribes inhabiting the territory that therefore recognised him as the Prophet and 
ruler.25 This document, often referred to as the Medina Charter, is widely recognised 
as the first constitution ever written, and by basing its principles on the teachings 
contained in the Quran and the Sunna underlines the original combination of religion 
and politics within the Islamic faith.26 It is this notion of the umma, the Muslim 
community that is both a source of identity and a sovereign state, that really poses the 
                                                 
24 The term “Islamic State” is used to refer to the Prophet’s original understanding of it. In this context 
the Islamic State is far from resembling a modern nation state or caliphate, as theorised by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, Sayyd Qutb or even Da’esh. Rather, it would be better understood as a “nation”, or umma, 
referring to the political unity of the Muslim community.  
25 Watt, M., Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) pp. 221-228 
26 ibid. 
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basis for the political nature of the Islamic faith in Mohamed’s constitution.27 While 
scholars such as Bernard Lewis argue that such document is more similar to a unilateral 
agreement than to a constitution, it is undeniable that the official establishment of an 
Islamic state had great repercussions for the Muslim psyche and for the notion of 
Islamic governance.28  
 
Another reason for Islam’s political nature lies in the schism between Sunni and Shi’a 
Muslims that followed the Prophet’s death, and that led to the separation of these 
two strands along political lines. This is still relevant today not only because it stressed 
the dual nature of the Islamic faith, but also because it led to considerably different 
interpretations of the Islamic State and of Political Islam. The first tensions between 
Sunnis and Shi’ites emerged from disagreements over the notion of leadership and 
succession to the Prophet that followed his death in 632 AD.29  The source of the 
debate was the lack of consensus on who should be the ruler of the Caliphate after 
Mohamed’s passing, as he left no guidance in this sense, and while Shi’ites believed 
that the leadership should follow the prophet bloodline and divine ordainment, Sunnis 
argued that any competent Muslim chosen by the community was suitable for the 
role.30 Following the belief that only Imams who were both directly related to 
Mohamed and divinely designated were suitable to rule, the Shi’a community 
recognised the Mahdi in Ali, Mohamed’s cousin and son in law, whose son Hussein 
would be protagonist of the Karbala tragedy examined later on.31  
 
At the same time Sunnis held that Abu Bakr, one of the Prophet’s companions, was 
suitable to the role of the Caliph as he was a pious and competent believer, and 
therefore elected him as the new ruler of the Caliphate.32 The disagreements between 
the two groups over his legitimacy and that of those who followed him characterised 
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the first decades of the Caliphate, and escalated when Ali’s son Hussein was 
assassinated by the hand of Sunni caliph Yazid in Karbala in 680 AD.33 That tragic event 
still affects Shi’a psyche today and marked the final schism between these two strands 
of Islam, which grew increasingly different in both religious and political practices 
throughout the centuries. In particular, the fact that this schism is originally based on 
the question of governance stresses once again the fact that Islam is an inherently 
political religion in its nature, and that its manifestations are as heterogeneous as its 
origins. As the ways in which Shi’a and Sunni Muslims live and practice the Islamic faith 
are inherently different, it can be argued that the manifestations of Islamic political 
thought stemming from these two branches are also very diverse, making it 
appropriate to talk about Political Islams. Contemporary implications of this historical 
schism can be clearly seen today, as they are reflected in the turbulent geopolitics of 
the the region. Therefore, applying Historical Sociology to the study of how different 
interpretations of Islam have shaped nations and states in the Middle East is necessary 
to the analysis of its current politics. 
 
1.2 Core tenets of Political Islam: the Sunni-Shi’a schism 
From what has been said so far, it follows that the core tenets of Political Islam vary 
depending on which strand they originate from and on the context they are employed 
within. There are, of course, shared values and beliefs that are common to both Sunni 
and Shi’a Muslims, which impact on both their religious and political life. These are, 
for example, the adherence to the five pillars of the Islamic faith, and the shared 
credence that the sources of Islamic jurisprudence are the Quran, the sunna, and 
shari’a law.34 Similarly, it follows that both interpretations of Islam hold that to be 
considered as such, the Islamic state should be based on these principles and be free 
from foreign influences and corruption. The notion of the umma codified by Mohamed 
in the Medina Charter is key to both understandings of the Islamic State, as while it is 
a source of identity and spiritual belonging it is also inseparable from the idea of a 
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sovereign territory, which needs a government to be considered as such.35 In modern 
times the Islamic State has grown to be characterised by the rule of shari’a law and by 
the separation between ruling and legislative powers, which have to be exercised 
respectively by the Caliph and the ulema, Islamic jurists and “guardians of the law”. It 
is on the role and duties of the ulema that major differences in terms of Islamic political 
thought emerge between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, as their different conception of 
jurists’ authority leads to diverse modes of governance.  
 
Apart from different opinions regarding the leadership of the Muslim community, 
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims also have a very different understanding of the role that 
clerics and jurists should play within the context of an Islamic State. In the Sunni 
understanding of Political Islam, the role of the jurists is that of legitimizing the acts of 
the ruler and maintaining the integrity of the community, making sure that shari’a law 
is respected and rightly implemented.36 The Sunni religious hierarchy is considerably 
less structured than the Shi’a one, as it is believed by most that no human being could 
be attributed the same superior status of the Quranic Imams.37  On the contrary, as 
demonstrated by the unique case of Iran, Twelver Shi’a Muslims practice a sort of 
veneration of Imams, who they believe descend directly from the Prophet.38 Because 
of this, those belonging to the ulema enjoy an almost privileged status in the 
community and are considered to be the only ones fit to rule in the absence of the 
Twelfth Imam, who is still in occultation.39  
 
Moreover, Shi’a clerics often engage in the practice of ijtihad, independent reasoning, 
which is the interpretation of shari’a for legal purposes.40 This is perhaps one of the 
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most dividing differences between these two Islamic strands, as in Sunnism such 
practice is strongly restricted and often absent.  
 
It is now clear that Sunni and Shi’a Islamic thought and practices come from very 
different backgrounds, even if they are both clearly political in nature. In terms of the 
evidence of these differences within their respective application of Political Islam, the 
works of prominent Sunni thinkers such as Ala abu Mawdudi and Hassan al Banna will 
be examined along those of Shi’a Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, with the aim of providing 
a comprehensive review of the main manifestations of this ideology. Once again, the 
existence of different practices, conflicting identities, interpretations, and even 
diverse origins underlines the problematic presence of various tensions within the 
doctrine of Political Islam. 
 
1.3 Political Islam: Initial Definitions and Misconceptions 
Following the schism between two distinct “sects”, part of the confusion and 
controversy surrounding both the theory and practice of Political Islam is due to its 
extremely heterogeneous nature, which varies depending on the country and socio-
political conditions it develops within, and to the lack of a common narrative and 
strategy. In times that are shaped by the Global War on Terror, which is often 
misconstrued as a “War against Islam”, it is therefore easy to generalise the 
understanding of the term and of its implications, and to assume that the 
characteristics of political Islamic thought in a particular country or context would also 
apply everywhere else. This heterogeneous nature is what causes the presence of so 
many competing tensions within the wider doctrine, which are often incompatible and 
highly specific to a particular context. This makes its understanding even more 
challenging, and leads to the creation of damaging assumptions and stereotypes.  
 
While a definition of what the term “Political Islam” suggests is indeed useful when 
beginning to approach the subject, this chapter aims to strongly challenge practices of 
generalisation and oversimplification of such a complex and influential ideology. 
Through the lens of Historical Sociology, this chapter identifies a working definition of 
the term, but does so while also acknowledging its particularity and diversity 
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depending on regional and national circumstances. It follows that the scope of the first 
part of this Chapter is to provide a basic understanding and background knowledge of 
the origins and core constituents of Political Islam, with the aims of starting to identify 
the inner tensions that makes its application and understanding as challenging as they 
are.  
 
Political Islam, often referred to as Islamism, can be understood as a collection of views 
and practices sharing the belief that the Islamic faith should guide political, personal, 
and social life.41 Being a religious ideology that supposedly provides both practical and 
spiritual guidance, it follows that while its core components are universal, its 
interpretation and implications vary depending on the geographical location and 
political context, therefore generating tensions.42 This is why Historical Sociology 
provides an effective analytical framework for the purpose of this study, as it moves 
away from the traditional understanding of “Islam” or the “Arab mind” as explanatory 
elements of the region’s geopolitics, and instead focuses on how religious and social 
institutions are established and maintained in a variety of different national contexts. 
The belief that politics should be an extension of faith causes a fascinating overlap 
between the secular and the religious spheres, hence the adoption of the term 
“Political” is extremely useful in demonstrating how social activities linked to Islam still 
have to act within the political domain and are often restricted by state-based 
“secular” institutions.43 Once again, it follows that practices of da’wa’, “preaching” or 
“invitation to Islam”, the application of the Islamic law shari’a, and similar activities 
are widely influenced by the socio-political context in which they find themselves.  
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Overall, Islamism holds that Islam is a complete and unique system providing a 
synthetizing ideology, the aim of which is to gradually transform society into an Islamic 
one.44 As Oliver Roy notes: “the Islamist movement thus conceives itself explicitly as a 
socio-political movement, founded on Islam defined as much in terms of a political 
ideology as in terms of a religion.”45 Despite its diversity, Islamism is still largely held 
to be a homogeneous ideology, a view that consequently shapes the foreign policies 
and approaches to the region of many Western states, including the UK. Beverly 
Milton-Edwards notes that this is not a contemporary phenomenon, rather, such 
trends are a contemporary manifestation of the deep “historical antipathy” 
established between Islam and the West at the time of the crusades.46 This has led to 
Islamic fundamentalism being the primary analytical tool for the study of 
contemporary Islam, a conceptualisation that not only fails to understand Islamism as 
a modern phenomenon, but also comes with serious repercussion for domestic and 
international policy-making. 
 
Most importantly, even if various forms of political guidance within Islam date back to 
the times of Prophet Mohammed, Political Islam has to be understood as a modern 
phenomenon the roots of which originated in the 19th and early 20th century as a 
response to Western colonization, values, and socio-political influence.47 John 
Esposito argues that modern Political Islam has emerged as an alternative to failing 
secular ideologies such as capitalism, nationalism, and socialism, as demonstrated by 
the slogan “Islam is the solution”.48 Modernization and Westernization are therefore 
perceived as evil forces that erode Muslim cultural and religious identities, leading 
Islamist groups to challenge governments, neo-colonialism and foreign powers.49 In 
such a framework, different Islamist organizations act as “agents of change”, and while 
most of them do so within the structures of governments and civil society, a minority 
is known for the use of violent means and therefore attach negative stereotypes to 
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the doctrine as a whole. This is why failing to see the difference between the various 
manifestations of Political Islam can be misleading, and often leads to the perception 
of an Islamic threat that generates international security concerns. In the words of 
Mohammed Ayoob “No two Islamisms are alike because they are determined by the 
context in which they operate”.50 
 
While organizations such as the Egyptian MB historically act within a system of 
electoral politics, other groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are more commonly known 
for being split between a political party and a militia group, which carry out their 
religiously legitimised agendas through violent tactics.51 However, Ayoob argues that 
a clear line should be drawn between such groups and transnational Islamist 
organizations like Al Qaeda. This is the case as, historically, violent acts perpetrated by 
militias linked to Hamas and Hezbollah have been territorially restricted and aimed 
exclusively at targets that were arguably obstructing their desire to free an occupied 
territory, or achieve national independence.52 On the contrary, the kind of violence 
carried out by Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda is transnational and indiscriminate in 
nature, and does not necessarily serve a specific purpose. While this claim does not 
justify Hezbollah’s actions in any way, it does still underline the nature of Political Islam 
as a catalyst for change and as a force against oppression. In particular, it also 
emphasizes the notion of Islamist groups across the region embodying resistance 
against colonial powers and autocratic regimes, which in the case of the MB was the 
main drive behind the organization’s creation. 
 
Moreover, the idea that the core components of Political Islam are directly related to 
the socio-political conditions of Muslim countries at the beginning of the 20th century 
also puts forward the argument that Islamism has been a key factor in the formation 
of the (anachronistic) national identities of these states.53 As most Islamic 
organizations developed as opposition cells and agents of change, this doctrine is said 
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to have acted as a source of both identity and political force within Sunni and Shi’a 
contexts alike. As such this argument further strengthens the links between the 
secular and religious spheres that Political Islam brings together, and underlines the 
major influence that this ideology had in the Arab World since its inception. This is also 
why Political Islam can be understood as a means through which its followers sought 
to achieve Arab dignity lost to Colonization, an unprecedented form of resistance and 
“identity politics”, which also explains the nationalistic language to which its founding 
fathers are associated, sometimes openly challenging the notion of Pan-Arabism.54 
 
1.4 Hassan al Banna and Abu ala Mawdudi: the origins of (Sunni) 
Political Islam and emerging tensions 
These elements of resistance and identity politics are central to the origins of modern 
Islamist thought, which are usually dated back to the beginning of the 20th century. It 
was then that Hassan al Banna founded the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt and 
Abu ala Mawdudi started developing his Muslim revivalist discourse before creating 
the Jamat-i-Islami. At the same time, Shi’a clerics in Iran were growing increasingly 
politicized in opposition to foreign forces and corrupted leaders’ influence on the 
country. Both these scholars are regarded as the founding fathers of modern (Sunni) 
Political Islam, and the two organisations they created are held as examples of what a 
religious political movement that promotes Islamic values and practices should be like. 
Despite the fact that there are many tensions within Political Islam, it is interesting to 
note that the two scholars were initially similar in their thought and that their religious 
and political messages originated from their shared experiences and beliefs.55 
 
While the MB and the Jamat-i-Islami appealed to very different publics, respectively 
Arab and South Asian Muslims, both organisations called for the establishment of 
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Islamic governance and were therefore based on an Islamist political ideology.56 The 
brotherly relations that their members entertained over the years, the similarity in 
objectives, and the fact that the Pakistani Jamaat-I-Islami “borrowed” its ideological 
basis from the Egyptian MB reinforces the conviction that the message perpetrated by 
their founders represents the original bulk of modern Political Islam.57 Moreover, 
authoritarian governance characterised the experience of both Egyptian and Pakistani 
Islamists and their historical and ideological bond is still strong today, to the point that 
when Mohamed Morsi won the Egyptian presidential elections in 2012 his victory was 
also celebrated in Pakistan with a special ceremony and prayers of gratitude.58 
However, tensions and competing strategies are evident when looking at these two 
organizations: while the MB soon became politicized and historically struggled against 
the dictatorship and corruption of the Egyptian Army, the Jamaat-i-Islam remains 
somewhat reactionary in its means, while also entertaining friendly relationships with 
the Pakistani Army.59 Therefore, it is important to note how inner conflicts and 
tensions can originate even from the two groups created by the founding fathers of 
this politico-religious ideology. 
 
Given that Mawdudi was directly inspired by al Banna’s thought, the core tenets of 
modern (Sunni) Political Islam are to be found in the Egyptian schoolteacher’s works, 
which influenced Islamist groups across the globe and are still widely analysed today. 
The origins of al Banna’s political and religious thought come from both his personal 
background and education, which made him acutely aware of the socio-political 
conditions characteristic of Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century. Being the son 
of a local Imam and Islamic author, from a very young age al Banna was devoted to 
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Quranic studies and deeply involved in religious societies, which he always actively 
contributed to develop and promote throughout his life.60 By the time he became a 
teacher, not only he was extremely familiar with the Quran and hadits, but also 
increasingly worried by the challenges that the Egyptian society was facing at the time, 
namely British colonial rule, increasing Westernization, and growing corruption.61 It 
was in such a state of mind that Political Islam originated from al Banna’s works, as he 
grew increasingly committed to the aim of returning the Egyptian society to original 
Islamic norms and values, rejecting the corruption and promiscuity brought about by 
Western colonialism.62  
 
In order to fully articulate and strive towards its aims, al Banna started advocating the 
“defence” of the homeland and Islam and in 1928 he founded the MB with two clear 
objectives: the removal of colonial power and influence from Egypt and the gradual 
establishment of an Islamic state that was to set an example for the other countries in 
the region. 63 It can be seen how the message of Political Islam had an inherent 
nationalist component, somewhat linked to the idea of a transnational umma being 
firstly linked to a politicized territory, leading it to be more than an ideology but also 
an identity-building force. Moreover, many of these sources of discontent can also be 
found in the Shi’a interpretation of Islamic political thought. 
 
One of the main misconceptions surrounding the doctrine of Political Islam today is 
the assumption of its inherently authoritarian nature, a prejudice that completely 
disregards the notion that one of the major opponents of Islamists are dictators and 
tyrants, while fitting Western foreign policy’s aims. From the beginning al Banna 
strongly emphasized the necessity for an Islamisation from below, arguing for a 
gradual and bottom-up approach that started from the individual and ended with the 
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achievement of Allah’s sovereignty over every aspect of society.64 This inclination 
strongly rejects the prejudice outline above and is clearly identifiable in al Banna’s own 
words: 
Muslims, this is a period of rebuilding: re-build yourselves, and your Umma will as a 
consequence be rebuilt!65 
 
This also explains the original charitable nature of the MB, which was created as a 
grassroots organisation focused on providing essential social services such as 
education and healthcare, while also delivering moral guidance and discussions of the 
Quran and its teaching.66 Down the line, the MB would come to be perceived as a 
“state within a state”, embodying many of the tensions between the concept of 
sovereignty and the state in Egypt. At the same time, some of the stated objectives of 
the organization were “To establish Allah’s sovereignty over the world. To guide all of 
humanity to the precepts of Islam and its teachings (without which mankind cannot 
attain happiness)”, once again emphasising the individuals’ role within the wider 
Islamist project.67 
  
So far, an Historical Sociological analysis of the genealogy of the doctrine has shown 
that Political Islam in its original form argues for a peaceful and moderate transition 
to an Islamic state, aimed at transforming society as a whole rather than imposing 
shari’a Law and Islamic Jurisprudence on it straight away. However, its understanding 
of such is still largely missing from the foreign policies of many Western government, 
a trend that particularly intensified after the rise of Da’esh in June 2014. 
Islamism is therefore “political” as it often acts within the boundaries imposed by the 
state, an element of which al Banna was extremely conscious and that he embraced 
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fully after some initial doubts. While holding that God’s sovereignty (al ha ̄kimiyya li-l-
la h̄) is indisputable and has to be reflected in every aspect of society, Political Islam 
also recognises the importance of state institutions and their necessary role in 
governance. Contrary to Militant Islam (often mistaken for Political Islam because of 
the presence of political goals), al Banna argued that rather than being eliminated and 
targeted by jihad, state institutions had to be gradually reshaped in an Islamic form, 
and drew from Islamic traditions and jurisprudence to sustain his argument. 68 These 
precepts are also what make the MB an evolutionary rather then revolutionary 
organization, a characteristic whose importance will become increasingly clear when 
looking at their foray into electoral politics. In al Banna’s view, shari’a Law is 
understood as a legitimate source of jurisprudence that also embodies Allah’s 
sovereignty, therefore fitting the notion of both an Islamic and a modern state, as 
reflected in al Banna’s own words:  
Every nation has a set of laws in which the people partake their ruling. These sets of 
laws must be derived from the proscriptions of the Islamic Sharee’ah (drawn from the 
Noble Qur’an, and in accordance with the basic sources of Islamic jurisprudence). The 
Islamic Sharee’ah and the decisions of the Islamic jurists are completely sufficient, 
supply every need, and cover every contingency, and they produce the most excellent 
results and the most blessed fruits.69 
 
Hassan al Banna successfully developed and spread a message of gradual Islamisation 
through peaceful activities and moderation, rejecting violence and recognizing the 
importance of state structures and institutions, operating under the overarching 
notion of God’s Sovereignty.70 
 
Despite being regarded as one of the founding fathers of (Sunni) Political Islam, 
something that is often overlooked is the progressive radicalization of Mawdudi’s 
thought, which is reflected in the reactionary nature of the Jamaat-i-Islami and in his 
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controversial influence on both Sayyid Qutb and the Salafist doctrine71. The origins of 
tensions and competing narratives that complicate the theory and practice of Political 
Islam can be traced back to the gradual radicalization of his own thought. While 
Mawdudi was one of the first Islamist thinkers to produce a political interpretation of 
the Islamic teachings and to develop a set of social actions aiming towards the 
Islamisation of the state, his views considerably shifted as he aged, moving from 
Political Islam towards Islamic Radicalism.72 
 
Interestingly enough the origins of his thought are directly drawn from al Banna’s 
example, as it developed in an Indo-Pakistani context where the subcontinent 
experienced centuries-long foreign domination, which caused a sharp decline in 
Islamic culture and societal practices just as in the Egyptian case. As a response to it – 
and inspired by the MB’s example –  Mawdudi founded the Jamaat-i-Islami in 1948 
and set it up to be a religious political movement aimed at the promotion of Islamic 
practices and values.73 At this initial stage, Mawdudi already perceived Islam as more 
than a religion, understanding it as a unifying system that encompassed everything 
from politics, economy, to sociology and legislation, and as al Banna he longed for a 
society based on its core tenets.74 
 
It is clear that at the start of his career, Mawdudi was arguing for an understanding of 
Political Islam that was inspired by and therefore very similar to the one put forward 
by al Banna. However, as Indian and Pakistani politics deteriorated and the 
subcontinent was eventually partitioned, his argument significantly shifted and this 
digression from the original form of Islamism is arguably what initiated the tensions 
within the doctrine. It was at this stage that Mawdudi started drafting what is 
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considered the most precise conceptualisation of an Islamic state and its structures, 
while also drawing a clear line between Muslim and Islamic governance. That is to say, 
an Islamic state can be considered as such only when it is based on the Quranic 
teachings and ruled by shari’a Law, and its status does not depend on how many of its 
citizens practice Islam as that would merely make it a Muslim state.75 Mawdudi goes 
even further in designing what can be considered a (Theo) Islamic democracy, which 
is to be founded on the three precepts of “oneness of God (tawhid), prophet hood 
(risala) and caliphate (khilafa)”.76  
 
However unprecedented and precise, this particular conceptualisation of the state 
causes yet another series of tensions within the original formulation of Political Islam, 
as many regard it as being more a dictatorship in the making than a Theo-democracy. 
This is the case because in Mawdudi’s view non-Muslims, or takfiris, would have 
limited rights when living under the Islamic state and would also have to pay a special 
tax, jizya, and both these arguments counter the conception of Islam as an inclusive 
and tolerant religion.77 The developments of these aspects are one of the reasons why 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s thought can be understood as being rather close to the 
Sunni conception of Caliphate, which will be discussed later on in the chapter. 
 
There are even more controversies originating from Mawdudi’s later conception of 
Political Islam, such as the fact that although he did not go as far as directly justifying 
the use of violent jihad, he did not stop or condemn the Jamaat-i-Islami from engaging 
in it.78 Moreover, he also rediscovered the reshaped the concept of jahiliyya, or pre-
Islamic ignorance, which was then picked up by Sayyid Qutb, and put forward a rather 
controversial response to it. Mawdudi argued that jahiliyya had not been eliminated 
by the advent of Islam and that his contemporary Muslim fellows were as guilty of it 
as non-believers, and went as far as calling for jihad against those Muslim countries 
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that in his opinion had lost their ways.79 Such a controversial perspective leads to yet 
another contradiction, as while al Banna’s understanding of jihad referred to it as the 
personal struggle to better oneself, Mawdudi goes as far as suggesting that it should 
be waged against non-believers and even against fellow Muslims.  
 
From what has been said, it is clear that Political Islam in its original form has been 
theorised as a religious political ideology, combining faith and the application of 
Islamic precepts to everyday life. The difficult socio-political conditions such an 
ideology originated from have been extensively reviewed, with the aim to explain how 
this doctrine can also be understood as an identity building and dignity seeking 
process, rather that only as a set of prescriptions. The thought of Hassan al Banna and 
Abu ala Mawdudi has been examined to provide a background knowledge of what 
Political Islam in its Sunni form looks like in different contexts. However, in doing so 
some inner tensions started arising, as Mawdudi’s thought strongly radicalised with 
the passing of the time and arguably diverted from Islamism in its “pure” formulation. 
Such contradictions at this initial stage are indicative of what would would happen 
across the 20th century, as Political Islam has been interpreted and reshaped many 
times during the years, therefore leading to confusion surrounding both its theory and 
practice and to the construction of unending prejudices. 
 
1.5 Sayyid Qutb: the ‘radical’ turn80 
Much of these prejudices are shaped by the narrative and justification for the Global 
War on Terror, which have been shaping public opinions and foreign policies alike 
since its declaration in 2001. Ayoob argues that the Western perception of Political 
Islam is negatively influenced by three main prejudices, which have strengthened since 
the terrorist attack on 9/11.81 These misconceptions are that Political Islam, like the 
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faith itself, is monolithic, that the interconnection of religion and politics is unique to 
the Islamic faith, and that Political Islam is inherently violent.82 While these prejudices 
can be easily deconstructed by the informed reader, they are undoubtedly affecting 
the way in which Political Islam is perceived internationally, therefore negatively 
impacting on the reputation of those countries in the Arab World that are 
incorporating aspects of Islamism into their governance. 
 
To start with, it should be clear that Political Islam is far from being monolithic, but 
rather both its theory and practice are heavily influenced by context, political 
discourses, and inclination of the various Islamist groups that follow this ideology. This 
aspect should be even clearer now that the political thought of al Banna and Mawdudi 
has been highlighted, as it shows how contradictions and tensions could originate even 
from the works of the two founding fathers of this doctrine. Consequently, there is not 
such a thing as a universal practice of Islamism, but rather there is a collection of ideas 
that hold the Islamisation of society and institution of Islamic governance as a final, 
shared aim, while the paths to it are blurred and vary heavily. In turn, this causes a 
great deal of confusion and equally damaging prejudices, which this research engages 
with. 
 
Secondly, the assumption that the interconnectedness of religion and politics is unique 
to the Islamic faith is equally incorrect and anchored to outdated Orientalist 
approaches83. Those who hold such belief against Islamism fail to remember that 
secular and religious powers held a deeply intertwined role in government throughout 
European history, and that Christianity prescribes various forms of interaction 
between church and state.84 Moreover, not only is this mutual influence undeniable 
when analysing history, but a growing focus on religious issues is increasingly 
influencing Western politics nowadays, challenging the secularist trend characteristic 
of the 20th century.85 Finally, when it comes to the supposition that Political Islam is 
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inherently violent, there is much to be said about those tensions in both theory and 
practice. Political Islam is not a monolithic force and therefore lacks a clear set of 
practices that are to be universally followed, as its applications and understanding vary 
depending on its geographical locations and socio-political circumstances. It follows 
that this led to many different interpretations of Islamism throughout the years, 
causing the core tenets of this ideology to be repeatedly re-interpreted and reshaped 
to fit particular historical circumstances. On several occasions the peaceful precepts 
argued by al Banna have been undeniably disregarded, even by the MB itself, but while 
a radical turn in the practice of Political Islam is indeed detectable it still does not make 
the whole ideology a violent doctrine. 
 
There is a considerable debate within the literature regarding the place that political 
violence, more specifically “lesser jihad”, holds inside the wider doctrine of Political 
Islam. This debate intensifies when it comes to the role of the MB, as while many see 
the group as a laboratory for democratic development others, such as Roy, identify it 
as one of the main cradles for Islamic terrorism. Those who argue for the terrorist 
trend generally base their rhetoric on the study of the influence that the Egyptian 
scholar Sayyid Qutb had on both the theory and practice of Political Islam. Originally 
part of the MB, through its written works Qutb developed a radicalised understanding 
of Political Islam and argued for the re-interpretation of some its core tenets, making 
them fit both his contemporary context and personal political aims, therefore 
generating much of the chaos and controversy generally associated to Political Islam. 
Considered to be one of the most influential Islamist ideologues, at the start of his 
career Qutb shared al Banna’s concerns regarding the corruption of Egyptian society 
brought about by Western values, and sought to return to the original practice of the 
Islamic faith.86 However, Qutb’s major and most controversial contribution to Islamism 
is his development of the concept of jahiliyya, which he borrowed from Mawdudi’s 
thought and proceeded to make his own.  
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In Milestones, his most famous work, Qutb identifies the notion of jahiliyya (ignorance 
of divine guidance) as the predominant characteristic of secular regimes, Western 
values, and Arab contemporary governments, and regards it as the major obstacle to 
the achievement of an Islamic society. 87  He formed the argument that such obstacles 
had to be removed through the practice of jihad, intended in both his greater 
understanding as “personal/internal battle” and in lesser sense as “armed Struggle”.88 
As a consequence, throughout the course of his life, Qutb developed a precise set of 
notions that justified the use of violent jihad as opposed to peaceful means to express 
opposition against the regime, which appealed to many Egyptian Islamists especially 
during Nasser’s oppressive rule. Equally, the application of this understanding of jihad 
can be somewhat recognized in the means adopted by both Hezbollah and Hamas for 
the achievement of their aims. 
 
 Qutb was hanged in 1966 under the accusation of having participated in the plot to 
assassinate Nasser, but the relevance of his legacy was already set and it is said to have 
directly influenced Al Qaeda, as Bin Laden was a student of Qutb’s brother in his 
youth.89 However, because of his “extreme” ideals and direct involvement in violent 
jihad Qutb clearly distanced himself from what was the Brotherhood’s core ideology, 
and therefore it is incorrect to associate his influence to that of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s as a whole. 
 
It is clear how Qutb’s notions of jahiliyya and justifications of violent jihad as a 
legitimate means to achieve political aims are directly opposite to the understanding 
of Political Islam put forward by al Banna, consequently generating tensions within the 
practice of Islamism. Given the challenging times in which such notions were 
developed, it is not surprising that they appealed to a wide number of Islamists 
globally. As a consequence, however, these notions led to a heavy radicalisation of the 
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Islamist thought that, in turn, contributed to the generation of prejudices towards the 
whole doctrine. Qutb’s radical view is not inherent to Political Islam in itself, but rather 
is a misreading and biased reinterpretation of the ideology, which would create 
endless issues for both Islamists and external observers. Islamist movements around 
the world are strongly divided in their practices over the concept of jahiliyya, and that 
proceeds to generate even more clashes in the understanding of this doctrine. As 
Khatab points out, “Islam and jahiliyya are two binary opposites and the real struggle 
in the future will be between them, and not between East and West.”.90 This shows 
once again just how diverse Islamist movements and their practices can be, meaning 
that Islamism is far from being monolithic, but is rather characterised by internal 
tensions and schisms. 
 
1.6 Shi’a Islamism: The case of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
One of the main and most damaging misconceptions surrounding the doctrine of 
Political Islam is not only the assumption of its monolithic nature, but the global 
tendency to equate such ideology uniquely with the Sunni branch of the Islamic faith. 
There are many reasons behind this malpractice, first of all the staggering prominence 
of Sunni Islam in comparison to Shi’a Islam worldwide, which is estimated as Sunni 
Muslims accounting for 87-90% of the total Muslim population.91 Moreover, the global 
resonance of Islamist groups such the Egyptian MB or the Pakistani Jamaat-I-Islami, 
together with al Qaeda and more recently Da’esh, has reinforced the immediate 
connection of Political Islam to the Sunni doctrine.  
 
However, it needs to be noted that Political Islam is not only heterogeneous in its 
manifestations, but that this diversity can be traced back to its very origins and to the 
schism between Sunni and Shi’a Islams. In fact, just as these two branches differ in 
religious practices and beliefs, they also embody two very diverse interpretations and 
practices of this particular ideology. Therefore, in order to gain the comprehensive and 
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insightful understanding of Islamism that this Chapter aims to provide, it is necessary 
to take into account the Shi’ite interpretation of Political Islam as well. Doing so also 
emphasises the numerous tensions inherent in this doctrine, as they do not stem 
solely from different interpretations of the same ideology, but arguably from two very 
diverse origins of the notion of Political Islam. 
 
The schism between Sunni and Shi’a Islam is itself political in its nature, as it was 
provoked by disagreements over matters of succession to the caliphate after the death 
of the Prophet Mohamed.  It follows that different positions regarding the nature of 
the leader of an Islamic state result in as many diverse versions of the Islamist doctrine, 
going back to the idea of Political Islams. Therefore, it is necessary to go against the 
misconceptions surrounding the term and analyse the Shi’ite version of Political Islam 
as an equally interesting and meaningful manifestation of this doctrine. In order to do 
this, the Chapter will focus particularly on the case of post-revolutionary Iran, as being 
the only “functioning” theocracy in the Middle East it provides a strong example of 
what Shi’ite Islamism entails.  
 
There are several other reasons that make Iran’s case unique and appropriate to this 
study, particularly the fact that Iran’s state religion is “Twelver Islam”, a unique 
manifestation of Shi’ism that therefore makes the country a source of diversity and 
authority in the region. Moreover, Oliver Roy notes that not only Iran is the only 
country in which Twelver Shi’ism is the official state religion, but more importantly it 
is the only one in which a successful Islamic revolution took place and maintained 
power after 1979.92 It follows that many of the elements that foster Political Islam 
across the Muslim World are also easily found in Iran, namely Islamist 
clerics/intellectual and discontent urban population, underlining once again its 
importance in the study of the manifestations of this ideology.93 
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Following from this, John Esposito notes that contrary to contemporary perceptions 
“containing Islamism” for a long time meant countering the spread of Shi’ism and the 
success of the 1979 Iranian revolution, which was viewed by many as the most militant 
and revolutionary force in the Islamic world.94 It is understandable that the aftermath 
of the 1979 Revolution could have been read as a major source of inspiration by the 
other Islamist organisations in the region, as the strive for change and challenge to 
authoritarianism are characteristics of both Sunni and Shi’a manifestations of Political 
Islam. Moreover, the toppling of the Shah and instalment of a functioning theocracy 
also demonstrated that Islam could be employed as a tool to successfully counter the 
influence of foreign powers in the region and to bring about social and political change, 
a set of powerful messages that made Iran the target for concerned Western an Arab 
analysts alike.95 It follows that at the time Sunni Islamism was very much considered 
as a “lesser evil”, reflecting how a particular set of events can change perceptions in a 
relatively short period of time. Furthermore, another justification for the choice of Iran 
as a case study for Shi’ite Political Islam is the considerable influence and support that 
the country has over Islamist groups such as Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in 
occupied Palestine, which are similar in practices and aims to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and not inferior in terms of regional importance.  
 
Before embarking on an explanation of Islamism in Iran, it is important to stress that 
the country is unique in its case and devoted to a politicized version of Twelver Shi’ism, 
which shapes its political precepts and beliefs. This particular branch of Islam is 
characterised by a messianic narrative in the sense that, originating from the belief 
that only God has the authority to appoint the successor to the prophet, there are 
twelve chosen Imams who have been divinely indicated and of whom Ali was the 
first.96 Twelvers consequently believe that the twelfth Imam in still in occultation, and 
that someone has to rule in his place until its return. In the original Shi’a tradition it is 
believed that a “guardian” Council, composed by clerics educated in the knowledge of 
                                                 
94 Esposito, J., “Political Islam and the West”, in JFQ Forum, (Spring 2000), p. 54 
95 Hunter, S., “Iran and the spread of Revolutionary Islam”, in Third World Quarterly: Islam and 
Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2, (April 1988), p. 731 
96 Blanchard, C., “Islam: Sunnis and Shi’ites”, p. 5 
 54 
the Quran and sha’ria Law, should rule in the place of the hidden Imam until his return, 
in order to preserve the true essence of the Islamic state and to avoid the corruption 
of Shi’ite values and traditions.97 
 
It is from this particular narrative that in the later part of his life Grand Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini developed the concept of velayat-e faqih, literally “governance of 
the jurists”. At the base of this ideology there is Khomeini’s interpretation of Twelver 
Shi’ism, and the claim that in the absence of the Hidden Imam a faqih, a leading Islamic 
jurist, must rule in order to protect the Islamic faith and the people.98 This 
interpretation prescribes a political guardianship over a country during the time of 
occultation, and argues that Islamic jurists should not be limited to the application of 
shari’a law, but that they are indeed the successors of the Prophet and Imams, and 
are therefore the only authorities fit to rule.99 It is necessary to point out that the 
ulema, or clergy, always had a prominent role within Shi’a Islam and that this 
institutionalization of religious figures is one of the main differences when compared 
to Sunni Islam, but the notion of velayat-e faqih represents the culmination of its 
politicization and one of the most striking characteristics of Iranian Shi’a Islamism.100 
With the intention of further justifying this process, Khomeini argued in his book that 
the figure of the faqih is indeed divinely appointed and that he should be the highest 
authority in both political and religious matters. He does so by reinterpreting the 
traditional Shi’ite understanding of the Imam’s role and states that: 
 
Today the Jurists of Islam are proofs (of God) to the people, proofs of the Imam. Total 
obedience is owed to them, since they are specially appointed by the Prophet to be his 
successors and to rule. The Jurists’ authority in government affairs is equal to that of 
the Prophet and of the Imams, since they all share in common the burden of executive 
power to apply the divine law.101 
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By doing so Khomeini concedes supreme authority to the ulema, in accordance of the 
belief that such a figure is necessary to maintain the Islamic government as unspoiled, 
superior, and a source of inspiration for other countries. However, even if the notion 
of velayat-e faqih has proven to be successful in maintaining stability in Iran since 
1979, despite contemporary socio-economic challenges, it needs to be noted that it is 
Khomeini’s account of what Islamism within Shi’a thought is like and not necessarily 
“original” in its nature, leading to another source of tensions within Islamic political 
thought. Ayubi highlights the perception that Khomeini’s thirst for power led him to 
heavily manipulate some of the core tenets of Twelver Shi’ism, regulating the notion 
of “guardianship” of the faith, and consequently shifting it heavily in favour of the 
ulema.102 For these reasons, there are claims that Khomeini’s political thought is to be 
placed close to the beliefs of Sunni Islamic thinkers such as Mawdudi and Qutb, and to 
the Sunni notion of Caliphate.103 Regardless, Iran remains the only available example 
of a functioning manifestation of Shi’a political thought and it projects a powerful 
influence on the region’s stability, which is why it remains an appropriate point of 
reference. Nonetheless, when approaching it there is the need to keep in mind that 
Iran’s worldview is very much Khomeini’s own, and as always be aware of the 
numerous manifestations of Islamic political thought, which changes over time. 
 
When looking at the Iranian theocracy it is possible to identify a number of recurring 
themes that are heavily present in both religious and political life, and can therefore 
be considered as drivers of the Shi’a version of political Islam. Before examining these 
it needs to be remembered that just like the Sunni branch of Islam, Shi’ism is political 
in its origins and history, as it originated from the schisms over leadership between 
these two different currents. Farid Mirgabari notes that this political connotation was 
further strengthened by Shah Esmail I’s decision to adopt Shi’ism as the state’s official 
religion in 1501, an action that inaugurated the institutional politicization of the faith 
in Iran.104 This also meant that from then onwards Shi’ism was closely linked to the 
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country’s politics, which led to an increasing degree of cooperation between the clergy 
and the state.105  
 
This aspect is particularly important as the institutionalised role of the clergy is one of 
Iranian Shi’ism’s main characteristics, and a fundamental difference when compared 
to Sunni Islam. In particular, the clergy played an unprecedented and fundamental role 
in the development of the events leading up to the 1979 Revolution, and their high 
level of involvement arguably facilitated the instalment of a Theocracy in its aftermath. 
The Shi’a clergy acted as a catalyst for political change in 1979, and as representatives 
of the widespread political dissent enveloping the country at the time.106 Their 
opposition to the Shah’ tyranny acted as a channel for popular discontent, and 
demonstrated the revolutionary potential of political Islam.107 Roy notes that the 
politicization of Shi’a clergy was not a new phenomenon, but was rooted in its history 
of cooperation/interference with the Iranian government, as a similar episode 
happened at the end of the 19th century when the ulema protested against the 
influence of Russian and British forces on the country.108 Khomeini brought the clergy’s 
politicization to its peak, marking the fundamental difference with Sunni Islam 
according to which the caliphate’s legitimacy lies in the community’s consensus rather 
than in the clergy’s authority.109 
 
Mirghabari also notes that in Shi’ism the only source of legitimate political behaviour 
is God, justifying the role of the clergy as fundamental to governance and explaining 
why it is professed that the Islamic state has to be based upon the application of 
shari’a law.110 However, there are several other notions that encompass Shi’a political 
thought and therefore needs to be considered. The first one of these is the notion of 
Karbala, which undeniably has a strong influence on the way in which Shi’ism is 
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translated into a system of governance. Originating from the notion that only God has 
the authority to appoint the Prophet’s successor, and that his cousin Ali was the first 
Imam, the narrative of Karbala refers back to Ali’s son Hussein’s assassination on the 
hand of the Sunni caliph Yazid while he was on his way to Kufa.111 Hussein’s death not 
only has a strong political connotation but is also is seen as an act of martyrdom in 
Shi’a Islam and as an unforgivable source of guilt, which is yet to be amended today.  
 
Therefore, the Karbala narrative has a strong influence on Shi’a political thought, as it 
is directly linked to the notion of mustakbarin vs. mustazeifin, oppressors vs. 
oppressed. This legacy of guilt in fact translates into a duty to support the oppressed 
Muslim population in the world that is even enshrined in Article 3.16 of the Iranian 
constitution, and that therefore explains Iran’s explicit support for “controversial” 
Islamist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.112 Moreover this narrative also 
divides the world into two distinct categories, where Western superpowers and Israel 
are perceived as the oppressors and most of the “third world”/Muslim countries are 
the oppressed.113 Such a legacy not only manifests itself in the Iranian commitment to 
support oppressed Muslim populations, regardless of the branch of Islam to which 
they adhere, but is also present in the notion of Pan-Islamism and commitment to 
export the revolution that have been characteristic of Shi’a political thought since 
1979. 
 
From what has been said, it is now clear that Shi’a political thought is historically 
influential and needs to be considered when striving to get a complete sense of 
Political Islam. It can be argued that it was the 1979 Revolution and its aftermath that 
really brought its relevance to light, and Shi’ism influence has not decreased since.  
While the instalment of a theocracy run by clerics and Islamic jurists underlines some 
of the major differences between Shi’a and Sunni political thought, there are some 
narratives that are common to both forms of Political Islam. Even if it was not strictly 
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Islamic in its origins, the 1979 Revolution is now read as an Iranian/Shi’a effort to use 
Islam as a political weapon to topple an unjust socio-economic political order, and an 
element of Islamic political thought that can be directly related to its Sunni 
manifestations. Moreover, the anti-monarchical and anti-Western drive of Khomeini’s 
“regency of the jurists” touches on some themes that were core to the Egyptian MB 
when created and recurrent in both Mawdudi and al Banna’s works. In addition, 
Islamist groups belonging to either manifestations of the Islamic faith share a similar, 
inherent relationship with modernity, which in turn shapes their policies and 
behaviour. 
 
Moreover, Iran and its geopolitics have become increasingly fundamental to the study 
of the region. The historical rivalry between the US and the Islamic Republic has been 
further reinforced by Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the Axis of Evil, with the former U.S. 
President stating that “(Iran) aggressively pursues these weapons (of mass 
destruction) and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's 
hope for freedom."114 It follows that, in the aftermath of 9/11, international 
perceptions of Iran’s status in the region increasingly focused on its geopolitical role, 
the  importance of which is further accentuated by the Republic’s historical rivalry with 
both Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This rivalry is of increased international significance today, 
especially when taking into consideration the regional implications of Iran’s support of 
the Assad regime, its relationship with Hizballah, and its ideological and military 
opposition to Daesh. To conclude, the study of Iran’s own practice of Islamism is a 
worthwhile and necessary exercise as the Republic is more involved than ever in the 
geopolitics of the region, meaning that its foreign policies come with both practical 
and ideological consequences. 
 
1.7 The “Islamic Threat” and Western Perceptions  
It is now clear that many of the tensions and conflicting narratives complicating the 
understanding of Political Islam arise within the different origins and manifestations 
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of the doctrine themselves. However, many of the prejudices surrounding this 
particular ideology come from Western misunderstandings of its core principles and 
generalisation of the Muslim identity. Coupled with the view that Islam is an inherently 
violent religion, over the years these have led to the construction of the “Islamic 
Threat” and to the misinterpretation of wider Islamic political thought.  This trend 
intensified in the aftermath of 9/11 and acted as a source of legitimacy for the US-led 
War on Terror, but it lives on today and often constitutes the perspective from which 
many in the Western world look at the Arab Awakenings and their implications. This 
was clearly demonstrated by the international preoccupation originated by Mohamed 
Morsi’s elections, while Al Sisi’s authoritarian ways are being left largely unscrutinised. 
 
Despite its diversity, Islamism is still largely held to be a homogeneous ideology, a view 
that consequently shapes the foreign policies and approaches to the region of many 
Western states, including the UK. As Beverly Milton-Edwards notes in her work “Islam 
and Politics in the Contemporary World”, the Western widespread understanding of 
contemporary Islam is inherently political in the sense that the public is encouraged 
to view the Muslim “other” as “a challenge to what they in the West have and which 
the Muslims want to do away with and replace with their own divinely inspired 
order”.115 It follows that Western perceptions of Islam are often informed by 
prejudice, which create tensions that are exacerbated by the media portrayal of the 
Islamic faith as associated to fanaticism, violence, and terror, fitting a predominant 
political agenda arguing for the increasing securitization of the faith and of its 
followers. Such perceptions are based on the belief that “Islamic politics represents a 
rigid pattern of activity undertaken by a bitter religious group with a major grudge 
against the rest of the world”.116 However, there is the need to move away from the 
monolithic understanding of all politics associated with Islam as similar in its roots and 
manifestations. Rather, as Eickleman and Piscatori state, Islamic manifestations of 
politics are as multifaceted and heterogeneous as any liberal-democratic ones, and 
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therefore highlight the fact that “the need to place Muslim Politics into multiple and 
shifting contexts then becomes apparent”.117 
 
After the rise of Da’esh in 2014, negative assumptions coming from the West continue 
to surround the doctrine of Political Islam. Claims of its incompatibility with democracy 
and liberal institutions, its alleged tendencies towards authoritarianism, terrorism, 
and religious propaganda still characterise the general understanding of this ideology, 
which as said before is extremely diverse and heterogeneous. It should be clear that 
attempting to compare Western institutions to the ones actually in place in many 
Middle Eastern countries is a futile process, as is pushing for the institution of a 
“Western” kind of democracy, as cultural and historical differences make for a diverse 
mode of governance. Regardless, the lack of “purely” democratic institutions is still an 
argument put forward by certain scholars and analysts to lessen the validity of liberal 
Islamic practices, and to assert the superiority of the West. However, there is a less 
radical trend within the Western literature that argues for a more open-minded 
approach towards Political Islam, and that openly challenges discrimination and 
prejudice. The first one of these scholars was Fred Halliday, who during the course of 
his career wrote expansively on the Middle East and on Political Islam in particular.  
 
Applying Historical Sociology to the study of International Relations in the region, 
Halliday draws a fundamental difference between Islam as a religious faith and Islam 
as a social and political force, and also challenges the binary representation of the 
“West vs. Islam”.118 Halliday recognises Islamism as a modern phenomenon, and also 
acknowledges the fact that the call for Political Islam originated as a response to issues 
of a socio-political nature, therefore accounting for diversity in its application and 
practice.119 By doing so he also challenges the portrayal of Islamism as a (dangerous) 
stateless force, as Islamism’s political nature ties it to the nation state, and its forms 
are defined by the issues that society in a particular nation is facing.120 It follows that 
                                                 
117 Eickleman, D., Piscatori, J., Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 20 
118 Halliday, F., Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 2 
119 ibid., pp. 118-119 
120 ibid. 
 61 
rather than being directly addressed against foreign domination and powers, as the 
“Islamic threat” argument tries to argue, contemporary Political Islam is rather 
concerned with the very society and government it finds itself in, something that the 
unravelling of the Arab Awakenings clearly demonstrate. Moreover, in the 
demonization and portrayal of Islamism as a threatening force Halliday recognises the 
Western search for a “necessary enemy”, for a binary opposition system that was 
needed more than ever after the events of 9/11.121 Such arguments delegitimise the 
misunderstanding and generalisation towards Political Islam typical of the Western 
view, which while occasionally based on real events, is a construction more than 
everything else. 
 
John Esposito is another scholar coming from a Western perspective who refutes the 
portrayal of Political Islam as the manifestation of a faith that is inherently linked to 
fanaticism, religious extremism, and violence. He argues that, because of the tendency 
to equate violence and terrorism to Political Islam, the West is also failing to grasp the 
wide variety of practices and the depth of Islamism, which result in crippling 
misinterpretations and excessive fear.122 Esposito understands the origins of modern 
Political Islam as a response against foreign secular narratives, and the development 
of both Islamist groups and Shi’a clerics as agents of opposition and change.123 He also 
underlines the differences in origin, application and manifestations of Political Islams 
depending on the context and on the groups who identify as followers of such 
ideology, and warns against the practice of generalization of this diverse and 
comprehensive doctrine. Political Islam, as the Islamic faith, is extremely 
comprehensive in its scope and message, as proven by the conception of religion being 
fundamental for both society and politics, but the secularised West is holding on to its 
militarised versions and failing to go beyond it.124  
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The case of the Arab Awakenings and of Egypt in particular also shows that Islamism 
is far from being widely accepted and supported by Arab Muslims, but rather 
demonstrates that Political Islam is struggling to rise up to the standards set up by its 
founding fathers. Esposito argues that this is the case because Islamic Politics, just like 
its secular counterpart, is strongly influenced by internal struggles, shifting ideologies, 
and local issues; all elements that reinforce its political legitimacy as opposed to the 
misinterpretations that compare it with radical movements.125 Esposito’s works offers 
an innovative take on Edward’s Said account of Orientalism. This view goes beyond 
the biases of the past and claims that a new, revolutionized form of Orientalism is 
flourishing today: it is found in the practice of associating Islamism with uniquely 
violent and radical activities, and in the failure of recognising that a small radicalised 
minority does not stand for the huge majority of Muslims who are committed to a 
“mainstream” and moderate expression of their faith.126 
 
Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori also belong to this trend within the literature 
covering Political Islam, as they go back to the roots of modern Political Islam rather 
that simply analysing the much feared Islamic Revivalism characteristic of the 1970s. 
They state that “Muslim Politics involves the competition and contest over both the 
interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions, formal and informal, that 
produce and sustain them”.127  By doing so Eickelman and Piscatori underline the 
dynamism and fluidity of Islamic societies, once again confirmed by the events of 2011, 
and the diversity and relevance of Political Islams. They recognize the fundamental 
contribution that Islamism made to the development of national identity in the wider 
Arab World, which makes it a legitimate and cultural-specific political force.128 The 
fluidity and ever-evolving status that they attribute to Islamic Politics directly 
challenges the mainstream assumptions regarding its allegedly authoritarian nature, 
as the way in which the Muslim population thinks about politics is malleable, therefore 
not excluding the possibility of a liberal result. 
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1.8 Oliver Roy and “Failure” 
The French scholar Oliver Roy offers a different perspective on contemporary Political 
Islam, which particularly gained international traction and recognition in the 1990s, 
shaping both foreign policies and public perceptions. This thesis will focus on his 
understanding of Political Islam as having ultimately failed as an ideology, as the MB’s 
deposition was perceived by many as a proof of its demise. While a more in-depth 
assessment of Roy’s argument will be provided in Chapter 5, it is worth initially 
engaging with his approach, and set out exactly what he means by “failure”, to then 
gain a working definition of the term.  
 
First of all, Roy understands Political Islam as a monolithic phenomenon, failing to 
acknowledge the wide diversity of practices and understandings that fall under this 
label. However, he draws a distinction between contemporary Islamism and the 
“traditional” view of the ulamas (clergy), arguing that while Islamists indeed argue for 
a return to traditional forms of Islam, they mean to do that in an almost “secular” 
way.129 He argues that modern Political Islam in its original form was and is guided by 
scholars and intellectuals that identify themselves as “religious thinkers”, rather than 
by exponents of the clergy, therefore drawing a clear difference between moderate 
Political Islam and its radicalised forms, which are usually “driven by self-nominated 
Imams”.130  
 
What Roy means by that is that there is a distinction between “Islamism” as such and 
“neofundamentalism”, with the former referring to the drive for political power, and 
the latter meaning a much narrower focus on the family and the mosque instead.  Roy 
goes  further by arguing that because of misinterpretations of the original thought and 
subsequent radicalization, Islamism has turned into neo-radicalism, the followers of 
which lack any form of political or economic program and are therefore heavily 
authoritarian in their thought.131 It is this degenerated form of Islamism instigated by 
the thought of Sayyid Qutb that gave birth to radical groups such as Al Qaeda that, by 
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claiming to be Islamist, contribute to the stigmas and prejudices surrounding Political 
Islam.  
 
Subsequently, Roy argues that because of this neo-fundamentalist trend Political Islam 
is not revolutionary anymore, and that its ideology has failed since it has proven 
incapable of providing the basis to build a new society or even a viable alternative to 
Western democracy.132 According to his position, “Aside from the Iranian Revolution, 
Islamism has not significantly altered the political landscape of the Middle East. 
Political Islam does not pass the test of power”.133 In essence, at the time of writing, 
Roy believed that Islamist movements were running out of “revolutionary steam”, and 
that they would either become normal political parties or lead to individualistic neo-
fundamentalism. In conclusion, he predicted that Islamists would disappear from the 
political arena, and solely focus on social and ethical issues rather than on the creation 
of an Islamic State.134  
 
Roy therefore understands “failure” as being primarily intellectual, by saying that 
“Islamism is a failure historically: neither in Iran or in liberated Afghanistan has a new 
society been established. The failure of Islamism does not mean that parties such as 
the Algerian ISF will not achieve power, but only that those parties will not invent a 
new society.”135 Ultimately, reflecting on the Egyptian context in 2013 after Morsi’s 
removal by the military-led coup d’etat, Roy stated that “The failure of Political Islam 
is not the political failure of the Islamists; it is the collapse of Islamism as a political 
ideology”136, claiming that Islamism has lost its credibility as a champion of change. 
While undeniably interesting, this argument is also very provoking, as many have seen 
its confirmation in the removal of president Morsi in July 2013.  
 
                                                 
132 Roy, O., “Islamism’s Failure, Islamists’ Future”, in OpenDemocracy, (30 October 2006),   
http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/islamism_4043.jsp  
133 ibid., p. ix 
134 Steele, J., “Globalised Islam”, in The Guardian (November 2004) 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2004/nov/13/highereducation.news  
135 Roy, O., The Failure of Political Islam, p. ix 
136 Roy, O., “There Will be no Islamist Revolution”, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 24, No. 1, (January 
2013), p. 16 
 65 
1.9 Failure and Destitution compared 
The notion of political “failure” is indeed an amorphous one, yet it is one that is central 
to this thesis. A working definition and understanding of the term are therefore 
necessary at this point to set up a robust analytical framework, which will then drive 
the research at the core of this work. To start with, for what has been said above, it is 
clear that Roy understands “failure” as being primarily an intellectual and ideological 
one, embodied by the incapability of Islamism of being an “actor of change”. According 
to Roy and to those who share his opinions, then, there seem to be some core criteria 
that can be applied to demonstrate that Political Islam has historically failed to fulfil 
its goals in the region, and particularly after the Arab Springs.  The first one of these 
criteria would be the understanding of “failure” as an intellectual one, namely the fact 
that Islamist groups have long ceased to be revolutionary in both their ideology and 
their means, and would therefore solely focus on the mosque or employ secular 
approaches to politics. The second criterion is the incompatibility of Islam and 
democratic rule, which could be demonstrated by the MB’s removal in July 2013, after 
only 12 months in power. This goes hand in hand with the idea that Islamism has 
“failed” in the sense that it is incapable to lawfully govern. Overall, these all lead to 
the idea that Political Islam as a whole ideology “does not pass the test of power”. 
 
More specifically, this is what is meant from now on when referring to “failure” 
throughout the thesis. Roy’s understanding of the term is the one the arguments and 
analysis in this thesis are built upon, or against, as the ultimate conclusion is that this 
is not an understanding that satisfactorily describes the end of the MB’s rule or the 
current state of Islamist groups across the region. Therefore, the thesis will make the 
argument that, given what Roy meant by “failure”, it would be more accurate to refer 
to what happened to the MB in 2013 as a “destitution”, in order to avoid 
misunderstandings and misleading assumptions about the general state of Islamism 
as a whole. 
 
There are several reasons why the work presented in this thesis contests Roy’s account 
of “failure”, which will be ultimately unpacked in Chapter 5. For now, it needs to be 
said that while still recognising the validity and utility of Roy’s argument, the criteria 
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that he uses to identify failure do not stand when compared to the recent history of 
the region. Firstly, throughout this chapter it has been argued that there is not such a 
thing as a monolithic Political Islam, but rather there are many Political Islams, an 
argument that makes Roy’s claim inaccurate and too general in its assumptions. This 
consequently challenges the idea that Islamism has intellectually failed to be 
revolutionary and an “actor of change”. One of the most influential Islamist groups in 
the region, the Egyptian MB, has specifically never claimed to be a revolutionary 
group, but an evolutionary one that never aimed at creating a new society, but rather 
at reforming the current one. In addition, the MB can not be classified as a neo-
fundamentalist Islamic group, and its perceived “failure” can be attributed to both 
external and internal factors. On the contrary, Da’esh has infamously demonstrated 
that certain forms of Islamism are indeed still capable of bringing about radical change 
and of subverting the region’s status quo, be it for the better of for the worst. Both of 
these groups embody current manifestation of Political Islam, but differ widely in their 
means and aims. 
 
Similarly, when it comes to the incompatibility of Political Islam and democratic rule, 
this is also a criterion that is not applicable to the recent regional order. The case of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran examined earlier is proof of the fact that certain 
manifestations of Islamism are indeed compatible and can co-exist with democratic 
structures. In the case of the MB, this thesis will argue that its removal and destitution 
were due to domestic and internal factors, which are not necessarily attributable to 
its being an Islamist organisation. This is the case as, particularly in the Egyptian 
context, any post-Mubarak government was set to face a unique set of challenges 
independently from its ideological affiliations or political composition. Egypt’s 
domestic conditions and the country’s legacy of authoritarian rule meant that the 
post-2011 transitional period was marked by an unprecedented political vacuum, 
which facilitated the split between actors that had been a part of the country’s politics 
for decades and those that were just coming to be as a result of the Uprisings. Further 
challenges included the task of re-writing the country’s constitution, the need to 
challenge wide-spread corruption, and to tackle the remnants of the deep state. 
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This last challenge in particular was the one dominating the transitional period. During 
the course of the decades preceding the events of 2011 the Armed Forces had grown 
increasingly embedded into Egyptian politics, a condition that reached its peak during 
the Mubarak government. This is also why, retrospectively, it would be possible for 
some to look back at the events of 2011 and argue that whichever party took over the 
country’s transition would have been set up to be removed from the very start. 
However, in order to avoid pre-conceptions, this is a matter that has been raised with 
all interviewees, whose accounts will be examined further later on.  
 
It is therefore debatable whether Islamism is indeed a failed ideology because of its 
alleged “radicalization”, as some of its more original and moderate forms arguably 
need the time to adapt to modern institutions before being able to provide legitimate 
governance. Furthermore, by looking at historical manifestations of Political Islam it 
can be argued that it is a resilient phenomenon, which despite often challenging 
historical circumstances managed to adapt itself and to keep expanding to new areas. 
There are also some perceived anachronisms within both certain interpretations of 
Political Islam and the way in which Islamist movements are analysed in relation to 
modernity, which call for a more case-specific examination. Especially when 
considering recent developments, it is clear that despite President Morsi’s removal 
various Islamist projects of different natures are still evolving and developing in many 
parts of the region, and that the Iranian theocracy is still functional and standing, 
further challenging Roy’s argument.  
 
To conclude, something else that needs to be taken into consideration when 
advancing such claim is the context in which the “failure” is perceived, as temporal, 
national and societal factors could impact significantly on success’s rates and 
indicators, regardless of ideological affiliations. In summary, while the MB has 
undeniably failed to keep its promises and to legitimately govern, it has done so 
because of domestic and internal factors that are not directly caused by its affiliation 
to a particular understanding of Political Islam. While the series of events that led to 
the July 2013 coup are the manifestation of a political failure nonetheless, in the 
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broader sense of the term, they are not so in Roy’s understanding and it and of its 
implications. 
 
1.10 Post Islamism 
Roy also suggests that in the aftermath of the Arab Springs137 and in the midst of what 
has been defined as an “Islamist Winter”, groups such as the MB might be moving 
towards “Post Islamism”. Developed by Bayat in 1995 Post Islamism was based on the 
analysis of the Iranian experience, but has gained increasing traction during the past 
few years, which is why it is worth examining here. Contrary to Roy, Bayat draws a 
distinction between reformist Islamist groups, who seek to gradually establish an 
Islamic state within pre-existing constitutional frameworks, and revolutionary/militant  
ones, known to resort to violence, and successfully underlines their differences in 
terms of aims, strategies, and impacts.138 Bayat begins from the assumption that 
reformist Islamists’ desire to hold state power derives from the Quranic principle of 
“command right, forbid wrong”, despite the lack of legal definition of these two 
terms.139 Regardless, he argues that Islamists desire to control state power not only 
because it would ensure their rule, but also because they understand the state as 
being the most powerful and efficient institution that is able to enforce “good” and 
eradicate “evil” within Muslim Societies.140  
 
Following from this, Bayat stipulates Post Islamism (PI) as both a condition and a 
project, and as a trend that has gradually intensified since the early 1990s.  In the 
“condition” understanding, Bayat refers to PI as both a political and social condition 
where the appeal and legitimacy of Islamism have been exhausted, following a phase 
of experimentation, meaning that even its most vocal advocates see its practical flaws. 
Consequently, in the process of attempting to establish and institutionalise their rule, 
Islamists have become aware of the anomalies of their own discourse, and of the fact 
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that “pragmatic attempts to maintain the system would reinforce the abandonment 
of certain of its underlying principles”.141 In turn, Islamism would be compelled to 
reinvent itself, but do so at the very high qualitative and ideological cost that Bayat 
recognises in the transformation of religious and political discourse that took place in 
Iran in the 1990s. 
 
Therefore, Bayat proposes the understanding of PI as a “project”, or as a conscious 
attempt to fuse religiosity and rights, Islam and liberty, and to conceptualise the 
rationale of Islamism in the social, political, and intellectual domains.142  He argues 
that “whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, Post 
Islamism empathises religiosity and rights. Yet, while it favours a civil and nonreligious 
state, it accords an active role for religion in the public sphere”.143 According to his 
analysis, this is a trend that, originating in Iran in the 1990s, has been consistently 
spreading across Muslim countries over the past few decades, and is therefore leading 
to a radical shift in the way in which Islamism is both understood and applied. 
However, while Bayat’s analysis is compelling, it is still too generalist in that it seeks to 
be applied to Islamic movements as a whole, as being a trend that has undoubtedly 
come out of the Arab Springs too. Rather, as will become clear in the following 
chapters, even if one subscribes to Bayat’s notion of Post-Islamism, it would be hard 
to claim that such a change and self-analysis has taken place in Egypt. Instead, one 
could say that it is the very lack of thereof that would eventually lead to the downfall 
of the FJP, making PI an interesting concept, but a too generalised one nonetheless. 
 
1.11 Emerging Trends: Islamist Winters VS Islamic Awakening 
Following the aftermath of the Arab Springs, there are two emerging schools of 
thought that focus on Political Islam and on the wider implications of the MB’s 
deposition in 2013. There are some, such as Tarek Osman and Quinn Mecham, who 
argue that Islamist groups are growing authoritarian in the post-2011 regional context, 
which has strengthened the binary between Arab secularism and Islamism.  Others, 
                                                 




such as Muqtedar Khan, instead understand the current regional (dis)order as a 
chance for moderate Islamist groups to self-reflect and re-invent themselves in the 
light of new regional needs and circumstances. With these new trends in the literature 
still being in the making, this thesis makes a considerable contribution to the study of 
the subject as it positions itself at the vanguard of these debates. Regardless of which 
of these trends one subscribes to, the understanding of Political Islam as a 
multifaceted and heterogeneous ideology is still necessary to make sense of the 
ideological and geopolitical trends currently enveloping the region. 
 
Quinn Mecham argues that there are four main trends that characterise Islamism as a 
whole in the aftermath of the Arab Springs. These are the removal and repression of 
the MB, the rise of Islamist militia-based state building embodied by Da’esh, increasing 
sectarianism and proxy wars, and Islamists’ increased caution in participating in 
participatory politics and in directly challenging their governments.144 He believes that 
the MB’s deposition came with enormous consequences for Islamist groups 
competing in politics, and predicts that exclusion and perceptions of injustice will 
eventually lead to the group’s resort to militancy.145 This has been followed by the rise 
of a “new model” for Islamism, exemplified by Da’esh, which is that of militant Islamist 
groups stepping in to fill the void left by failing states. He argues that these groups, 
while rejecting the Westphalian system, still borrow many of the tools of modern state 
systems and are challenging international norms by seeking to establish a new political 
order.146  
 
This new political order is one that is fostering the rise of sectarian ideologies and 
proxy conflicts in places like Syria, mostly along Sunni-Shiite lines, as it is encapsulated 
by the growing geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and by its 
manifestation in contested spaces such as Syria and Iraq. In Mecham’s view, this will 
lead to militant Islamist groups across the region being considerably more well-
                                                 






funded, diverse, and sectarian in their ideology than before the Arab Springs, in a trend 
that is already leading to a deep polarization between these groups that will take years 
to reverse.147 Lastly, these trends have also contributed to the shaping of a regional 
political environment that actively discourages non-militant Islamist groups from 
directly engaging in politics, for the fear of being targeted and repressed. This is in 
direct opposition to the growth in political space and participation fostered by the 
Arab Springs, and is instead leading back to a pre-2011 deeply negative political space. 
 
Tarek Osman holds a similarly negative understanding, and states that the failure to 
take power during the Arab Springs “has led not to ‘soul-searching’" in major Islamist 
groups about what went wrong, but instead to "antagonism and fiery anger" and a 
thirst for revenge. Partisans of political Islam see themselves as victims of an injustice 
whose perpetrators are not just "individual conspirators but entire social groups”.148 
He predicts that there will soon have to be a fight to save the soul of Islamism, meaning 
that, as Salafist jihadist groups grow in numbers and popularity, non-militant Islamist 
groups and thinkers will have to defend the idea of Political Islam against the 
accusation of being equated with violence and terror.149 According to Osman, this will 
include a battle over what it means to be an Islamist. However, the research conducted 
by this thesis demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case, and that the future of 
Islamism does not necessarily call for a battle between Mohamed Abdou and Sayyid 
Qutb, according to a binary between moderate and radical Islamism. Rather, the 
current regional circumstance should be thought of as an opportunity for self 
reflection and reformation, in the lights of changing needs and circumstances, which 
is a process that has always been at the core of non-militant Political Islam and that 
has allowed the doctrine to grow and thrive in all its different manifestations 
 
Muqtedar Khan belongs to the second trend within the literature on contemporary 
forms of Islamism, and he notes that the MB’s inability to provide good governance 
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and unite Egyptian society under a common purpose does not directly imply that 
Political Islam and democracy are incompatible.150 Similarly, the fact that the 
organization is widely considered one of the region’s oldest and most influential 
Islamist groups does not mean that the MB has a monopoly on Political Islam, or that 
its perceived failure is also the failure of Islamic values.151 In fact, the counter-
revolution and the country’s elites were brought together by their shared anger over 
the Brotherhood’s perceived attempt to consolidate their power while alienating 
those who had supported them during the elections. Therefore, the popular protests 
that escalated in a coup d’etat were not the rejection of Political Islam or of 
democracy, they were simply a rejection of the MB’s rule.  
 
In addition, the fact that other Islamist groups, such as the Salafist al Nour Party, are 
still active and engaged with the country’s politics if a further testimony that Egypt has 
not given up on Islamism, it has simply let go of the Brotherhood. Similarly, other 
Islamists groups around the region have not been discouraged by the MB’s deposition, 
on the contrary, the appetite for Islam in the public and civil spheres is continuously 
shifting forms, looking for new ways to adapt to contemporary challenges. Khan 
predicts that the continuous regional and international battle against the “Islamic 
Threat” will do nothing but strengthen these groups’ sense of victimhood, which will 
in turn push them to thrive and develop.152  
 
To conclude, it is now clear that the history of both Political Islam and of the MB in 
particular is characterised by strong contradictions and lack of continuity, which 
complicates attempts to profile the influence and role of the organisation. Its history 
has never been static, but is rather characterised by a constant state of flux, internal 
contradictions, and changes in the social composition of the organisation. Such 
heritage of changes in strategies and narratives, and lack of unity in both composition 
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and aims, is prominent today and is arguably one of the causes of the Brotherhood’s 
political failure, and will therefore be carefully analysed throughout the course of this 
thesis. However, over all the internal schism and competing narratives, it needs to be 
noted that there has been an historical continuity in the organisation’s commitment 
to (Political) Islam as an ultimate aim, and to the Islamic faith as a unifying factor. 
 
1.12 Methodology  
In order to facilitate our understanding of the contemporary challenges faced by 
Political Islam in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the thesis will specifically look at 
the case study of the MB government in Egypt. The thesis does so by relying on 
qualitative research that is based on both primary and secondary sources, adding to 
the existing literature on the topic with data gained through interviews with both 
Egyptian Secular Activists and members/supporters of the MB. Indeed, two 
meaningful contributions that this thesis make are the presentation of the MB’s 
account of what happened during the FJP’s year in power, gained though interviews 
with some of its prominent members, and the identification of four domestic factors, 
unrelated to ideological matters, which led to the July 2013 coup. That is the case as, 
given the recent nature of the events examined, the implications of the MB’s 
deposition for the broader understanding of Political Islam have been left largely 
unassessed.  
 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic, and the nature of the current military regime in 
Egypt, there are several events that led to the MB being voted into power that have 
been left largely un-investigated, but are nonetheless key to the understanding of 
what happened during the post-2011 transitional period. The initial interview 
questions detailed below have been designed to specifically address these gaps, and 
have been posed to both secular activists and MB members/supporters, inevitably 
evolving over time as new information was gathered, as can be seen on the transcripts. 
By interviewing both secular activists and MB members, this thesis seeks to provide a 
tool to assess perceptions and experiences that are usually not analysed together in 
the current narrative. By doing so, another original contribution of this thesis is the 
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space given to the MB account of events that, while it is somewhat present in the 
Arabic media, is largely missing from the English equivalent. The thesis has attempted 
to give equal space to activists and MB members and supporters, in order to put 
forward balanced data that can therefore be used to add and further understand the 
factors that led to the FJP’s toppling in 2013, and its wider implications for the 
understanding of Political Islam. The interviews conducted for the scope of this 
research were structured around these main nine questions: 
 
1. The MB (in particular some of its factions) have been perceived as having 
played a fundamental strategic and organizational role during the 2011 
uprisings. What is your perception of this? 
2. How relevant were the MB internal schisms (especially those between the 
conservative VS the reformist wings) in the post-2011 context? Do you think 
that they negatively impacted on the MB’s direct engagement with politics? 
3. In your opinion, what were the main factors that led to the parliamentary and 
presidential victory of the FJP in the post-2011 context? 
4. Many observers argued that the MB failed to maintain power as it was not 
revolutionary enough. Do you agree with this statement/why? 
5. Do you think that the creation of the FJP went against the MB’s nature as a 
grassroots organisation, or was it a necessary step to take at the time? 
6. Do you think that the MB “hijacked” the post-2011 emerging political order for 
its own advantages? 
7. What do you perceive to be the main gap between ideology and practice 
looking at the experience of the MB in the post-2011 context? 
8. What do you think went wrong under Morsi’s rule?  
9. In your opinion, does the MB’s experience mean that we are witnessing the 
“failure” of Islamism, or are we rather witnessing its transformation and 
adaptation to contemporary times? (i.e. Post-Islamism) 
 
As one can imagine, there are extreme difficulties that arise from the study of an 
organization that was proscribed as a “terrorist” actor both domestically and 
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internationally.153 Such difficulties are tied to the sensitivity of the topic analysed and 
therefore translate into issues of access and consequently, the potential participants’ 
willingness to be interviewed and to share their experiences. The proscription of the 
MB and the subsequent sensitivity of the topic also translates into considerable ethical 
concerns for the safety of both the researcher and the participants, hence why 
fieldwork has taken place in the UK, which has historically offered asylum to both MBs 
and secular activists therefore making primary research achievable, and via Skype. 
However, there were several ethical and security challenges that limited the scope of 
primary research that could be conducted towards this thesis. These include:  
 
 The current political climate in Egypt. 
 The country’s treatment of journalists and researchers (as embodied by the 
case of Giulio Regeni). 
 The UK government stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood and Political 
Islam more broadly. 
 The process of obtaining ethical approval from the University’s Ethical 
Committee. 
 Issues surrounding the security of both the researcher and the interviewees.  
 
After being ousted from power in July 2013, the MB was officially proscribed as a 
terrorist organisation in Egypt, causing its members to suffer unprecedented 
persecution and repression.154 The authoritarian nature of the Al Sisi regime means 
that the country is currently in the midst of its worst Human Rights crisis so far, with 
highly restrictive association laws limiting the possibility for opposition, while the 
silencing and imprisonment of native and international journalists has become 
common practice.155 The disappearance, torture and murder of Italian doctoral 
researcher Giulio Regeni made it clear that Egypt is not safe for academics either, 
stressing further the incompatibility between the current political climate and primary 
research. In addition, several countries followed Egypt’s lead in proscribing the MB as 
                                                 
153 The Guardian, “Egypt Declares Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group”, in The Guardian, 
(December 2013) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/25/egypt-declares-muslim-
brotherhood-terrorist-group 
154 ibid.  
155 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: consolidating repression under al Sisi” 
 76 
a terrorist organisation, therefore limiting the scope for research and negatively 
influencing the understanding of both the organisation and of Political Islam more 
broadly. These include Kazakhstan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia, with the Trump 
administration recently launching an investigation aimed at declaring the MB a 
terrorist group, and consequently subjecting it to US sanctions, revealing a worrying 
international trend.156  
 
While the UK has not officially proscribed the group, the “Muslim Brotherhood 
Review” published in December 2015 revealed some conclusions that appear to have 
been largely influenced by this international trend, such as “there is little evidence that 
the experience of power in Egypt has caused a rethinking in the Muslim Brotherhood 
of its ideology or conduct. UK official engagement with the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood produced no discernible change in their thinking. Indeed even by mid 
2014 statements from Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-linked media platforms seem to 
have deliberately incited violence” and “aspects of Muslim Brotherhood ideology and 
tactics, in this country and overseas, are contrary to our values and have been contrary 
to our national interests and our national security”.157 These findings have been  
challenged to some degree by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
“Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood Review”, published in November 2016 
158, but little has changed in the UK’s attitude towards the group.  
 
This meant that obtaining Ethical Approval to conduct interviews from the Lancaster 
University Ethical Committee proved to be a rather lengthy process, ultimately limiting 
the scope of primary research to the UK. Given the contemporary political nature of 
this research, the main concerns were the safety of both the interviewer and the 
interviewees, meaning that anonymity has been applied in all but one case, where the 
interviewee’s public engagement and willingness to be identified have been taken into 
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account after careful consideration. The anonymity of all other participants is ensured 
by the meticulous selection of the data presented throughout this thesis, meaning the 
omission of particular life experiences, mentions of backgrounds, and so on, aimed at 
preventing the identification of interviewees by external parties. To this aim, and in 
line with the directions given by the Lancaster University’s Ethics Committee, 
transcripts will not be made accessible to further protect the interviewees’ identity.  
 
Furthermore, there are other limitations that come with the gathering of primary data 
from a geographically restricted area and relatively small number of participants. 
These are the possibility of gaining a biased or at least only partial version of events, 
to give more relevance to one group of interviewees over the other, or to report claims 
that are hard to verify fully. These potential shortcomings have been addressed by 
choosing to interview a balanced number of participants from each side in order to 
avoid biases when possible, and by cross referencing all data gained with other 
primary sources to verify their factuality. These are interviews gained and published 
by other authors, public statements, news sources, media publications, and official 
documents such as texts of Constitutional Decrees, political manifestoes, legislations, 
and Constitutions. 
 
1.13 Conceptual Approach: Historical Sociology  
This thesis relies on a specific understanding of Historical Sociology (HS) as the main 
theoretical framework supporting the research conducted for the scope of this thesis. 
While HS is not a new approach, few have applied it to the study of the ways in which 
a group such as the MB can shape the state within which it exists and acts. In particular, 
HS will be used to address questions and concepts such as the relationship between 
domestic factors and state institutions, legitimacy originating from non-state actors, 
and the interconnectedness of religious ideology and governance. Therefore, in order 
to understand how HS fits with the purpose of this research, it is first necessary to look 
at the development of HS as a multifaceted discipline, and to examine the ways in 
which it could successfully be applied to the study of International Relations (IR), and 
in particular to the analysis of the state.  
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This thesis relies on the works of Max Weber and on his development of what is now 
called “Comparative Historical Sociology” to provide an original lens through which 
analyse the ways in which domestic factors influence change both within and outside 
the state.159 It does so in conjunction with Fred Halliday’s contribution to the field, as 
he was the first to argue in favour of the application of HS to the study of geopolitics 
and IR in the MENA region.160 In particular, this research employs HS as it moves away 
from the Realist and traditional understanding of “Islam” or the “Arab mind” as 
explanatory elements of the region’s geopolitics, but rather focuses on how 
institutions of both political and socio/religious power are established and maintained, 
recognising states, ideologies and societies as the core components of political and 
social order.161 Therefore, it is most suited to the study of how the MB’s political 
evolution has historically shaped the country’s institutions, civil society, and politics. 
 
Originating within the field of Sociology itself, and particularly driven by the works of 
Karl Marx and Max Weber, HS asserted itself as a discipline that could be applied to 
the study of IR at the beginning of the 20th century, in what is now called the “first 
wave” of HS. Understood as a broad discipline, HS is not a mere sociological study of 
the past, but rather focuses on how societies develop through history in order to 
explain the structures of contemporary societies. While these structures are often 
regarded as being natural, HS argues that they are instead shaped by complex social 
processes, and that their origins and development ought to be analysed in order to 
understand the ways in which they in turn shape institutions, organizations, and 
societies themselves.162 Following from this, contemporary HS focuses on how the 
state has developed through the analysis of the relations between states, classes, 
economics and political systems.163 However, HS is not a unitary discipline. Charles 
Tilly notes that it can be understood as developing in four different directions, these 
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being: social criticism, pattern identification, scope extension, and process analysis.164 
While these are all legitimate manifestations of historical sociological analyses, they 
differ widely in aims, procedures, and results.  
 
Similarly, HS can also be seen as being composed of three main historical waves. The 
first wave, relying on the works of Karl Marx and Max Weber, aimed to understand 
the processes by which social structures and actors originated and then transformed 
during the transition from feudal societies to “modern” social life.165 Modernity and 
the motors of social change are understood differently by thinkers included in this 
wave, varying from Marx’s analysis of the rise of capitalism and class-structured actors 
to the formation of the “disciplined bourgeois subject and his confinement in the iron 
cage of rationalized collective life” theorised by Weber.166 While this undeniably 
created a diverse intellectual landscape, these theorists still converged on a common, 
fundamentally historical project.  
 
The second wave of HS arose in the 1960s-70s and, while still relying on Marxist 
conceptions of history, focused more on issues of political economy and centrality of 
the state rather than on the cultural level, discarding Modernization Theory in favour 
of conflict-theoretical perspectives and a focus on revolutions and social 
mechanisms.167 Thinkers such Charles Tilly and Andrew Abbot are usually identified as 
key figures of this movement. Adams et al. note that the third wave of HS is still very 
much in the making, but that it will arguably be the most intersectional and 
interdisciplinary in nature. This will include Feminist thought, Postcolonial Studies, and 
a renewed focus on the cultural, social, and modernization aspects that were 
suppressed during the second wave.168 Overall, it can be seen how diverse and 
multifaceted HS is as a discipline. While these different waves and thinkers share a 
common aim, at times they conduct their analyses in ways that can be perceived as 
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being significantly different. Although all of these strategies provide a new lens for the 
study of IR, this thesis will rely particularly on Weber’s Comparative Historical 
Sociology and on Halliday’s application of HS to the MENA region in order to provided 
a genealogy of the MB’s political evolution. 
 
1.14 Max Weber’s “Comparative Historical Sociology” 
Beginning his career as an historian, Weber would develop a new way of merging 
history and sociology together, revolutionising what had been a rather antagonistic 
relationship between these two disciplines until then. Because of this he is often 
remembered for his contribution to the field of HS, a reputation that continues to grow 
with the recent renewed interest in the discipline. Writing at the turn of the 20th 
century, Weber argued in favour of a methodological division of labour between 
history and sociology, acknowledging their difference in levels of analysis and rejecting 
the prescription that the individual researcher should be either a sociologist or an 
historian.169 Weber’s view was undeniably influenced by the Historiographic crisis 
brought about by World War I and by the peak of European hegemony and capitalism, 
which posed questions of identity, purpose, and reorientation. According to Weber, 
the answer to these questions could only be found by combining levels of analysis that 
had been kept separated before, therefore leading to the merging of the historical and 
the sociological.170 Since then, the field of HS developed in a variety of different 
directions, but Weber’s contribution to the field remains one of the most relevant to 
this day, especially when wanting to apply this discipline to the study of IR. 
 
HS as firstly theorised by Weber allows for the study of state autonomy by shifting the 
focus towards non-state actors and dynamics.  The popularity that Weber’s approach 
to IR quickly gained was due to the high adaptability of the theory, which rested on six 
main principles that can be understood in opposition to those developed by Hans 
Morgenthau, one of the founding fathers of Realism. These are: History and Change, 
Multi Causality, Multi Spatiality, Partial Autonomy, Complex Change and the Non-
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Realist Concept of State Autonomy. The first principle draws attention to the fact that 
the study of history is crucial not just for itself, but also as a means of problematizing 
and critically exploring the origins of modern domestic and international institutions 
and practices.171 In essence, it is fundamental to the understanding of the process of 
change, both within and outside the state and in and around institutions. Multi 
Causality further reinforces the concept that social and political change can only be 
understood through the interaction of multiple forces, none of which can be reduced 
to a single essence.172 The third principle follows on from the second, and asserts that 
societies, states and international systems (both political and economic) are inherently 
linked, therefore emphasising the necessity of an intersectional and encompassing 
approach.173  
 
Partial Autonomy embodies the assumption that, because power forces and actors are 
multiple, and constantly interact and shape each other in complex ways, it becomes 
problematic to talk of power actors such as states or classes as wholly autonomous 
and self-constituting. Therefore, they cannot be understood as wholly rational and 
pure phenomena with single interests, as they are determined by the interaction of 
multiple sources of power.174 In clear opposition with the Neoliberal notion of 
continuity in world politics , Complex Change rests on the concept that both societies 
and international politics are areas subject to constant change, and that it is therefore 
more pertinent to focus on discontinuity in IR.175 Finally, the sixth principle directly 
challenges the Neoliberal understanding of political autonomy as resting on a 
fundamental analytical separation of the state from societal forces. Rather, HS relies 
on the belief that: 
 
State autonomy is not absolute and wholly separate from society, nor is it measured in 
terms of the state’s ability to separate itself from society. Rather, state autonomy is 
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measured in terms of a state’s degree of embeddedness within society. Thus the more a 
state is embedded in society, the greater its capacity to maintain itself domestically and 
abroad. Conversely, the higher the isolation from society (i.e., in Mann’s terms, where 
‘despotic’ power is high), the more a state’s capacity to maintain itself domestically and 
internationally is diminished. The basic principle here is that state power and capacity can 
be greatly enhanced by mobilizing society, and by maintaining a high degree of consent. 
This places emphasis on ‘collective’ power which enables the development of state and 
society, as opposed to the more ‘zero-sum’ conception of power found in realism and 
crude statism.176 
 
Therefore, Weber’s understanding of the indivisible nature of the mutual relationship 
between state and society is most suited to the understanding of the MB’s genealogy 
and influence on Egypt’s institutions and society. This is the case as the group has 
historically acted as a “state within a state”177 despite its troubled history of 
repression, routinely mobilising society against the country’s elites and Armed Forces. 
Therefore, an analysis of Egypt’s contemporary geopolitical role and of the country’s 
recent history would be incomplete if not paired with the study of the MB. 
 
1.15 Fred Halliday’s “International Sociology” 
Fred Halliday’s contribution to HS within IR theory came from the merging of his 
intellectual Marxist background with Weber’s influence on the discipline. Halliday’s 
understanding of IR as an analytical lens for the study of state-society relations in the 
Middle East goes beyond the traditional divide between normative and analytic 
theories. Rather, he argues in favour of an approach that does not just focus on the 
study of norms and ethical issues within the international context, or solely on the 
provision of a set of explanations for how the international system works, stating the 
need to move away from these tendencies that have dominated the study of the 
region for the past several decades. The approach that Halliday proposes is that of 
Historical/International Sociology, which has the state as its main focus, but 
conceptualises in a completely different way than the Realist. This is the case as, 
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ontologically speaking, HS falls within the post-positivist category and believes in a 
verifiable reality, focusing on emotions, groups, and structures within the wider 
framework of IR.  
 
According to Halliday, HS understands the state as a distinct institutional category 
rather than as a sum of myriad decisions, and combines its study with the foreign 
policy analysis approach.178 HS employs foreign policy analysis not to reduce or qualify 
the role of the state, but rather to understand the state as an actor that through its 
influence on society creates the very context for the formation of foreign policies that 
it then implements. Therefore, this approach combines the study of the international 
role of the state with that of key domestic factors that are usually presented as 
timeless features of the region’s politics by other schools of thought, such as 
nationalism or religious fundamentalism, arguing that they are formed and 
transformed by their very association with the state. As Halliday states “Just as a more 
flexible and specific view of history has made historical analysis more effective, a more 
specific view of the state may, thereby, lead to a recognition of its greater 
influence”.179  
 
Therefore, HS moves away from the traditional Realist and homogeneous 
understanding of “Islam” or the “Arab mind” as explanatory elements of the region’s 
geopolitics, but rather focuses on how institutions of both political and socio/religious 
power are established and maintained, recognising states, ideologies and societies as 
the core components of political and social order.180 It therefore seeks to understand 
the relevance of these social factors within the historical and international context in 
which they were created, with the aim of gaining a comprehensive view of how they 
then shape politics. Therefore, this particular understanding of HS is most suited to 
the study of how the MB’s political evolution has shaped the country’s institutions, 
civil society, and politics. 
 
                                                 




Especially in the First Wave, HS begins with the assumption that the starting point for 
the historical perception of the state are the two categories of modernity and force.  
This is the case as the state, understood as an institution of coercion and 
administration, has existed for millennia, while according to Halliday modern states 
are not necessarily a linear continuation of these original institutions. Rather, he 
understands the state as a creature of modernity, as a product of the economic and 
social changes that have been associated with the transformation of the world since 
the creation of a new interstate system in 1780.181 It follows that states forged through 
inter-state competition owe their inception to the reproduction of force, which in 
turns means that the origin of  modern states, and their primary activity, has 
historically been violence (especially when taking claims to religious or popular 
legitimacy into account).182  By adopting this approach HS makes a meaningful 
contribution to the study of IR in the Middle East, which has historically focused on 
the state, by understanding it as an institution of coercion and appropriation that 
operates on two levels, the internal state–society dimension and the external state–
state dimension. 183  
 
By doing this HS fuses the study of the state with that of another wide range of issues 
that are traditionally key to the analysis of the region, these being the role of ideology 
and religion, conflicts and their causes, transnational actors and movements, and the 
role of domestic change within society.  Ideology and norms are therefore understood 
as central to the process of legitimation and coercion that is at the very core of the 
state, further underlining the fact that HS provides a theoretical framework for the 
understanding of the region that goes beyond generalisation and takes into account 
domestic dynamics and factors.  
 
Therefore, Halliday’s contribution to the field of HS and IR is undoubtedly a 
fundamental one, which has been developed through several of his works such as “The 
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Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics, and Ideology”184, “State and 
Society in International Relations”185 and “For an International Sociology”186. 
However, there are some who criticize his methods and approaches, and argue that 
his call for a “sociological turn” in IR theory was informed by multiple and often 
conflicting contributory elements, and therefore plagued by ambivalence and 
inconsistency.187 One of the most common critiques moved to his scholarship is that 
of being underpinned by “creative tensions”, as his internationalism at times focused 
on resistance to systems of oppression such as capitalism, while at other times it 
appeared to be supporting the spread of ideas and practices through capitalist 
means.188  
 
Similarly, there is a shared perception that while Halliday undeniably contributed to 
the development of HS in IR, he did so without offering his own definitive theoretical 
statement on the discipline, but rather remained a “miscellaneous theorist”. This is 
the case as he remained tied to an understanding of International Theory as being tri-
partite in nature, divided between the inter-state (realist), transnational (liberal) and 
systemic (structural/Marxist) levels.189 However, despite Halliday’s propensity to draw 
upon competing theoretical understandings, there were two particular characteristic 
of his approach to HS that were always consistently applied, and they both fell within 
his unfaltering concern with human agency and with the way in which individuals took 
control of their surroundings and determined their own future, which is central to the 
purpose of this thesis. The first feature is the need to move away from naturalised 
understandings of the international order, such as capitalist modernity, and the 
second is the necessity to focus upon the successes and failures of individuals and 
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movements that challenge these structures of oppression.190 These two aspects, 
combined with Weber’s own contribution to HS in IR, are fundamental to the study of 
the way in which the MB’s politicisation has shaped the Egyptian State, making HS the 
most suitable methodological approach for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
1.16 Framework: Historical Sociology and the Muslim Brotherhood 
Despite its flaws, there are several features of Halliday’s contribution to and 
understanding of HS that make this approach fundamental to the purpose of this 
thesis. First of all, while HS is generally understood as a dialogue between Weber and 
Marx, Halliday managed to successfully bring together both sides of the debate in his 
understanding, making two particularly striking contributions to the application of HS 
to the region: first, “the need to denaturalise taken-for-granted understandings and 
practices of international order, (…)  and, secondly, the need to study the successes – 
and failures – of individuals and movements that had challenged these structures of 
domination”.191 His concern with human agency is what makes this particular 
conception of HS fundamental for the study of the MB in Egypt, as an analysis of how 
individual-driven domestic factors that directly challenge the status quo end up 
playing such a fundamental role in the legitimisation and formation of the state itself. 
Moreover, such an intersectional approach is the most suited to the study of the MB’s 
political and ideological evolution within the context of the Egyptian state and history. 
This is the case because, as it will become clear during the course of this thesis, the 
MB’s history is inseparable from that of modern Egypt itself, therefore underlining the 
importance and interconnectedness of domestic factors and state development and 
legitimacy.  Understanding the influence that the MB historically had on the country’s 
civil society and political life is fundamental to understanding the Egyptian state itself, 
particularly when seeking to focus on the events that followed the 2011 Uprisings. As 
such, to understand the MB we must first understand the Egyptian state and vice 
versa. 
 




HS will therefore be applied throughout this research, as a means to investigate and 
understand the MB’s relevance in terms of roots, ideology, and relations with state 
institutions since its foundation. In Chapter 2 HS will examine the MB’s roots in 
resistance and identity politics, and for the understanding of the organisation’s core 
tenets and transnational appeal. Chapter 3 will apply Halliday’s conception of HS to 
the analysis of the relationship between structure and agency, with the aim to 
understand the MB’s historical role in shaping Egyptian politics as more than yet 
another manifestation of how Islam is understood as affecting the geopolitics of the 
region. Similarly, Chapter 4 will focus on the creation of the FJP with the aim of 
recognising the fundamental role that ideology plays in the formation of both political 
and social institutions, focusing on the tensions and contradictions that it might also 
cause. Finally, Chapter 5 will analyse the events leading up to June 30th with the intent 
of showing that, as Halliday argues, it is necessary to move away from the conception 
of “Islam” as an explanatory element of the region’s politics, as there is a lot more to 
the MB’s deposition than just their Islamist message. 
 
1.17 Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided a review of the key texts and authors that provide the 
fundamental background needed when engaging in research concerning the topic of 
Political Islam. It has done so while attempting to challenge prejudices and to keep an 
engaging and provocative argument, and has therefore examined both its Shi’ite and 
Sunni manifestations. After providing a short historical background and basic 
understanding of the implications of the term, the chapter has moved on to the 
analysis of the existing body of literature.  First of all, it has focused on the thought of 
the founding fathers of (Sunni) Political Islam Hassan al Banna and Abu ala Mawdudi, 
whose works arguably set the basis for modern Islamist thought and whose influence 
can also be recognized in Khomeini’s Shi’ite Iran. While reviewing the main 
manifestations of this ideology that originate from these two scholars’ writings, this 
Chapter has identified the source of tensions and contradictions within Political Islam 




The research has then moved to the analysis of the misinterpretations and 
radicalization of original (Sunni) Islamic thought, which is arguably still driving most of 
the mainstream Western approaches to Political Islam today. To do so, the thought 
and influence of Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb has been examined, showing how the 
development of concepts such as jahiliyya and the justification of violent jihad have 
caused a radicalization surge that still negatively affects perceptions of this doctrine 
today. The Chapter then moved onto the analysis of secondary sources, reviewing 
some of the key Western literature that argues for an inevitable clash between 
Western and Islamic cultures, and therefore contributes to the construction of the 
feared “Islamic Threat”. However, the Chapter later focused on a selection of Western 
scholars who interestingly recognise the huge diversity characterising Political Islam, 
and put forward several arguments against its stereotyping and demonization. 
Ultimately, Roy’s argument for the failure of Political Islam has been quickly reviewed 
and challenged, as this thesis focuses on it with the aim to investigate whether the 
removal of the MB from governance in Egypt is a symptom of failure or just a step on 
Political Islam’s road to adaptation to governance. 
 
Overall, the final aim of this Chapter was to provide solid background knowledge on 
the subject of Political Islam, and a working definition of the term and of its main 
characteristics. It also aimed to show that there is more to this doctrine than what is 
being presented, and that it is far from being a radicalised and violent religious 
ideology. In order to do so the diversity of Political Islam and the multiplicity of its 
forms and origins have been identified and justified throughout the whole chapter, 
with the ultimate aim to challenge prejudices and to examine the sources of chaos and 
confusion. To conclude, the chapter has presented the methodology and analytical 
framework that the thesis relies on. Given the high sensitivity of the topic and the 
contemporary perceptions surrounding Political Islam, the primary research 
conducted for the scope of this thesis was faced by several intellectual and ethical 
obstacles, which have been outlined above.  
 
Because of this, Historical Sociology has been presented as the most appropriate 
analytical framework for the aims of this research. In particular, this thesis relies on 
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Historical Sociology as this approach moves away from the Realist and traditional 
understanding of “Islam” or the “Arab mind” as explanatory elements of the region’s 
geopolitics, but rather focuses on how institutions of both political and socio/religious 
power are established and maintained, recognising states, ideologies and societies as 
the core components of political and social order.192 This is the case as, in order to 
understand the MB and other groups like it, one must place them within a broader 
context. HS allows this thesis to accomplish that. Therefore, it is most suited to the 
study of how the MB’s political evolution has historically shaped the country’s 
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2. The Ikhwan and Egypt: the religious meets the political 
 
 “No one but God knows how many nights we 
spent reviewing the state of the nation… 
analysing the sickness, and thinking of the 
possible remedies. So disturbed were we, 
that we reached the point of tears.”                      
   (Hassan al Banna, 1939) 
 
In the winter of 1938, Hassan al Banna stated “Islam does have a policy embracing the 
happiness of this world”,193 in response to accusations that labelled the MB as a mostly 
political rather than religious group. The MB founder sought to emphasise that, 
because of the nature of Islam, separating the religious and the political was an 
impossible task, and that the MB had therefore to be concerned with both given its 
Islamist nature. This statement marks a clear acknowledgement of 
interconnectedness between Islam and politics, which will be analysed by this chapter 
relying on the case of the historical mutually dependent relationship between the MB 
and the Egyptian state. The chapter argues that the MB’s political development needs 
to be analysed alongside that of Egypt’s itself, as the mutually dependent relationship 
between the group and secular institutions has been historically key to the 
development of both.  
 
Having analysed the historical and ideological roots of Political Islam in the region, it 
has been established that this thesis puts forward an understanding of the doctrine 
that highlights its diversity and heterogeneousness. An awareness of just how diverse 
manifestations of Islamism can be, depending on contexts, groups, and circumstances, 
is key to the purposes of this research and to the understanding of the MB’s political 
evolution. This is the case as, even the group that is considered the Islamist 
organisation par excellence, has had a varied relationship with Political Islam across 
the decades, experiencing recurring internal schisms over ideological matters.  
Following this premise, this chapter examines the Egyptian MB’s relationship with a 
specific understanding of Political Islam and governance, with the aim of providing a 
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genealogy of the Egyptian group and to highlight its importance for the purposes of 
this thesis. The chapter will therefore focus on the MB’s history and political 
development as inherently tied to that of Egypt itself, and will rely on Historical 
Sociology in order to underline and analyse the mutually dependent relationship 
existing between the state and the Islamist group. The chapter provides a short but 
comprehensive analysis of Egyptian religious and political significance, followed by a 
detailed examination of the MB’s history and evolution into one of the most influential 
Islamist groups in the region, and a review of Egypt’s geopolitical importance that 
further justifies the choice of the country as a case study. 
 
This chapter also teases out the tensions inherent in the MB’s practices of Political 
Islam, and therefore establishes the context for the understanding of what “failed” in 
2012. The chapter focuses on the MB’s ideology and tactics, and shows how they 
progressed and developed since the inception of the organization in 1928, underlining 
why they could be perceived as being inconsistent. That is the case because, rather 
than subscribing to a unified and cohesive political narrative, the Brotherhood has 
historically been characterised by internal divisions that therefore lead to different 
interpretations and practices of the same ideology. While its members overall share al 
Banna’s beliefs and objectives, the tactics used to achieve said aims can heavily vary 
and even, at times, be opposed. Once again, this shows how many different 
manifestations of Political Islam can exist within the same interpretation of it, and how 
difficult it is even for an affirmed and influential group to agree on a coherent political 
path.  
 
Ultimately, this chapter argues that despite its troubled history and internal divisions, 
the MB has played a fundamental role in shaping both Egyptian identity and state 
structures that in turn shaped the organisation itself. Its Islamist nature has been both 
an advantage and a liability throughout its political development and has undoubtedly 
shaped its relations with both the regime and the population. This once again goes to 
show that an Historical Sociological approach is fundamental to understanding how 
social and political institutions are established and maintained or, in the case of Egypt, 
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to understand how the MB’s inception and political evolution has shaped the country’s 
institutions, politics, and civil society, and vice versa. 
 
2.1 Genealogy and Historical Context 
The Egyptian MB is renowned for putting forward a very specific and pragmatic 
understanding of Political Islam, and because of its influence on other Islamist 
organizations it embodies a deep religious significance for both the country and the 
region. This relevance is further accentuated by the Brotherhood’s widely recognised 
status as one of the most prolific and renowned Islamist organizations in the region, 
which therefore makes the group’s impact wider and more significant than that of 
smaller or more national-focused Islamist groups. This is not to say that the Egyptian 
MB is somehow representative of Political Islam as a whole, since this doctrine is 
extremely multifaceted as explained in the previous chapter, but it is undeniable that 
the organization and its ideology have been historically taken as an example by several 
Islamist groups across the MENA region. Sisters organizations in Syria, Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan have been directly inspired by the Egyptian group, and MB’s authority 
and influence is widely acknowledged across the Arab World.194  
 
Another unique characteristic of the Brotherhood is the close involvement with 
politics and with the Egyptian government that the organization has had since its 
creation in 1928. This Islamist group is therefore uniquely representative of Political 
Islam’s dedication to society and participation in government, an element that will be 
analysed in depth throughout this thesis and that adds to the MB’s region-wide 
influence. Moreover, the Brotherhood’s status as one of the main civil society actors 
in the country suggests that the organisation has historically acted as a “state within a 
state”195. While this is often used in reference to Hizbollah, I argue that this concept is 
also suited to describe the MB’s involvement with civil society, as the organisation 
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historically derived legitimacy and popular support not just from its religious narrative, 
but also from its social involvement. Millions of Egyptians have for decades relied on 
its provision of basic social services such as education, free healthcare, and so on, 
which shows how deeply embedded the organization is within the country itself.  
 
It is worth noting that this commitment to both government and society is one of the 
main sources of tension within the Brotherhood, as it put the organisation in an 
arguably untenable position, making the exploration of the interplay of commitments 
to both state and religion a recurrent theme throughout the thesis. Therefore, the 
study of the MB’s genealogy is also the study of the development of the Egyptian state 
itself, as the two cannot be separated.  
 
Founded in 1928 as a religious grass-roots movement, the MB has since developed 
into one of the most influential Islamist organisations in the Arab World. Despite its 
troubled history, from the start the Brotherhood directly contributed to the 
development of Egypt’s political identity, by defining it in opposition to colonialism 
and British rule, and represented a steady opposition force against corruption and 
authoritarianism by providing social services and support where the government 
failed to do so. Moreover, notwithstanding internal disputes and external difficulties, 
the organisation has been consistently present throughout the political crises that 
have characterised Egypt since 1952, showing itself to be instrumental to regime-
change and political transitions, while revealing the capability to adapt its narrative to 
changing circumstances and needs.  
 
Deriving its popularity from both its civil society involvement and religious narrative, 
the Brotherhood had the unique capability of being able to mobilise a significant part 
of the Egyptian population, a trait that has historically led to the perception of the 
organization as both a potential government ally and a significant threat.196 Because 
of this, the MB alternated brief periods of somewhat necessary mutual collaboration 
with various Egyptian presidents with decades of harsh repression and illegality, which 
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can be understood as instances of sectarian violence197, which developed the 
organization’s skills in surviving and adapting to changing political circumstances.   
 
While this dynamic nature is somewhat problematic when trying to track the MB’s 
ideological development, this particular characteristic coupled with the Brotherhood’s 
grassroots nature and dedication to the provision of basic social services meant that it 
was not long before the organization sought to have a more active say in Egyptian 
politics. This shift was somehow facilitated by the fact that, as mentioned above, the 
MB’s religious narrative gained it support beyond the state, along with its behaviour. 
However, as outlined in the previous chapter, the organization’s dedication to 
electoral politics was source of various internal schisms and ideological and tactical 
tensions, which eventually divided the MB between those committed to “legitimate” 
political means and those who resorted to the use of violent jihad. This is one of the 
many sources of internal tensions and disagreements that are characteristic of the 
Brotherhood’s history, to be examined later on in the chapter. 
 
The organisation’s evolution from a religious movement into a powerful political entity 
is linked to Egypt’s own revolutionary history as, since its inception, the Brotherhood 
has progressively participated in the country’s political life and its Islamist ideology has 
brought about topical debates and repeatedly challenged despotic governance. The 
Brotherhood’s election as a result of the 2011 Revolution comes with unprecedented 
implications, and a comprehensive understanding of the organisation’s narrative(s) is 
fundamental to grasping the relevance of these contemporary events. Following this, 
it is necessary to clarify that there are five clear themes that are recurrent throughout 
the Brotherhood’s history and political development, which are also fundamental to 
understand its religious significance and influence. These are the politicization of a 
religious movement, radicalization198, involvement in politics, civil society, and internal 
divisions; all aspects that need to be analysed in order to understand the 
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organization’s significance and perception. Often a source of tensions and 
misunderstanding, these themes will be analysed throughout this chapter in order to 
provide a complete understanding of the Brotherhood’s importance in the context of 
Islamic politics and (Egyptian) nation building. 
 
Having acknowledged the importance of the MB, this chapter will also focus on Egypt’s 
religious significance and on its relationship to the origin and growth of some very 
influential understandings of Islamism. Ayoob identifies three specific elements 
underlining Egypt’s affinity to some Political Islam(s), which also explain how it grew 
to be a regional centre for Sunni Islamic theology, a status that is still upheld today and 
embodied in the authority of Al Azar’s University and Mosque. What is behind this 
inseparable relationship is first of all the incredible growth of religious writing and 
literature that started taking place in the country at the beginning of the 19th century, 
and was then renewed towards the end of the 20th century during what is generally 
identified as “Islamic revivalism”.199 Secondly, because of the growing success and 
popularity of the MB, which after only 10 years from its foundation had about 150,000 
active members, the Egyptian government and in particular presidents Nasser and 
Sadat inevitably found themselves having to rely on Islam as a source of legitimacy in 
order to gain popular support.200 This underlines a lack of governmental control and 
capability to look after its own population that still characterises the country today, 
leaving numerous gaps to be filled by other actors, further decreasing its volatile 
legitimacy. In the case of Gamal Nasser, the Pan-Arab president allied with the MB in 
order to successfully complete the Free Officers Coup in 1952 and then, after 
outlawing the organization, kept their networks of social services provision in place 
out of fear of a popular insurgence.201  
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Similarly, upon being elected President, Anwar Sadat called himself “the believer 
president”202, freed MB political prisoners jailed by the Nasserist regime, and was 
know to conclude his speeches with verses from the Quran.203 Finally, even Hosni 
Mubarak who was distinctively hostile towards the MB, cracked down on the 
organization but once again kept their social institutions in place, aware of the 
government’s inability to compete with and substitute them. These are but a few 
examples of how deeply ingrained Political Islam, and in particular the MB’s 
understanding(s) of it, are within Egyptian society, which makes the country and the 
organization a unique case study. Thirdly, Egypt is a state in which the tendency of 
Islamist groups to represent the political opposition and to act as a catalyst for socio-
political revolts reached its peak, once again through the means of the MB.204 Despite 
being proscribed as illegal for the most of its existence, the MB had a unique capability 
of mobilising popular masses in Egypt, contributing to it being at the centre of the 
country’s most significant uprisings throughout its history, such as the January 25th 
movement that culminated with the ousting of Mubarak’s three-decade-long 
dictatorship.  
 
While this particular aspect will be further explained in the next chapter, the 
importance and influence of the Egyptian MB has now been briefly outlined and will 
be underlined further while analysing key themes such as the politicization of a 
religious movement, radicalization, involvement in politics and internal divisions. Their 
importance will be further stressed throughout the detailed analysis of the MB’s 
genealogy and political development. To this aim, it is also necessary to contextualise 
Egypt’ religious and geopolitical importance, using Historical Sociology, as the MB can 
fully be understood only when discussed within the context that influenced its political 
and ideological development. While doing so, the chapter will flag up sources of 
tensions and internal disagreements that are characteristic of the organization and of 
its approach to politics. 
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2.2 Religion, Society and Geopolitics in Egypt 
Before moving onto the study of the MB’s religious and political development, it is 
necessary to provide an analysis of Egypt’s fundamental religious significance. The 
close relationship between the Islamic faith and Egyptian society is not a modern 
phenomenon, as this particular coexistence began with the Arab invasion in the 7th 
century AD.205 This event was to shape Egypt’s essence for the centuries to come, 
turning the country into an Arabic speaking and Islamic nation.  Conquered by Umar, 
the second caliph, Egypt slowly grew into one of the leading intellectual, economic, 
and political protagonists of the region, acquiring the geopolitical and strategic 
importance that still characterises the country today. Moreover, being conquered by 
the former companion of the prophet Mohamed meant that the Egyptian population 
adhered to uniquely Sunni Islam, with a small percentage remaining faithful to 
Christianity, making the country homogeneous in its Islamic component, a 
characteristic that is rare in the region.206 This was a time when, along with prosperity, 
loyalty to Islam progressively grew to be absolute over that for the state, a trend that 
even survived Egypt’s annexation to the Ottoman Empire in 1517.207  Despite 
Istanbul’s replacement of Cairo as a centre of religious and spiritual authority, the 
majority of the Egyptian population maintained their Islamic faith independently of 
their rulers until the 19th century, and developed most of the social and communal 
structures that were then to be taken over by Islamist organizations in the wake of the 
20th century. 
 
The comprehensive doctrine that is now referred to as Political Islam is thought to 
have firstly emerged in Egypt in the 19th century, starting off the mutual and at times 
tempestuous relationship between the Islamic faith, society, and the Egyptian state. 
This conception of Islamism was sparked by various factors and events, such as the 
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Napoleonic invasion, the move to secularization with the emergence of the nation 
state, and popular mobilization ignited by Islamic counter-elites.208 First of all, it was 
foreign intervention and the cultural alienation that came with it that inspired the rise 
of Islamic activism, which was born in response to the Napoleonic and then British 
colonization of North Africa and the Middle East.209 This was when the colonial 
experience fostered the growth of a particular understanding of Political Islam as a 
means against occupation and an expression of resistance, which was also legitimised 
by a new conception of jihad.210 According to Ayoob, the Islamic opposition to colonial 
occupation and corruption of society that triggered the origins of Islamism also 
resulted in the understanding of jihad as a political “struggle” for freedom, a concept 
that Sayyid Qutb later developed further.211 Following this, and perceiving Western 
powers both as rivals and innovators, Egyptian scholars such as Jamal Eddin al-Afghani 
and Mohammed Abduh started arguing for the application of the Islamic faith to 
societal life, almost a century before Hassan al Banna and Sayyid Qutb.  
 
These scholars argued that religious thought had to be reformed and dedicated to 
progress, much needed in order to counteract the advanced innovations introduced 
by colonial powers.212 However, viewing Western colonial powers both as an enemy 
and a model, Abduh  and al-Afghani also argued that an ideal Islamic society should 
incorporate some of the Western innovations and achievements, to be a resilient 
opponent against external influence.213  Abduh based this on the understanding that 
“most of the core values of Western Countries, such as freedom, human rights, and 
justice, are universal and do not conflict with Islam or any religion, even yet they are 
important constituents of Islamic teachings.”214 Such a notion is highly provocative as 
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it is directly opposite to Hassan al Banna’s understanding of Islamism, which viewed 
Western powers and their culture as the main corrupters of both the Egyptian society 
and the Islamic faith,  and therefore as something that had to be removed in its 
entirety. 
 
A more radical version of this ideological position was also shared by Sayyid Qutb, 
which underlines how many diverse school of Islamic thought were flourishing within 
the Egyptian borders and emphasises the importance of the country for the 
development of Islamic theology.215 This variety once again underlines the importance 
of embracing relativism when approaching the study of Islamism, as even within the 
Egyptian context, the diversity of the various manifestations of the ideology is striking. 
This can be best achieved by applying Historical Sociology, as it allows for the 
unpacking of the mutual relationship between formal and informal structures, state 
and non-state actors, and ideology. 
 
Mohamed Abduh, in particular, is regarded as one of the leading figures of early 
Islamist thought and as the precursor of the Egyptian Salafist movement, which 
emphasises once again the importance of Egypt for the development of various 
Islamist schools of thought. Abduh strongly advocated that the prime solution against 
the degeneration of the Muslim society was a return to the governance model created 
by the Prophet and by the first four Caliphs.216 He also believed this to be achievable, 
as he considered the Quranic teachings to be in line with the rationality and positivism 
that characterized modernity.217 It should be pointed out that, while these concepts 
were at the basis of one of the original schools of Egyptian Islamist thought, many of 
these positions were not shared by al Banna or by the MB. Even if the type of Islamism 
advocated by the MB is still directly linked to the birth of the (Egyptian) nation-state, 
which makes it almost anachronistic , it should be clarified that, in opposition to the 
                                                 
https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/07/02/democracy-religion-and-moral-values-a-road-
map-toward-political-transformation-in-egypt/  
215 Bergesen, J., (ed.), The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society (New 
York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 6-8 
216 Ayoob, M., The Many Faces of Political Islam, p. 7 
217 ibid. 
 100 
Salafist movement, the MB has always argued for the transformation of society 
through constitutional means and within the boundaries of the civil state.218 Following 
this, this could be seen as the characteristic that makes the MB a reformist movement 
rather than a radical one.  
 
Moreover, it is interesting to note how some aspects of early Islamist thought had such 
influential repercussions on later Islamist theorists such as Sayyid Qutb. It is in fact 
clear that the thought of the notorious Islamist scholar was clearly influenced by 
Abduh’s conception of jihad, and that the Salafist doctrine is strongly based on that of 
the 19th century scholar. This also supports once again the argument that Political 
Islam is indeed heterogeneous in its manifestations, as solely in the context of Egypt, 
where various Islamist thoughts arose out of the same causes, the various schools are 
inherently different and sometimes even opposite in their aims and means. 
 
Meanwhile, at the end of the 19th century Egypt was moving towards secularization as 
a consequence of foreign intervention and colonial influence, a context that strongly 
affected its transition into a nation-state. Interestingly, the growth of some forms of 
Political Islam as we understand them today can be traced back to the formation of 
the nation-state itself, with this interplay of governance and Islamism being unique to 
the case of Egypt. It is worth noting that these tensions between state and religion 
would come to be embodied by the MB’s ideology and practices, which highlight the 
mutually-shaping relationship between the organisation and the Egyptian state. It 
follows that, along with the secularization of the state came a strong wave of 
institutionalization of the religious field, which was due to the state’s desire to control 
all aspects of everyday life and to somehow limit the influence of the Islamic faith.219  
 
It is therefore clear that even decades before the creation of the MB, the state feared 
the influence and popularity of Islam on the Egyptian population and society, and 
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attempted to control it in order to maintain legitimacy and stability.220 The 
implementation of such state measures was evidently aimed at counteracting the high 
levels of popular support that many mainstream Islamist organizations enjoyed at the 
time, which was partly due to their use of a religious vocabulary familiar to the 
Egyptian people, and which therefore became a powerful mobilization tool.221 The 
popular support enjoyed by the MB especially in the first half of the 20th century was 
one reason that made it so instrumental to regime-change and as a source of 
legitimacy, as the organization had the capability to mobilise a very significant portion 
of the Egyptian population. 
 
This fear of Islamist groups receiving high levels of popular support led to the creation 
of the Dar al-Ifta, (Fatwa Office), in 1895. Created by the state, the institution was 
originally conceived as yet another tool to assert state control over the religious 
sphere.222 However, the Fatwa Office was also set up in order to provide guidance on 
how to live according to the Quran and Islamic jurisprudence, and throughout the 20th 
century has been an instrumental actor in the on-going debate regarding the role of 
the Islamic faith within Egyptian society.223 Part of the role embodied by its head, the 
state Mufti, was to serve as an example for pious Muslims to follow, while the 
institutionalization of this role officially marked the incorporation of religion within the 
sphere of the state. It follows that a new, more politicised form of Islam started 
emerging, which being directly linked to the nation-state, set the stage for the dispute 
between religious and governmental forces that still goes on in the country today. As 
Skovgaard-Petersen argues “The stage was set for a contest between the state and 
various oppositional forces in a common public discourse”.224 However, while this 
office is still in place, it has to be said that its institution had very little success in 
containing the spread and development of various schools of Islamist thought.  
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This is because these new emerging practices of Political Islam took different forms 
and expressions depending on the changing socio-political circumstances and 
therefore lacked common strategies, aims, and a unifying or encompassing identity. 
This once again emphasises the key role that the Egyptian state played in the 
development of Islamist thought and of several of its manifestations. Therefore, even 
manifestations of oppositional Islam –embodied by the MB– were indeed a direct 
response to the formation of the nation-state. Once again, this shows how their two 
histories are inherently linked, and therefore need to be analysed together in order to 
fully understand their mutual influence. 
 
While providing the framework for the development of various Islamist narratives, 
Egypt’s move towards the creation of a secular nation-state also reinforced the leading 
geopolitical role that the country historically played in the region. Egypt’s historic role 
as a regional leader partly derives from the state’s borders, which makes it a land 
bridge between two continents and principal waterways,225 and from its proximity to 
Israel and the Nile basin that has made the state subject to invasions and colonial 
takeovers because of its highly strategic position. 226 Moreover, throughout the 20th 
century Egypt further reinforced its central position in Middle Eastern and African 
affairs because of the pivotal role that its leaders, in particular Anwar Sadat, played in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which also came with strong implications for the narrative of 
Islamist groups such as the MB that have always been against the creation of the state 
of Israel.227 Sadat’s role as a moderator and ally to Israel in fact intensified popular 
discontent towards the government and therefore aided the MB’s popularity, but also 
meant that Egypt started receiving unprecedented amounts of American support and 
aid in order to ensure that it kept being both a pacifier and a buffer zone.228  
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US monetary aid meant that Egypt could still relay on a steady affluence of economic 
support, allowing for the development of a private sector, industrial infrastructures, 
power-generation facilities, transportation and water.229 Egypt benefitted from this 
geopolitical shift from an economic and infrastructural point of view, but significantly 
affected its perception as a regional leader both inside and outside its borders. Egypt’s 
alliance with the US and Israel goes against the position of most states in the MENA 
region, and further justified the Brotherhood’s narrative that calls for a removal of 
external influences from the country, therefore fostering the growth and popularity of 
Islamism.  
 
Egypt’s religious and geopolitical significance are therefore inseparable elements, 
which both contributed to the political development of various Islamist schools within 
the state. These forces also shaped the popular success of the MB throughout the 20th 
century. The regime’s relationship with both Islamist thought and the MB is further 
assessed by Abdo, who identifies three distinct waves of Islamic activism that are 
discernible throughout the country’s modern history and subsequently strengthen this 
relationship. The first wave was the aforementioned first expression of Political Islam 
perpetrated by Jamal Eddin al-Afghani, and was born out of a response against the 
Napoleonic invasion and British colonialism.230 The foundation of the MB in 1928 
represents the second wave of Islamic activism, together with the appearance of an 
ideology that sought to reform Egyptian society through the al dawa, Islamic call, and 
to merge religion with politics and society.231  
 
The third wave of Islamic activism that enveloped the country is what is today 
identified with Islamic Revivalism, started in the 1970s and developed upon the 
previous experiences.  The Islamists leading the revival soon split between those who 
advocated the achievement of an Islamic state through peaceful means and those who 
were more radical in their positions, who soon ended up on the fringes of society 
therefore leaving room for the moderates to take over the Egyptian political 
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discourse.232 The MB, despite not being the only Islamist group active within Egypt at 
that time, led the moderate factions towards an increasing engagement in politics and 
on the quest for political legitimacy and recognition by the state. Therefore, it is clear 
that through these waves Islamism became deeply engraved in Egyptian society, to 
the point that the two are almost inseparable and mutually dependent.  
 
It follows that Egypt has not only provided a unique environment for the MB to 
develop in, but has also played an historical role in shaping and leading the politics of 
the region. The 1950s and 1960s are now remembered as Egypt’s golden era, with 
Cairo being the capital of the Arab World  while the country was guided by Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, the post-colonial leader par excellence.233 This is particularly true 
especially when looking at the country’s influence during Nasser’s times, when Egypt’s 
role as a regional leader and innovator was at its modern historical peak. In his essay 
“Egypt’s Liberation: Philosophy of a Revolution”, Nasser identified three specific areas 
of influence on which the country had significant power, named “circles”, which 
emphasised Egypt’s strategic importance. Laying the basis for pan-Arabism, Nasser 
argued that Egypt existed within three significant orbits, namely the Islamic, Arab, and 
African contexts.234  
 
This position not only underlines Egypt’s multifaceted identity, which makes it an Arab 
Muslim country with deep African connotations, but also shows how vast and diverse 
its sphere of influence is, making it a desirable ally and a significant player in Middle 
Eastern affairs. The merging of its Islamic and Arab identities is one of the main forces 
that made Egypt the regional power and leader it has been for decades. The country’s 
long Islamic heritage developed into a strong sense of identity that grew deeper during 
the times of the British occupation, and yet was somehow distinct from the rest of the 
Arab World. Egyptian national identity was in fact never just a part of a wider, 
encompassing Arabism, but was strongly influenced by the country’s own history, 
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traditions, geography and language. However, this identity was and is without a doubt 
Arab-Islamic, which explains the country’s influences over the entire Arab World and 
on particular Islamist schools of thought.  
 
Before the Arab Uprisings and the chaos that came with the removal of Hosni 
Mubarak, Egypt was regarded as a significant regional power, able to influence the 
region culturally, politically and militarily. 235 Despite the significant turn in events, it 
is undeniable that the country’s inseparable link to Islamic thought and literature is 
also an element that contributed to its prominence, even if everything that happened 
since 2011 has changed perceptions and affected regional equilibrium. Regardless, it 
can be seen once again that the country’s religious significance and political relevance 
are inseparable characteristics, which both significantly affected the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s narrative(s) and political development, as it will be shown in the rest of 
the chapter. 
 
2.3 The Muslim Brotherhood: inception and narrative(s) 
Considered to be one of the leading Islamist political movements in the world, the MB 
was founded as a grassroots, Pan-Islamic organization dedicated to the provision of 
basic social services to the Egyptian population.236  However, it was not long before it 
sought to play an active part in the country’s political arena.237 Represented by the 
slogan “Islam is the solution”, the Brotherhood benefitted from a comprehensive 
ideology and understanding of Islamic values as core pillars of society, which awarded 
it with an unprecedented level of domestic and regional support. 238 Because of this 
the MB soon came to embody a powerful religious and political opposition to the 
Egyptian government and, as the country’s leading Islamist movement, successfully 
presented itself as the defender of Muslim dignity and Egyptian national interests 
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against the colonial occupiers and the national political elite.239 When founding the 
organization, Hassan al Banna was attempting to challenge the British colonial 
presence in Egypt and to dismantle their collaboration with the national elite. This 
narrative eventually evolved to encompass contemporary issues and themes of 
resistance and identity politics.240 
 
Under al Banna’s guidance, the MB was committed to the Islamization of society 
through a bottom-up approach, but it is necessary to note that, in opposition to 
Mohamed Abduh’s position outlined previously, al Banna did not argue for a return to 
the “original” model of governance existing at the time of the Prophet.241 Rather, the 
MB had to operate within “the existing constitutional parliamentary framework in 
Egypt (that), if reformed, would satisfy the political requirements of Islam for a Muslim 
state”.242  Once again, the evolutionary rather than revolutionary nature of the MB is 
apparent and worth highlighting, as its importance will become clear later on in the 
thesis, especially when addressing Roy’s understanding of “failure”. Dedicated to a 
bottom-up approach, the MB aimed at constituting an inclusive society based on the 
teachings contained within the Quran and in the Sunnah, and successfully combined 
this inclination towards social and charity work with political activism and 
revolutionary activities.243 This strategy, combined with the widespread frustration 
with Egypt’s colonial ruler and corrupted government, was one of the elements that 
awarded the MB with unprecedented levels of popular support, which, in turn, made 
it a threat to the existing system of government.  
 
While the exact level of support that the MB gained throughout the decades is hard to 
encapsulate in an exact figure, there are some statistics and estimates that can be 
used to provide an idea of just how quickly its influence grew. Munson notes that while 
the group remained relatively small in its first 3 years, it had 5 branch offices by 1930, 
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15 by 1932, and 300 by 1938. Following from this, while the exact membership figures 
are unknown, 300 branches probably represented between 50,000 and 150,000 
members, with at least double the amount of unofficial supporters.244 By 1949,  when 
the MB had become explicitly critical of British colonial forces had had began 
participating in parliamentary elections, the organization had over 2,000 branches 
throughout Egypt and between 300,000 and 600,000 active members— making it the 
largest organized force in the country.245 Such a rapid and exponential growth is a good 
indication of just of unprecedented the level of popular support the MB enjoyed was, 
making the organisation a key actor in the country’s political change and evolution. 
 
However, when looking at the role played by the MB in the Egyptian context and 
examining the organization’s significance as an Islamist political actor, it is necessary 
to be cautious when approaching matters of ideology, involvement with government, 
and internal schisms. This is the case as the history of the organization is dynamic, 
given various factors that forced the MB to constantly evolve in order to survive 
regime repression and therefore to develop impressive adaptation skills. While there 
has not been an extreme shift from al Banna’s original teachings, the organization’s 
narrative has shifted and the MB has evolved from a mostly religious and social 
movement to a more politicized one. Moreover, as will be developed further, it is 
necessary to note that the history of the organization is characterised by recurrent 
internal schisms over ideology and tactics, with its political evolution therefore being 
less than harmonious, both elements that would have a significant impact on the 
creation and performance of the FJP.  
 
The Brotherhood’s relations with different Egyptian presidents is also similarly 
challenging to evaluate, as they have been characterised by short periods of relative 
collaboration and decades of harsh repression. The controversial claim that the 
organization has also often resorted to the use of violence as a way to achieve its aims 
also needs to be carefully assessed. Therefore, all these aspects will now be examined 
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further in order to achieve a complete and objective understanding of the MB’s 
significance in the Egyptian context. All along, it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
Brotherhood has played a fundamental role as both a civil society actor and political 
entity since its inception, and that its relevance as such needs to be carefully assessed 
especially in the light of contemporary events.  
 
2.4 The Politicisation of a Religious Movement 
The increasing influence of British colonial power on Egyptian affairs and the outbreak 
of the 1936 Arab Revolt in Palestine are amongst the main factors triggering the 
politicization of the Brotherhood, which also showed support for the Palestinian 
struggle through its newsletter and by encouraging sympathy for those rebelling.246 
The MB’s newsletter can be used as a tool to track the organization’s political 
evolution, as it was through it that the MB openly condemned the corruption of the 
Egyptian regime and repeatedly attacked British power. The Brotherhood’s 
participation in the 1941 Parliamentary elections that marked the beginning of the 
organization’s transition into a powerful political entity was also announced through 
their weekly magazine, which embodied the movement’s political essence.247 The 
Brotherhood’s decision to participate in Parliamentary elections was not unexpected, 
as at the turn of 1940s the organization was at the peak of its popular success, with 
approximately 150,000 supporters and more than 300 branches spread across the 
country.248  The Brotherhood’s capability to mobilise such a significant amount of 
people was instrumental for the success of the increasing popular protests and strikes 
that were taking place at the time, and is an aspect that will be analysed further as it 
made the group both a threatening opposition force and a potential powerful ally for 
the Egyptian regime, something that would have a great relevance in the political 
vacuum that followed Mubarak’s removal in 2011. 
 
The Brotherhood’s shift into becoming a mostly political actor, directly engaged in 
electoral politics despite the state’s repression, did not alter the aims of the 
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organization nor did it weakened its core ideological positions, but rather further 
developed and clarified many of them. According to Zahid, one of al Banna’s main 
motivations to embark on such a political transition was the aim of responding to the 
worsening economic crisis and increasing secular practices with a more powerful 
voice, that even as a successful civil society actor the Brotherhood simply did not 
have.249 The political rhetoric adopted by the Brotherhood therefore included the 
objective of countering Egypt’s moral decline and rising poverty through the 
constitution of the umma, the Muslim collective community, and also strongly focused 
on the removal of external pressures on the state.250  The necessity to counter 
Western colonialism and to expel British forces from the country was in fact central to 
the Brotherhood’s political discourse, together with the implementation and 
spreading of a more pure and less corrupted vision of the Islamic faith. To an extent, 
these are still some of the central aims of the organization today, even if slightly 
modified to meet contemporary challenges. 
 
The MB found the legal basis for its increasingly politicized agenda and aims in the 
already existing Egyptian bureaucratic system and constitution, as al Banna was 
committed to the evolutionary reformation of modern state structures rather than to 
their complete eradication. The Brotherhood’s famous slogan “Islam is the solution” 
fits perfectly within Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution, which made “the principles 
of Islamic Law the main source of legislation” and therefore legitimized the 
organization’s call for a society based on original Islamic teachings.251 Article 2 allows 
for the establishment of an Islamic state by recognising shari’a Law as a legitimate and 
principal source on jurisprudence, which once again underlines the link between the 
Egyptian state and Islamic thought.  However, while Article 2 has been in place since 
1952, its formulation had never specified the way in which such correlation had to be 
drawn, who was in charge of codifying shari’a into legislations, and which branch of 
Sunni Islam or school of jurisprudence had to be taken into account. These are all 
                                                 
249 ibid. 
250 Zahid, M., The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s succession crisis: the politics of liberalisation and 
reform in the Middle East, p. 74 
251 Saleh, N., “The 2012 Constitution of Egypt”, Middle East, Information Technology, Foreign Policy, 
http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-2012-translation/  
 110 
aspects that the FJP would clarify when in power in the Constitution of December 
2012, which is also often referred to as the MB’s most obvious attempt to begin the 
Islamisation of the Egyptian state. 
 
When it comes to the Brotherhood’s politicization and to their agenda, a frequent 
source of debate is the role that its commitment to democracy has historically played 
within the organization’s narrative. There are many who contest the applicability of 
this notion, however it needs to be noted that while al Banna was openly opposed to 
the concept of “partyism” and considered it one of the main reasons behind the 
corruption of the Egyptian parliament, he also argued that a democratic framework 
was not incompatible with an Islamic society but rather a component of it:252  
 
When one considers the principles that guide the constitutional system of government, 
one finds that such principles aim to preserve in all its forms the freedom of the individual 
citizen, to make the rulers accountable for their actions to the people and finally, to delimit 
the prerogatives of every single authoritative body. It will be clear to everyone that such 
basic principles correspond perfectly to the teaching of Islam concerning the system of 
government. For this reason, the Muslim Brothers consider that of all the existing systems 
of government, the constitutional system is the form that best suits Islam and Muslims.253 
 
The Brotherhood’s commitment to an Islamic conception of democracy fundamentally 
distinguishes the group from more radical Islamist organizations such as the Salafist Al 
Nour movement, and the value attributed to participation is also evident in the major 
role played within the organization by its followers and supporters. Moreover, as Eid 
Mohammed underlines, the MB is known for operating within the governmental 
framework existing in Egypt throughout the 20th century, and its commitment to the 
achievement of a more democratic political system is something that distinguished the 
organization especially during Hosni Mubarak’s 30 year rule.254 Since the 2005 
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elections, democratic commitment and inclusive governance have been two of the 
main elements characterising the Brotherhood’s political agenda, however, they are 
also a source of internal debates and disagreements, as became clear in the post-2012 
political context. 
 
Since openly politicizing its strategies, the MB experienced a further growth in support 
and popularity that, according to Munson, was due to three specific historical and 
political conditions. These were the continuing influence of British power on the 
Egyptian state, the loss of support experienced by the once anti-colonial Wafd Party, 
and the growing ideological struggle over the creation of the state of Israel.255 At the 
time when the Brotherhood entered the political arena, the British issue was 
dominating Egypt’s political debates, and the once nationalist Wafd party was 
controversially allying with both the government and the colonizers, thereby giving up 
its role as one of the main oppositional parties.256 It follows that the Brotherhood 
quickly replaced the Wafd party in the public battle against colonialism, subsequently 
gaining even more followers and supporters, especially when coupled with the 
commitment to the Palestinian cause and clear opposition to the state of Israel.257  
 
A very similar narrative, even if slightly modernised in order to fit contemporary 
events, was central to the Brotherhood’s aims and political manifesto under the Morsi 
government, whose involvement in the 2012 Gaza conflict is often referred to as a 
continuation of the group’s Islamist ideology. Moreover, upon becoming a political 
actor, the MB quickly filled the political vacuum taking place in Egypt at the time, but 
its ever-growing popularity soon started to be perceived as a threat by the regime.  For 
this reason in 1941 the Brotherhood was outlawed, and al Banna and other prominent 
Brotherhood leaders were arrested in October, starting off the cycle of illegality and 
strive for legitimacy that was to characterise the organization for decades to come.258  
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2.5 Radicalization259 and Use of Political Violence 
The MB is usually regarded as a moderate Islamist organization, however, there are 
also those who claim this to be false and consider it a radical and violent group.260 In 
fact, despite the MB’s clear commitment to the use of peaceful means, the group has 
historically been linked to political violence and lesser jihad.261 This is particularly the 
case as some of its offshoots, such as Hamas, have often recurred to violence to 
achieve their aims and to the fact that some prominent members of Al Qaeda claimed 
in the past to have been directly inspired by some of the Brotherhood’s ideologues.262 
There are consistent debates even within the literature regarding the historical 
heritage of the MB, with some considering it a laboratory for Political Islam and 
democratic progress and others viewing it as a core cradle of Islamist political violence. 
This latest claim needs to be assessed, as the history of the organization has been 
characterised by disputes over matters of ideology and tactics, which have arguably 
affected its political development and evolution. 
 
While the equation of the MB to political violence and extremism is not inherently 
incorrect according to some of its followers, it is necessary to recognise that such a 
notion does not account for the narrative and aims of the “mother” organization. 
Moreover, the radicalization of some of the organizations narratives and members can 
also be explained largely as a defensive rather than an offensive measure.263 There are 
two “trends” of radicalization that can be identified when looking at the Brotherhood’s 
history, however, a deeper analysis then shows that such events had been carried on 
by splinter groups or single individuals rather than by the “official” MB itself. The first 
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radicalization “trend” that swept the MB, in terms of both ideology and recurrence to 
violence as a means to an end, came at the peak of the organization’s popularity in the 
early 1940s. This was a time when its members started separating into different groups 
with a significant divide taking place between the “traditional” Brothers and those who 
wanted to be more active in politics, therefore creating ideological debates.  
 
The result of this schism was the creation of the Secret Apparatus, a paramilitary group 
that interpreted the slogan “jihad is our way” literally and therefore countered the 
MB’s commitment to peaceful and constitutional means.264  The Secret Apparatus was 
officially founded in order to offer protection to the Brotherhood’s leaders and to 
further the organisation’s aims through the use of politically motivated violence.265 It 
was particularly active in the years between 1947 and 1949 and the escalation of 
violent activities linked to the paramilitary group led to the dissolution and outlawing 
of the “mother” organization in 1948.266 However, it is necessary to note that this 
particular militia group was only a splinter of the original MB, and therefore separated 
from its “original” narrative in terms of both strategies and aims. Interestingly, MB 
members and supporters I have interviewed267 all vehemently rejected the idea of the 
Secret Apparatus being somewhat attached to or representative of the mainstream 
organisation. Therefore, it follows that branding the main MB as extremist and 
radicalised is inappropriate, despite international efforts to proscribe the group as 
“terrorist”.  
 
Looking at the Brotherhood’s history there is a second radicalisation “trend” that can 
be identified, which came in 1954 after Gamal Nasser’s crackdown on the organization 
and with the emergence of “Qutbism”. This trend could be understood as being 
defensive rather than offensive in nature. Regarded as one of the most influential 
Islamist scholars, Qutb was a founding member of the Brotherhood and shared al 
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Banna’s preoccupation with the “degenerated” state of Egyptian society. Responding 
to Nasser’s authoritarian and nationalist regime, Qutb took direct inspiration from 
Mawdudi’s interpretation of jahiliyya, Islamic ignorance, and developed it further to 
make it embody a condition that could exist at any time rather than just an historical 
period.268 By doing so, in his book “Milestones”, Qutb identified jahiliyya as the core 
characteristic of secular regimes, Western values, and Nasser’s government, which 
were therefore all obstacles to the achievement of an Islamic society.269   
 
He consequently argued that the practice of jihad was the only solution to the removal 
of these obstacles, and understood it in both his greater sense as “personal/internal 
battle” and in a lesser sense as “armed struggle”270. Qutb subsequently developed a 
very precise set of notions that justified the use of violent jihad as opposed to peaceful 
means to express opposition against the regime, which appealed to many Brothers 
especially during Nasser’s repressive rule. This consequently led to a deep ideological 
division within the organisation, and this radicalised narrative kept on fascinating 
numerous Muslim Brothers even after Qutb’s death in 1966.271 Subscription to Qutb’s 
radicalised narrative is the main reason why links can easily be made between the MB 
and extremism or political violence. However, it needs to be pointed out that the 
existence of a paramilitary wing and the recourse to violent means has been 
condemned multiple times by the “mother” organization. While the group’s affiliation 
to such practice is undeniable, one must always keep in mind the Brotherhood’s 
diversity and internal divisions.  
 
It is therefore a fact that certain factions of the group resorted to violent jihad and 
political violence at various times throughout its history, and the peak of such activities 
can be identified in the assassination of Anwar Sadat by one of the Brotherhood’s 
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splinter groups in 1981.272 Moreover, Qutb’s influence went beyond the sole use of 
violent jihad, but marked a clear radicalization of the Brotherhood’s core ideology as 
well. Under Qutb’s legacy, many young Muslim Brothers grew increasingly dissatisfied 
with what they identified as the organization’s passivity towards the government 
oppression and persecution.273 Such frustration and dissatisfaction with the 
organization’s strategies led to further schisms and internal division, with many 
members leaving the “mother” organization in order to form more militant groups.274   
 
It needs to be noted that the original components and majority of MB’s members 
remained moderate and committed to peaceful means, increasingly focusing on social 
provision and political activism as a way to engage with the Egyptian population and 
government. This internal shift was further accentuated in the 1970s, when the 
Muslim Brotherhood guide and moderate Hasan al Hudaybi condemned and de facto 
excommunicated Sayyid Qutb in his book Du’a la Quda (Preachers, not Judges).275 In 
Hudaybi’s words: “Sayyid Qutb represented himself alone and not the Muslim 
Brethen”.276 Therefore, while it is clear that the Brotherhood has indeed been 
subjected to some radicalization trends, it should also be said that the “mother” 
organization also quickly distanced itself from its more radical elements. For this 
reason, arguing that the organization as a whole is radical and extremist is 
inappropriate, and for the purposes of this thesis only the moderate and mainstream 
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2.6 The Brotherhood as a double-edged sword: source of legitimacy or 
threat? 
The year 1941 marked the start of the Brotherhood’s unstable relation with the 
Egyptian state, which saw cycles of political cooperation alternating with violent 
crackdowns and repeated outlawing of the country’s leading Islamist movement. This 
was mostly due to one of the Brotherhood’s most striking characteristic and resources, 
which is the unprecedented number of followers that, given its popularity, the 
organization could mobilise at any given time. As said before, while the exact numbers 
are hard to pin down, it is believed that at the time the MB had more than 150,000 
active members, and about three times that amount of supporters.277 This aspect was 
fundamental to the MB’s political transition, and while making alliances with the 
organization has looked desirable to many Egyptian presidents, it also turned it into a 
considerable potential threat to the government’s legitimacy. A similar pattern can be 
also identified when looking at the fragile and mutually beneficial alliance that the MB 
struck with SCAF after Mubarak’s removal in 2011, which saw the remnants of the 
deep state once again temporarily coming to terms with the organisation as a way to 
meet popular expectations and gain legitimacy. 
 
The Nasserist era is generally remembered as one of the most repressive times in the 
Brotherhood’s history, characterised by persecutions, crackdowns, and illegality. 
However, there was a time during which these two political entities cooperated and 
worked together to better the country’s conditions and fight external influences. The 
initial harmony between Nasser and the MB could be understood by considering that 
many of the Free Officers, including Nasser himself, came from an Ikhwani background 
and more specifically from the ranks of the Secret Apparatus, before it radicalised.278  
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It follows that the two groups had several key objectives in common, namely the 
removal of colonialism, tackling of the worsening socio-political conditions, and 
opposition to an increasingly corrupted government.279 What tends to be forgotten is 
that Nasser himself was initially committed to a gradual Islamization of society as a 
means to get rid of external powers, which further accentuated the collaboration 
between these two entities; however, lacking a clear strategy themselves, the Free 
Officers heavily relied on the Brotherhood.280 Moreover, because of the Brotherhood’s 
popularity, the Free Officers heavily relied on this political alliance as a way to seek 
legitimacy after the coup, as they lacked a clear ideological narrative and therefore 
needed the MB to secure popular support.281 Sadat and Mubarak also had a very 
similar affiliation to the MB at the start of their respective presidencies, showing 
various degrees of ideological opportunism that then ceased when they realised how 
powerful the organization actually was. 
 
Nasser’s initial affiliation with the MB bore its fruits, as the removal of King Farouk was 
seen by many as a proxy victory for the Islamist organization282 and the Brotherhood 
leader al Hudaybi went as far as describing the coup as a “blessed revolution”.283 
Therefore the Brotherhood initially acted as a source of legitimization for the Nasserist 
regime, but by 1953 this somewhat cooperative relationship had already started to 
crumble. As the Free Officers’ popularity started to fade Nasser perceived the MB 
increasingly as a threat rather than an ally, and a long series of skirmishes and 
disagreements eventually culminated with the dissolution of the organization in 
January 1954.284 The banning of the Brotherhood put the organization into an illegal 
status that lasted up to 2011, and caused a spiral of internal chaos that made Qutb’s 
narrative appeal to an increasing number of members. The appeal of such radicalised 
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ideology was justified by Nasser’s increasing persecution towards the MB, with 
thousands of followers being sent to concentration camp-like prisons, and many of 
these being executed on 9th December 1954.285 
 
Even though the repression experienced during the Nasserist era did not eliminate the 
MB from the Egyptian political sphere, the organization lost approximately 4,000 
followers as a direct consequence of it and was affected by unprecedented internal 
schisms, a blow from which it took a while to recover. Even though it was temporarily 
removed from the realm of high politics, the organization maintained its social 
activities that had always made it a fundamental low politics actor. Moreover, thanks 
to Sadat’s initial openness, the 1970s witnessed a successful rebuilding of the 
Brotherhood, which went back to being one of the most powerful oppositional forces 
in the country. Zahid notes that Sadat’s justifications for once again opening up the 
political system to the Brotherhood were very similar to Nasser’s, as the newly 
installed President was in need of the legitimacy that in Egypt was inevitably tied up 
with the Islamic faith and with the Brotherhood.286 Because of this and of Sadat’s own 
religiosity, the Egyptian president is very often remembered as the “believing 
president”.287 It is important to note that while Sadat did welcome the Brotherhood 
back into the political context, he did not lift the illegal status of the organization, 
which therefore remained an unofficial but influential political actor.  
 
This initial cooperation was indeed mutually beneficial, as Sadat gained considerable 
popular support while the MB was once again able to pursue its aims through legal 
and political means, whose success is clearly shown on the recognition of shari’a law 
as the main source of jurisprudence in 1971.288 However, Sadat’s increasing 
cooperation with Israel and the authoritarian nature of most of his policies soon 
brought history to repeat itself, with his refusal to legally re-install the organization 
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further souring his relations with the Brotherhood.289 Sadat’s popularity declined to 
the point that the Brotherhood joined the ranks of the political opposition once again, 
and allegedly played a role in both the political uprisings of the late 1970s and in 
Sadat’s assassination in 1981.290  
 
It can be seen that there are parallels between Nasser and Sadat when it comes to 
their relationship with the MB, and that the history of the organization is in this sense 
cyclical. Both Presidents sought the Brotherhood’s support in order to secure 
legitimacy and popular support, and turned on the organization when they feared to 
be overthrown. This is the case as the MB’s commitment to both governance and 
society meant that the organisation could mobilise popular support to a degree 
unmatchable by the state, as it was perceived by the millions of destitute Egyptians 
has having replaced the state when it came to the provision social services. Coupled 
with the fact that the MB also represented one of the most organised actors of the 
political opposition in the country, it follows that the organisation was indeed an 
important source of legitimacy. Nasser was the first president to fully grasp the MB’s 
potential in this sense, and took actions to use their popular base for his full advantage. 
However, contrary to what happened under Nasser, the failed cooperation between 
Sadat and the Brotherhood turned out to be highly beneficial for the organization, as 
it further shaped its political identity and narrative and renewed its commitment to 
political activism and resistance.  
  
It follows that, when Hosni Mubarak took Sadat’s place in 1981, the Brotherhood was 
once again one of the most influential and powerful oppositional forces in the country, 
relying on nearly 1 million official members.291 It should not come as a surprise to 
notice that the organization’s relations with the president developed according to a 
pattern that was similar to the one observed at the times of Nasser and Sadat, with 
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the first years of Mubarak’s rule being characterised by (relative) political openness 
aimed at gaining legitimacy and popular support. In an attempt to show his 
commitment to democracy Mubarak released various political prisoners, among 
whom were several influential Muslim Brothers, 292 just as Sadat had done after 
succeeding Nasser in 1970.293 Once again, the similarities between the strategies 
adopted by the different Egyptian Presidents to gain popularity are clear to see.  
 
Despite its illegal status, the Brotherhood managed to participate in both the 1987 and 
2000 elections by having candidates running as individuals or by affiliating with 
external parties,294 and reached the peak of its popularity again in 1994.295 However, 
it soon became clear to Mubarak that the organization’s ever-growing popular support 
was a direct threat to his rule,296 and the Brotherhood and its members started being 
persecuted again under the State of Emergency Law.297 Governmental censorship and 
propaganda were focused on disregarding the authority of the organisation and on 
accentuating the schism between its members, in a clear attempt to provoke a split 
that would cause the Brothers to abandon political activities in what was effectively 
becoming a one-party state.298 
 
However, despite unprecedented repression and indiscriminate arrests, the 
Brotherhood managed to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections, winning 88 
seats (20% of the total places) and therefore confirming once again its status as Egypt’s 
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principal opposition entity.299 In doing so, the Brotherhood also marked a clear break 
with the past, as it finally achieved the political recognition that its members had 
sought for decades. This victory caused Mubarak’s authoritarianism to increase even 
more, with Ottaway noticing that the closest parallel that can be drawn between Sadat 
and Mubarak is the brutality of the continuous crackdowns on the Brotherhood.300 By 
the time of the 2010 contested elections, which are now considered as one of the main 
motives behind the outbreak of the 2011 revolution, hundreds of political opponents 
and Muslim Brothers had been jailed but the Egyptian people never gave up hope. 
With popular rage being fuelled by almost three decades of authoritarian rule, 
opposition groups kept going and governmental authority was challenged daily, 
eventually leading to the events of the 25th January that marked the beginning of 
Mubarak’s fall. According to its original strategies, the Muslim Brothers were going to 
be silent protagonists and essential players throughout the uprisings that eventually 
led to their rise to power for the first time in history. 
 
2.7 The Muslim Brotherhood and Civil Society: “a state within a state” 
It is now clear that the MB and the understandings of Islamism that they advocate are 
deeply ingrained into Egyptian life and both high and low politics, because of the 
involvement in civil society and political affairs that the organization sought since its 
very beginning. What makes the MB unique is the commitment that the group 
dedicated to both national politics and social welfare despite its illegal status, which 
made it both a fundamental social welfare agency and a political movement.  
 
Moreover, for decades the group has been the strongest and most vocal opposition to 
the authoritarianism embodied by Mubarak’s dictatorship, inevitably tying the history 
of the organization with that of the country itself. Known for its moderate approach, 
the Brotherhood (along with other Islamist organizations) arguably did more for the 
Egyptian population than the state itself. The MB focused on the achievement of its 
objectives through means such as education, social services, consciousness-rising and 
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nonviolence, which shortly made it an irreplaceable civil society actor in Egypt.301 The 
huge popular support that the organization enjoyed up to the 2011 Revolution was 
mostly due to the provision of social services across the country, and that focused in 
particular on the poorest parts of the population that were often neglected by the 
state. The organization set up and ran schools, hospitals and job training centres, 
essentially allowing social welfare to develop and flourish in Egypt.302 This further 
shows how Islamist ideologies and the role of Islamist organizations are irreplaceably 
linked with the modern history and development of the state. 
 
Of course while the MB was the most renowned grassroots Islamist organization in the 
state, it was definitely not the only non-governmental association to be active within 
civil society. The presence of many more once again emphasises that unique 
relationship between Islamist ideology and the state in Egypt. in the first half of the 
20th century, the poorest parts of the Egyptian population were heavily reliant on the 
presence of Islamist groups, along with hundreds of Christian and secular non-
governmental organizations, which stepped in and filled the welfare and societal gaps 
left by the state.  Sullivan notes that the popularity of the MB and other Islamist 
groups, despite their illegal status, was mostly due to two simple reasons, namely the 
failure and corruption of the government that was therefore unable to provide for its 
citizens, and the willingness demonstrated by these organizations to fill the gaps left 
by the state.303  
 
Often led by the Brotherhood, these religious and secular NGOs were the only civil 
society actors willing to help local communities tackle poverty, unemployment, and 
government neglect. “Mosque-based” NGOS, aided by their secular counterparts, 
have been instrumental in providing their society with what the Egyptian government 
promised but never fulfilled. Their frustration with the self-centred and corrupt 
centralised authority motivated them to identify the specific needs of local 
communities and population and to develop welfare and social structures to tackle 
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their essential requirements.304 They built hospitals, provided education and support, 
and overall created a sense of civil society and community that was often underpinned 
by the adherence to the Islamic faith. Therefore the MB can be regarded as both a 
political organization and a welfare agency, which has been historically active and 
instrumental in providing health care, education, and the promotion of social 
services.305 
 
The extent to which the Brotherhood provided basic social services becomes even 
clearer when looking at statistics put together by the humanitarian news agency 
Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) in 2006, according to which 20% of 
about 5,000 legally registered NGOs in Egypt were Brotherhood-run or affiliated.306 
Even if the state provides some subsidized public services such as education and 
healthcare, the quality and accessibility to these facilities are often so low that they 
leave the majority of the population on their own.307 Especially in particularly 
impoverished areas, governmental clinics are incredibly rare and often understaffed, 
with only one doctor having to care for entire neighbourhoods at time.308 On the other 
hand, thanks to the wide networks of volunteers and charitable donations, MB’s clinics 
are generally well staffed and better distributed, and their medical services are held 
to be lower in cost and better in quality than those available through the public 
systems.309 It was also found that in 2006 the organization ran more than 22 hospitals 
and at least one school in each of Egypt’s governorates, along with hospitality and care 
centres for orphans and widows and training programs for the unemployed.310  
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Moreover, the services provided by these centres and institutions are open to all 
citizens regardless of their religious and political affiliation, and often considerably 
cheaper than private alternatives. As reported by IRIN in an interview with prominent 
Brotherhood member Gamal Abdel-Salam in 2006, “A woman would usually pay at 
least US $875 to give birth in a private clinic, compared to just US $175 in one of our 
hospitals”.311 Many other Brotherhood members, when interviewed regarding the 
organization’s involvement in social services provision and its perception as an 
alternative provider of services, stated that these activities are undertaken because 
they are a requirement of the Islamic faith, therefore once again strengthening the 
deep cooperation within religion and society in Egypt. The MB’s historical commitment 
to the provision of social services is yet another example of how inherently political 
their narratives and existence have always been, an aspect that further showcases 
their multifaceted involvement in the country’s high and low politics levels. 
 
2.8 Membership and usra: the “family system” 
One of the main differences between the MB and other social movements is its highly 
selective membership system, which is designed to ensure cohesiveness through a 
long process of identification, indoctrination, and socialization.312 Despite the MB 
populist nature, becoming an official ikhwani is a process that takes several years 
because, as a social movement, it is essential for the MB that its members internalise 
the organisation’s ideology, norms, and core values,  develop a sense of belonging and 
self-commitment (iltizam), and merge their identity with that of the organization.313 
This last element is key to the MB’s renowned influence and further stresses the 
“identity-politics” component of the organization’s message, which significantly 
contributes to its strong and unmatchable organizational structure. Such rigidity can 
be easily explained by the fact that the MB had to exist in repressive conditions for the 
majority of its history, with the regime targeting its members and discriminating 
against them along sectarian lines in an attempt to diminish their influence and 
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legitimacy. Therefore, the highly selective process prospective members have to go 
through is intentionally designed to avoid infiltration, to the point when one has to be 
formally invited to become a member rather than doing so voluntarily, leading one MB 
saying “the movement selects its sons”,314 and an ex-member stating “I did not join 
the Brotherhood, I was selected. The Brotherhood recruited me since I was eight years 
old through its children’s program in my village”.315 
 
The MB members I interviewed were reticent when asked to talk about the 
organisation’s internal structure, and it quickly became clear to me that this is a topic 
they would rather not discuss.316 This could be attributable to the international 
scrutiny the MB is currently subjected to, which leads it members to be secretive when 
it comes to its inner workings. While there is a lack of original primary data on this 
topic, there is a consistent body of literature that examines what makes the MB so 
structurally rigorous and unique. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee’s 
piece, “Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood Review”, casts some light on this. 
In addition to the lengthy and strict recruitment process outlined above, the MB builds 
and maintains its organizational unity with what is generally known as “usra”, or as 
“the family system”. First developed in 1949 the usra serves two main principles: it 
reinforces loyalty to avoid infiltration, and essentially constitutes an Islamic studies 
circle, in which the first step of da’wa is delivered.317 The usra also constitutes the first 
of the three sphere that make up the national structure of the MB, with the other two 
being the regional and the national one. Evidence collected in the House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee on Political Islam and the Brotherhood describes the 
national hierarchical structure that governs the organisation as follows: 
 
The first organizational sphere is the local one in which each usra, “family”, chooses a leader 
(naqib) to represent it on the administrative council of the local Muslim Brotherhood branch. 
Each family member is required to lead an Islamic lifestyle; “Regional—The activity of the 
                                                 
314 ibid.   
315 ibid.   
316 Interviews with MB current and former members. 
317 Wonder, K., Re-Islamization in Higher Education and from above and below: the University of 
South Florida and its Global Context (University of South Florida, 2008), p. 222 
 126 
“families” is monitored by a regional administration…The activity of the regional 
administrations is directed by the professional departments, subjected to the General 
Guidance Office”.  “National—the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has remained 
essentially identical to the initial scheme formed in the 1930s and 1940s”. The submission 
explained that the top decision-making body of the Muslim Brotherhood was the General 
Guidance Office, which operated in conjunction with the General Shura Council.318 
 
Such a tightly organised and interconnected structure is arguably what makes the 
MB’s internal organisation unique, and has been a key factor in making the group one 
of the most powerful and influential opposition actors in Egypt up to Mubarak’s 
removal in 2011. In addition, this internal structure and organisation was also reflected 
in the MB’s unrivalled capability in mobilising people, which was explained to me by a 
secular activist that had marched in protests with the MB even before the events of 
2011: “The MB are very organised. They have all of these hands signs (for protests) 
that indicate when to chant, when to march, when to stop. And also, they know how 
to mobilise. To the extent that, if you were participating in a protest before 2011, it 
would be 50% MBs and 50% other protesters from other groups”.319 
 
It is clear that the MB’s internal structure undeniably put it in an advantaged position 
in the aftermath of Mubarak’s removal, especially when combined with its decades-
long experience within the circles of the opposition. However, despite these 
organisational efforts to foster unity and a sense of belonging, deep cracks and schisms 
along ideological lines have historically been characteristic of the MB, and their 
implications are arguably one of the main factors that would lead to the FJP’s 
deposition in July 2013.  A more detailed insight into how internal divisions shaped the 
creation of the FJP and the appointment of its leaders will be provided in Chapter 4, 
but it can be said now that this dichotomy between two separate ideological groups 
had a dramatic impact on the MB’s performance while in government. The MB’s lack 
of trust for outsiders and consequent lack of willingness to cooperate with the 2011 
revolutionaries, together with the preference given to loyalty over expertise, can be 
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understood as direct results of the strict usra system that, designed to keep the MB 
united in times of repression, arguably played a major role in its downfall. 
 
2.9 An history of Internal Divisions 
Just as a troubled relationship with the Egyptian government is characteristic of the 
MB own history, so are the recurrent internal divisions and schism over ideology and 
tactics that indeed affected the organization’s political development. Because of the 
extremely dynamic context in which the organization developed, and because of the 
often authoritarian nature of the Egyptian regimes, the MB had to learn to quickly 
adapt to changing and challenging situations, which, however, came with a price to 
pay in terms of internal harmony and overall political narrative. The first radicalisation 
“trend” that hit the Brotherhood in the Nasserist era brought about internal debates 
over ideology and the use of violence as a legitimate means, which led an era of 
confrontation within the organization itself. Such internal debates are also further 
proof of how diverse the “same” manifestation of Political Islam can be, depending on 
circumstances, individuals, and perspectives. It needs to be noted here that many 
could look at the MB ongoing history of internal divisions as being mostly based on 
tactical differences within a unique ideological context. While that is true to an extent, 
it needs to be acknowledged that, especially after 2011, internal schisms became so 
drastic that their source goes beyond just tactical differences, and that groups within 
the MB ended up following what arguably were distinct ideological paths. 
 
The first manifestation of internal schisms was triggered by a series of historical 
coincidences, these being the death of al Banna, which caused debates over 
leadership, the group’s outlawing at the hands of Nasser, and its deteriorating 
popularity because of illegality and of the regime’s repression. In such a context the 
radicalised doctrine developed by Sayyid Qutb became appealing to many Muslim 
Brothers, who subscribed to a narrative that was inherently opposite to that 
articulated by al Banna himself.320 While these divisions were mostly based on tactics 
at the start, it can be argued that they quickly became ideological, given the 
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incompatibility of the messages put forward by al Banna and Qutb. In fact, those 
radicalised soon clashed with the organization’s new murshid (general guide) Hassan 
al Hudaybi, who was appointed in 1951 and shared with al Banna a deep friendship 
and a similar narrative.321 The new General Guide was renowned for being explicitly 
committed to a gradual Islamization of society and to the use of peaceful means,322 
and his strategy to constitutionally regain the organization’s lost legality and 
popularity was not shared by all. While al Hudaybi called for a stop to public rallies and 
manifestations and openly condemned the Secret Apparatus’s radical tactics,323 those 
who were supportive or part of the militia effectively left the organization and openly 
challenged it, asking for al Hudaybi’s resignation.324 These events marked the peak of 
the organization’s ideological schisms, and also slowed down the MB’s political 
development. From the 1950s onwards the Brotherhood has struggled to present itself 
as a united socio-political movement, something that arguably deeply affected the 
smooth running of the organization once President Morsi was elected into power in 
2012. 
 
While Sadat’s time was relatively calm in terms of internal schisms, it still marked a 
definite evolution in terms of the organization’s narrative and aims. The arrest and 
execution of Sayyid Qutb ended debates over leadership,325 and al Hudaiby’s beliefs 
led to an unprecedented change within the organization that was going to characterise 
its ideology and tactics from then on: the final shift from spiritual to political activism, 
which in turn impacted on the moderate Brotherhood’s strategy and aims.326 If during 
Nasser’s rule the Brotherhood’s political aims were strongly obstructed by internal 
disputes between competing leaders and narratives, soon after Sadat’s appointment 
the focus shifted towards achieving political recognition and inaugurated the 
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beginning of the Brotherhood’s modern era.327 The Brotherhood started evolving from 
a grass-root religious organization and occasionally violent group to an influential 
political movement, developing an Islamist ideology that still characterises it.328 Even 
if making such affirmations could be considered controversial, as the political 
inclination was present since the Brotherhood’s inception in 1928, it is undeniable that 
the shift in aims happened then and that this trend has been characteristic of the 
Brotherhood ever since. Such an inclination was continued by the third murshid Umar 
al Tilmisani, whose leadership was instrumental in rejecting the use of violent jihad 
and therefore marking the shift towards a politicised narrative, and in leading the 
Brotherhood to the elections as independents in 1984.329 Even if short lived, this 
internal harmony allowed the MB to pursue its own re-building and path to 
legalization, which would be instrumental to its survival during Mubarak’s era. 
 
The Brotherhood’s now official ideological and tactical commitment to political means 
continued throughout the Mubarak’s era. However, even if the internal schisms that 
characterised the organization throughout its history seemed to have reduced 
significantly during the first years of Sadat’s Egypt, such confrontations quickly arose 
again with the increasing influence of the MB. The internal divisions characteristic of 
these era can be seen as being mostly tactical rather than ideological. The internal 
struggles that emerged in the early 1980s grew central to the organisation’s running 
and, even if the Mubarak era undoubtedly marked one of the highest peaks of the 
Brotherhood’s political activity, the continuous internal debates limited its potential. 
What in the times of Qutb and al Hudaybi was a disagreement between a moderate 
and a radical ideology turned into a confrontation over political involvement in the 
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1980s. This was due to the emergence of a new, younger generation of Muslim 
Brothers who were more committed to political means rather than religious 
preaching,330 and therefore soon started to clash with the “Old Guard’s” traditional 
approaches.331  
 
The “new” Muslim Brothers took political dynamism and involvement very seriously, 
pursuing alliances with other opposition parties and participating in elections as 
independents in 1984, effectively taking the Brotherhood back to its old popularity and 
influence. 332 However, those constituting the Old Guard were highly reticent to be so 
deeply involved in the country’s political life, and attributed the Brotherhood’s success 
to Mubarak’s growing authoritarianism and harsher repression of the organization.333 
As it happened in the 1950s with the advent of Qutbism, the internal debates 
eventually led to a breaking point over the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood-
affiliated party al Wasat. With the Old Guard strongly challenging its creation, the 
organization came close to yet another crisis, therefore proving that internal 
disagreements remained the Brotherhood’s weakest point.334  
 
This is the case as internal schisms have occurred at different times within the 
organisation – and continued to do so until the 2013 coup – stemming from different 
visions over the political role of the MB, which translated into both ideological and 
tactical questions.  The internal challenges that swept the organisation in the 1980s 
re-emerged in 2012 over the creation of the Freedom and Justice party, which 
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demonstrates how the Brotherhood still struggles to act as an ideologically and 
strategically unified political entity.  
 
In the pre-2011 era, ideological schisms within the MB can be described as a divide 
between “conservatives”, or “traditionalists”, and “reformists”. Traditionalism here 
does not refer to a commitment to pre-modern Islamic thought, but rather puts an 
emphasis on the MB’s “traditions”, these being gradualism, hierarchy, and “listening 
and obeying”.335 These divisions can also be thought of as two very clear, distinct 
boxes: an open box and a black box. The open box would represent the Reformist 
wing, whose followers identify with Al Tilmisani’s school of thought, led by former 
presidential candidate Abdel Fotouh up until the schism that happened in 2011. The 
MB members composing this wing mostly joined the organisation in the 1970s and 
share a general background as student activists in universities, therefore being more 
open to outsiders, and willing to engage in dialogue and political activities with 
external actors. As the events following January 25th demonstrated, there are bigger 
strategic and tactical questions that emerge from these ideological differences. 
 
 On the other hand, the black box represents the Conservative/Qutbi wing, headed by 
Khairat al Shater, who would play a key role in both the creation and administration 
of the FJP in 2011. The conservative wing is characterised by a close-minded position 
and structure that derives from its members’ shared historical experience: most of 
those belonging to this group came to the organization at the time of Qutbism and 
were imprisoned under Nasser, consequently being less trustful of both outsiders and 
fellow MB members who do not belong to their close circle. Particularly when it comes 
to the Conservative wing, and to the role that they played throughout Morsi’s 
presidency, one could argue that their strategies and political behaviour also marked 
a very clear ideological schism from the rest of the MB membership. 
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Most current MB members and supporters interviewed vehemently deny the 
presence of historical divisions within the MB, and rather argue that these have been 
over-emphasised by external actors seeking to diminish the organisation’s renowned 
unity. This is somewhat corroborated by further interviews with secular activists, who 
mostly agree with the fact that “(before 2011) people definitely viewed the MB as one 
monolithic block (...) when Fotouh left, that’s when the divisions became public”.336 
However, several MB ex-members interviewed asserted that there was a leadership 
struggle taking place in the Shura Council even before 2011, playing out between 
Fotouh and al Shater, which had dramatic consequences when it came to the post-
2011 transitional process.  
 
Those will be explored in more detail in chapters 4 and 5, but are usually referred to 
as the “FJP Controversy”, with the Reformist wing arguing that the MB should 
participate in the political system competing accordingly to the rules of the secular 
state and forming alliances and coalitions, and the Conservative wing wanting to 
create an MB specific political party. In addition, there was also an even more 
historically conservative wing that argued that the MB’s focus should remain solely on 
da’wa, something that had already stopped happening in 1939 after the MB 5th 
Conference in Cairo, in which al Banna stated “we need to become political”.337 Public 
or not, the extent to which internal tensions evidently divided the MB in the aftermath 
of 2011 suggests that schisms over practice and ideology had indeed been part of the 
organisation for a while, which is not a surprising phenomenon when taking into 
consideration the size and diversity of its membership. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a clear analytical and geographical framework for the study 
of the MB’s genealogy, with the aim to underline Egypt’s relevance and importance to 
the growth and development of the organisation. To start with, Egypt’s role as a cradle 
for Islamic theology and Islamist thought has been examined, showing how the 
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country and various manifestations of Political Islam are historically tied and mutually 
depended. The chapter has then moved to the analysis of the MB’s history and 
development into a powerful and influential political entity, especially focusing on 
recurring themes such as internal divisions, radicalization, governance, and civil 
society. By doing so the chapter has argued that the history of the organization is far 
from being linear or harmonious, and that its ideology and political narrative have 
therefore been significantly influenced by the status of illegality and instability in 
which the organization has existed.  
 
It has been shown that the Brotherhood lacks and has historically lacked a cohesive 
and unifying ideology, because of internal tensions and different manifestations of the 
same Islamic thought. Regardless, the importance of the MB and of its 
understanding(s) of Islamism for the political history of the country has been 
examined, underlining how the organization has historically acted as a vector for 
change and political opposition since its inception in 1928. Finally, the chapter 
analysed sources of tensions and internal divisions that have characterised the 
Brotherhood throughout its political development, and by doing so it has set the basis 
for the understanding of what arguably went wrong when President Morsi achieved 
power in 2012. Internal disagreements over matters of leadership, ideology, and 
ultimately political strategies and tactics have affected the organization’s evolution 
into a political party, as the lack of a unified narrative has compromised its potential 
to finally bring Egypt out of decades of dictatorship and repression. 
 
Finally, this chapter has shown that the political development of the MB has been 
troubled and inconsistent, because of Egypt’s political situation and of recurring 
internal divisions. The chapter has also outlined the MB’s historical involvement in high 
and low politics, as both a political organization and a civil society actor, an aspect that 
has at times generated competing strategies and narratives within the very 
organization. Therefore, it can be seen that many of the issues that the MB 
experienced while in power in 2012-2013 are direct consequences of these 
disagreements, and of internal issues that have never been properly addressed. 
Moreover, it follows that even such a strong and influential organization appears 
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incapable of providing a unifying and cohesive practice of Political Islam, even when 
its members strives for the same ambitions. This last point farther strengthens the 
argument that Political Islam is far from being monolithic, and that therefore its 




























3. “Preachers not Leaders”: the rise and fall of the Freedom 
and Justice Party 
 
“Treat people like trees: when they throw stones 
at us, we will respond with fruits.”338 
 
 
The MB formally established a political party on 18th May 2011, for the first time since 
its foundation in 1928. Cheered by Islamists across the region and received with 
preoccupation by international observers, the founding of the MB’s political arm 
embodied the opening up of the political space that followed Mubarak’s removal. 
However, the establishment of the FJP was also a source of controversies both inside 
and outside the organisation, as the party was to play a key role in the country’s short 
lived transition to democracy. The events of January 25th and the call for “bread, 
freedom, and social justice” embodied the manifestation of intersectional issues that 
transcended class, religion, and ideological boundaries, leading to the temporary 
formation of a wide-ranging coalition of interests that had Mubarak’s removal as a 
key, shared objective. Yet, the quick success of the popular uprisings came as a surprise 
to many, with an activist stating “The whole 18 days, if you think of it, it was some kind 
of a euphoria, a dream, people did not really believe that something like this could 
happed (...) and then it happened”.339  
 
However, that temporary coalition quickly fragmented when faced with the 
challenged posed by a democratic transition, with the population splitting between 
those supporting the SCAF, secular activists, and MB’s supporters.  Having set up such 
a context, the chapter focuses on the creation of the FJP, examining its manifesto, 
aims, and relationship with both the “mother” organisation and secular actors. 
Understanding such a watershed event as the beginning of the MB’s experience in 
                                                 
338 Mahdi, M., “Statement from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt”, in Ikhwan Message Newsletter, 
(February 2007) http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=2850  
339 Interview with an Egyptian Activist who took part in the popular protests in both Cairo and 
Alexandria. 
 136 
government, the chapter examines the significance of the creation of the FJP and of 
Mohammed Morsi’s election, by focusing on the implications that this had for the 
mainstream organization and for its ideology. For example, the opposition to the 
party’s creation from some prominent members within the MB, and the organization’s 
unprecedented level of political involvement, significantly accentuated tensions over 
practice and ideology that have historically been characteristic of the MB, the outlining 
of which began in the previous chapter.  
 
This chapter uses Historical Sociology to critically analyse the historical and political 
conditions that led to the creation of the Brotherhood-led FJP in the aftermath of the 
January 25th uprisings, in order to assess the implications of such a watershed event 
for both the organization and the perceived incompatibility of governance and Political 
Islam. The analysis of the FJP’s role is fundamental to the purpose of this thesis, as the 
party arguably embodied an historical understanding of Political Islam that had to be 
applied to governance and institutions for the first time, and encountered both 
external and internal challenges while attempting to do so. This chapter does so by 
building upon the understanding of Political Islam as a comprehensive set of practices 
and ideologies established in Chapter 1, together with the teasing out of the various 
internal tensions that such diversity has historically caused for the MB. Following from 
this, Chapter 2 has examined the MB’s interpretation and application of a certain 
understanding of Political Islam to civil and societal life, also focusing on the influence 
that Egypt’s historical role as a regional leader and its geopolitical importance had on 
the organization’s narrative and ideology. Subsequently, it has analysed the conditions 
that led to the politicisation of the Brotherhood from the 1990s onwards, and assessed 
the role that the organization played in the unfolding of the 2011 uprisings.  
 
Chapter 2 also started outlining the tensions between agency and structure that the 
politicization of the Brotherhood’s narrative brought about, which will be further 
analysed and contextualised in this chapter. The clash between agency and structure 
is another recurring theme that is essential to examine in order to fully understand the 
MB’s political behaviour, as it was characteristic of every phase of the MB’s history. 
This therefore drives the analysis that is conducted by each chapter and, together with 
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other core themes such as resistance and civil society, will be fully assessed in the 
Conclusion.  Ultimately, this Chapter seeks to initially assess the Brotherhood’s first 
direct engagement with governance, and the implications that this had for the 
organization’s ideology and membership. 
 
3.1 A Revolution in the making 
The few years leading up to the January 25th uprisings were instrumental for the 
growth and establishment of the MB as a key political player in Egypt, as by directly 
engaging in formal electoral politics for the first time in its history, the organization 
was consolidating its shift from a purely grassroots movement focused on civil society 
to one of the leading actors of political opposition in the country. This was done in a 
context in which the Mubarak regime was growing increasingly authoritarian, 
restricting the already limited political space that it had allowed to Islamist and 
opposition groups during the 1980s, and while sectarian violence and discourses 
aimed at damaging the Brotherhood’s reputation and legitimacy started escalating at 
an alarming rate. Despite such a hostile political environment, the decade between 
the late 1990s and the parliamentary elections of 2005 witnessed the establishment 
of a solid political platform and party structure for the Brotherhood, which were 
arguably instrumental for the organization’s (albeit short-lived) success in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. 
 
Despite Mubarak’s authoritarian rule, the decade preceding his removal was identified 
by many as of one of “Islamic revivalism”.340 This was due to the initial openness 
demonstrated by the regime towards Islamist and opposition groups, a political 
manoeuvre specifically aimed at appeasing the growing levels of popular discontent 
that marked the shift between the Sadat and Mubarak era. Following from the success 
of its independent candidates in the parliamentary elections of 1980s, the MB made 
the most out of the temporary political openness despite its continuing illegal status. 
Under the guidance of Adly Masshour, who belonged to the MB’s “Old Generation”, 
the organization fully committed to al Banna’s original approach to the institution of 
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an Islamist state, which he argued had to come about through a gradual reformation 
of values, society, and governmental structures and institutions.341 In order to renew 
its appeal to different levels and classes of Egyptian society the MB was careful to put 
forward a moderate and reformist narrative, therefore widening its appeal beyond 
what would have constituted the core of its membership thus far. In addition, the first 
decade of the Mubarak regime saw the Brotherhood reaching its peak as a civil society 
actor, as the organisation’s charities, schools, and hospitals were taking care of 
millions of deprived Egyptians and therefore effectively creating what could be 
defined as “a state within a state”.342 The provision of social services is another 
element that widened the Brotherhood’s membership throughout the 1990s, 
however, what aided its political establishment and growing perceived legitimacy even 
more was the change in the regime’s approach to Islamist groups. It is estimated that 
just before the outbreak of the 2011 uprisings, the MB could rely on about 1 million 
active members.343 
 
As his predecessors before him, Mubarak was well aware of the legitimising role that 
the Islamic faith played within the context of Egyptian politics, especially since Sadat’s 
amendment to the Constitution in the 1980s, which saw the establishment of shari’a 
Law as the main source of Jurisprudence.344 Therefore, in order to improve the 
regime’s declining perceived legitimacy, Mubarak made a clear distinction in the way 
in which his cabinet was going to approach the two different strands of Islamism 
prominent in the country at that time, these being a violent form of Islamism or 
Jihadism that relied on strategies such as assassinations and attacks, and a more 
peaceful one that worked from within state institutions.345 In particular, the regime 
hoped that by showing some degree of tolerance towards the MB, the organization’s 
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peaceful narrative and gradual approach to the Islamisation of society would 
overcome and overshadow Jihadist groups’ violent discourse. Moreover, enforcing 
harsh crackdowns on the Brotherhood would have also meant limiting the 
organization’s scope as a civil society actor, a role that the government could not 
afford to replace either economically or structurally.  
 
This is the case as in 2006 the organization ran more than 22 hospitals nationwide and 
at least one school in each of Egypt’s governorates, along with hospitality and care 
centres for orphans and widows and training programs for the unemployed.346 
Besides, the services provided by these centres and institutions were open to all 
citizens regardless of their religious and political affiliation, and often considerably 
cheaper than private alternatives. The extent to which the Brotherhood provided basic 
social services becomes even clearer when looking at statistics put together by the 
humanitarian news agency Integrated Regional Information Network in 2006, 
according to which 20% of about 5,000 legally registered NGOs in Egypt were 
Brotherhood-run or affiliated.347 Such an extensive networks would have been 
impossible for the regime to replace, and therefore had to remain unchallenged to 
avoid the emergence of even more grievances and popular discontent. 
 
However, the regime’s concessions of a wider political space and a higher degree of 
acceptance towards religious and opposition groups were set to be short lived. The 
emergence of Islamic Revivalism348 soon meant that various Islamist groups started 
“politicising their achievements of social legitimacy in society”, a trend that hugely 
accelerated the erosion of the regime’s already lessening legitimacy.349 In line with 
what happened under the rule of both Nasser and Sadat, it quickly became clear that 
the regime was willing to be accepting of the Brotherhood’s social activities only as 
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long as they did not negatively impact on its authority, and that Mubarak’s tolerance 
for their extra-legal integration was dictated by the regime’s need for legitimacy.350  
The growing social and political successes of the MB were the main source of concern 
as, drawing on decades of experience as an illegal opposition group, the organization 
was quick to make the most of the opening up of the political space while it lasted.  
 
The Brotherhood’s achievements in 2005 represented the peak of Egypt’s revivalist 
trend, as the months leading up to the parliamentary elections were characterised by 
numerous demonstrations, protests, and referendums, and culminated with the 
Brotherhood winning 88 seats in Parliament.351 The MB candidates ran as independent 
and almost quintupled their presence in the Assembly, coming to represent the largest 
opposition bloc in Parliament. This was an unprecedented result even for the 
organization itself, as despite its long history, this meant that the Brotherhood had 
won four times the number of seats it had won in the previous elections, and more 
than ten times the number of seats won collectively by other opposition groups.352 
  
As one might expect, the Brotherhood’s electoral success was perceived by the regime 
as a direct and immediate threat to its authority, meaning that whatever little 
tolerance was shown to the organization until that point, was then quickly replaced by 
violent crackdowns and the almost sectarian persecution of its members. The troubled 
relationship between the MB and the various Egyptian regimes can in fact be 
understood as a manifestation of sectarian tensions and violence taking place 
between different political entities that share the same religious narrative. As argued 
elsewhere, in my article “The Politicisation of Sectarianism: the state VS the Ikhwan”, 
state repression against the MB can be understood as a political tool aimed at 
constructing the group as both an “other” and a scapegoat”.353 In the case of 
Mubarak’s regime, the dictator feared a rise in Islamic extremism as a direct result of 
the MB’s electoral successes, and therefore attempted to stop its resurgence by 
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putting in place legal reforms stipulating that "political activity or political parties shall 
not be based on any religious background or foundation”, effectively restricting the 
organization’s access to politics.354  
 
Some of these legal reforms were specifically designed to target the MB and similar 
organisations, as the Constitution was rewritten to include an article stating that 
“Political activity or political parties shall not be based on any religious background or 
foundation”, while other amendments made banned independent candidates from 
running for president.355 New anti-terrorism legislations also gave the the security 
forces the power to arrest and detain suspects without a warrant, and to restrict public 
gatherings, therefore targeting the very heart of the MB’s strategies and modus 
operandi.356 
 
As a consequence, the regime targeted and arrested hundreds of Muslim Brothers and 
supporters, postponed municipal elections to avoid another Islamist success, and 
passed  constitutional amendments  aimed at restricting freedoms and at keeping 
Islamists out of politics.357 Essentially, within the space of 18 months, what little 
attempt had been made to partially re-integrate Islamists into the political system had 
been completely erased once again. By the time of the 2010 elections, which are now 
considered as one of the main motives behind the outbreak of the 2011 revolution, 
hundreds of political opponents and Muslim Brothers had been jailed, with Mubarak 
portraying the Brotherhood through a sectarian lens358 as an “illegal organization with 
ties to extremist groups”.359 As one Muslim Brother articulated: “we were always 
treated as second class citizens under Mubarak. If you are a member of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, you will not join the army, become a minister, or a governor”, therefore 
creating a strong sense of deprivation and exclusion.360 
 
3.2 Political Successes and Internal Schisms 
Despite the regime’s repression, the political progress and levels of popular legitimacy 
that the Brotherhood had achieved up to 2005 were not completely erased. Perceived 
by the majority of the population as a legitimate and powerful opposition actor, 
because of its history as one of the most vocal oppositional groups in Egypt, the 
Islamist organization could still rely on an almost complete control over the country’s 
professional syndicates, and on a growing number of supporters and young activists 
within Egypt’s most important universities.361 This added to its already unrivalled 
membership, that at the turn of the decade counted approximately 1 million of active 
members, and even more non-affiliated supporters. If anything, the threats that the 
organization was facing in the six years leading up to the 2011 Uprisings were not 
coming from the outside, but were once again internal in nature.  
 
In line with a trend that is characteristic of much of the Brotherhood’s history, 
following the 2005 electoral success internal debates were very much focused on 
whether the organization should remain purely grassroots in nature and committed to 
gradual and long term social change, or whether its members should directly engage 
in competitive and “real” politics.362 These debates were both ideological and tactical 
in nature. Therefore, the schism between conservative senior leaders and reformist 
youth activists that emerged during the Sadat era came to the fore once again, with 
internal competition over matters of engagement and leadership risking to seriously 
undermine the organization’s political progress.363  
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These internal divisions would also characterize the creation of the FJP after the 
successful removal of Hosni Mubarak, but in a pre-revolutionary context, there were 
four main principles that kept the Brotherhood united and relatively successful despite 
its internal struggles over power dynamics. These were articulated by the 
organization’s founder Hassan al Banna, and were a belief that Islam is an all-
encompassing system, the rejection of violence as a means of political change in 
domestic politics, the acceptance of democracy as a political system, the consequent 
recognition of political pluralism as a valid concept, and the support for resistance 
movements operating against foreign and colonial occupation.364 Such values were 
being held by the vast majority of Muslim Brothers despite their sometimes competing 
ideological leanings, meaning that despite its internal dynamics, the organization went 
into the events of 2011 as an ideologically united group, even if the divisions in terms 
of interpretation flagged up in Chapter 2 still persisted among its members. 
 
Islamist groups such as the Brotherhood were mostly operating at the fringes of 
Egyptian politics before the events of 2011, because of their illegal status and the 
regime’s preoccupation with its own legitimacy.  In the pre-2011 era, the MB in 
particular had two key objectives: the enhancement of its socio-political appeal and 
the survival of its organization, which it managed to achieve despite the brutal 
repression imposed on its members by the military dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak.365 
Such a mind-set, coupled with the serious transformation that the organization 
underwent in the previous decade, meant that when January 25th brought about the 
complete reshuffling of the country’s political arena, the Brotherhood and its 
members had already developed a political agenda that increasingly prioritised 
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3.3 Lead up to January 25th: regime change VS. change of regime 
In the six years leading up to the 2011 Uprisings, the Brotherhood grew to be 
recognised by both internal and external observers as the single largest and most 
organised opposition group in Egypt. It is estimated that by the time the popular 
protests started, the organisation counted 600,000 to 1 million active members, and 
a support base of approximately 2 million Egyptians.367 That is because of the 
organization’s charitable nature that appealed to many in a time of worsening 
economic and political crisis, and considerably widened the Brotherhood’s appeal and 
influence. However, despite its established status as a fundamental civil society actor, 
the Brotherhood was just tolerated by the Mubarak regime, which meant that its 
members had to participate in politics as independents and were forced to operate in 
a grey area, which left them open to arrest and torture at any given time.368 This 
blurred line between tolerance and repression is particularly important when 
understanding the role that the Brotherhood played during the 2011 Uprisings, as the 
organization’s membership was torn between seizing the opportunity for change and 
fearing even harsher persecutions if the protests failed.  
 
When the Egyptian population took to the streets on January 25th 2011, the general 
reaction was not surprise at the fact that an uprising was taking place in Egypt, but 
rather that it had taken so long. Decades of worsening economic conditions, restriction 
of political space and gross abuse of human rights under the Mubarak regime had left 
Egyptians – literally – hungry for change, as the numerous protests characterising the 
late 2000s demonstrate. It follows that the uprising that brought together Egyptians 
of all classes and religious backgrounds was only in part triggered by neighbouring 
Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution; rather, it was a result of popular grievances that had 
been building up for years in a country with a long history of both military 
authoritarianism and “street politics”.369 This can be seen as on 25th January 2011 
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Egyptians were not just calling for the fall of the regime. A demand that was louder 
than all the other chants was that for “bread, freedom, and (human) dignity”.370 It is 
estimated that at the time when the uprising broke out about 40% of Egyptian lived 
below the poverty line, while even higher percentages had to rely on subsidized 
goods371, and 2.5 million Egyptians aged 20-24 were unemployed.372 Hosni Mubarak’s 
regime was the exemplary case of durable authoritarianism, allowing its citizens just 
enough political space to keep direct threats to the regime at bay. Interestingly, it was 
this admittedly very limited space that made the country’s population extremely 
competent with the practice of politics and dissent in the street; essentially, a strong 
regime was deposed by an even stronger society.373  
 
Likewise, the choice of January 25th as the initial day of the protests was also highly 
significant. Generally called “Police Day” it marked an annual national holiday meant 
to commemorate the lives of various policemen that died in the fight against British 
colonialism.374 Anti-Mubarak political activists had gathered in Tahrir square on 
January 25th for years, in what had become an annual protest that usually failed to 
attract more than a few hundred people.375 However, the continued escalation of 
police brutality and the regime’s blatant interference in the 2010 parliamentary 
elections, when ballot boxes were tampered with in order to make Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party emerge as victor, made it clear that achieving reforms through 
formal institutional channels was increasingly becoming an utopia, while Ben Ali’s 
successful removal allegedly demonstrated the efficacy of peaceful protests as a 
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means of political change. Such a convergence of historical circumstances and regional 
dynamics were set make the 2011 Police Day a historical landmark in Egyptian history. 
 
In the weeks leading up to January 25th, youth activists from several opposition groups 
had been secretly meeting to devise tactics that would attract more protesters and 
outsmart the police forces that would have been present en mass, a carefully planned 
process in which young MB activists played a fundamental role.376 Friday 28th was 
chosen by the organisers as a national “Day of Rage” that had the overarching aim of 
occupying Tahrir Square, even if there were very few activists who believed that the 
protest would last that long. However, the conjunction of unique historical and 
regional circumstances meant that the activists’ expectations were quickly met and 
surpassed, as millions of Egyptians joined marches not only in Cairo but throughout 
the country, in what would rapidly become an 18-days-long revolution that would 
topple one of the region’s longest standing dictators.  
 
Because of the decades-long nature of the grievances that brought Egyptians together, 
the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square were quick to issue an official statement 
containing their 6 main demands377, these being: the downfall of the regime of Hosni 
Mubarak and its ministers, the cessation of Emergency Law, freedom, justice, the 
formation of a new, non-military government with the interest of the Egyptian people 
at heart, and the constructive administration of all of Egypt’s resources. Essentially 
what the people were asking for was the removal of an ancient and discriminatory 
status quo, which united them all in their popular struggle for dignity. Of course, the 
visions of what was to follow eventually turned out to be radically different from what 
actually took place in the following months and years. 
 
Interestingly, the people were not fighting alone in Tahrir square, as the 
revolutionaries also had the army on their side. When the regime realized the extent 
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to which the protesters were willing to go, Mubarak ordered tanks and troops in to 
restore order in the heart of Cairo. What happened instead is that the soldiers were 
welcomed as “guardians of the people”, with chants such as “the people and the army 
are one hand” resonating from Tahrir square, reflecting the genuine affection that 
many felt towards the Army.378  That was the case as throughout the decades the Army 
had managed to repeatedly present itself as one of the few competent organizations 
in Egypt’s decaying public sector, and also distanced itself from some of the regime’s 
most unpopular policies by refusing to get involved in acts of domestic repression.379 
This highly strategic move meant that in 2011 many genuinely perceived the Armed 
Forces as honest and trusted guardians of the state, and were therefore willing to trust 
the SCAF to oversee the transition from Mubarak’s dictatorship to a democratic rule.  
 
3.4 The Muslim Brotherhood and Jan 25th: the status quo VS. 
opportunity for change 
The MB internal situation and its fragile relationship with the Mubarak regime are 
essential to examine when seeking to understand the role that the organization played 
during the 18 days that led to the toppling of Mubarak (even more so when 
considering that many of the actions taken by its members came as a surprise to both 
internal and external observers). Given the Brotherhood’s activist history and its status 
as one of the most organised and influential opposition groups in Egypt, many 
expected its members to fully endorse the protest and take part in the uprising straight 
away; instead, its leaders held the MB back. This perception was also reinforced by the 
active role that the Brotherhood’s youth activist wing had played in the organization 
of the popular gathering on January 25th, something that underlined the changing 
nature of the organization into an increasingly politicised group.  
 
In a clear break with the past, and in opposition to the senior and more conservative 
leadership of the Brotherhood, in the decade preceding the 2011 uprising young 
Muslim Brothers had already started to engage with their secular counterparts, 
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especially within universities. Because of the organisation’s internal discipline and 
organisation, Brotherhood affiliated youths represented the largest and most effective 
faction of the student movement, which made them a desirable ally for their fellows 
in other opposition groups.380 While the organisation’s senior leadership remained 
isolated and suspicious of cooperation with non-Islamist networks, many within the 
Brotherhood’s youth grew increasingly convinced that their actions would be more 
effective if they came from a wider coalition, and therefore started to develop 
friendships and cooperative ties with their counterparts in secular human rights 
networks, as they shared the same overarching aims.381  
 
Therefore, MB youth leaders with their secular allies were involved in the planning of 
January 25th from the very beginning, something that further accentuated internal 
divisions when the leadership realised that the uprising could represent a milestone in 
the organisation’s history. Essentially, individual agency had started to become more 
of a driving force for the younger generation of Muslim Brothers, despite the rigidity 
of the organization’s structure, creating a tension that would quickly surface in the 
aftermath of January 25th. 
 
The position that the Brotherhood would take throughout the 2011 uprising therefore 
reflected this deep and long running internal divide between its reformist and 
conservative members. While the senior membership was deeply conservative in its 
means, sceptical towards the outcome of the revolution, and feared repercussions 
that could hit the organisation if it openly challenged the status quo, the 
Brotherhood’s activist youth were leaning towards a more reformist narrative and 
were more eager to participate in anti-regime protests and to tackle Mubarak’s deep 
state head on. Moreover, despite the fact that as youth members the young 
Brotherhood’s reformists were still acting under the supervision of the senior 
Guidance Bureau, their activities and growing influence within universities meant that 
they enjoyed quite a sizeable degree of autonomy in practice. Therefore, as soon as it 
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became clear that the 2011 uprisings were going to be inherently different from the 
protests that had been characterising the country for years, the MB found itself facing 
not only external challenges, but also a crippling internal divide. 
 
Because of the active role that youth Brotherhood members played in the organisation 
of January 25th, they soon requested the Guidance Bureau’s permission to participate 
in the protests in the name of shabab al-Ikhwan (Brotherhood youth), but they were 
denied permission because of the sensitivity of the issue.382 One ex-MB member 
explained this reticence to me by saying “The main idea was that they (the MB 
leadership) did not want to get themselves involved in something they did not have 
much to do with. They thought it was not going to succeed, and they were afraid that 
no one would participate, and that if we went would take all the responsibility and we 
would go to jail if there was not everyone else in the street”383. However, as the 
protests spread throughout the country and progressively gained more momentum, 
the Brotherhood’s senior leadership found themselves facing two inherently opposite 
choices: extreme provocation of the regime, or detachment from the broader 
nationalist movement.384  
 
Both positions would come with severe consequences, as the Brotherhood could face 
yet another round of harsh governmental crackdowns that would further aggravate its 
failing quest towards legitimacy, or it could risk losing the support and influence on 
the population if it failed to participate in such a topical historical event. As a former 
Brotherhood member clearly articulated: “the MB is afraid of aggravating security 
forces against them and are at the same time afraid of missing the opportunity to 
participate in this widely anticipated protest against the regime”.385  The difficulty in 
choosing whether to endorse the protests or not was further aggravated by the 
Brotherhood youth’s clear intent to participate as independents with or without the 
approval of the Guidance Bureau, which eventually complied to their request under 
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the condition that they would not openly target any governmental official by name.386 
Therefore, while the Brotherhood itself initially remained neutral, neither supporting 
the protests nor opposing it, its youth faction was present on the ground since day 
one, while the special circumstances that the organization faced as the largest and 
most organized faction of the opposition were reflected in the escalating tones of the 
statements that its senior leadership released between the 15-28th of January.  
 
The Guidance Bureau’s reluctance to officially endorse the revolution was deeply 
rooted in their fear of crippling governmental repercussions, a suspicion that was soon 
confirmed by the fact that, just hours into January 25th, the Interior Minister issued a 
statement blaming the Brotherhood for the unrest, while the following day several 
prominent senior members were warned that they would be arrested if the protest 
continued.387 This is a clear example of the legacy of alternating and mostly troubled 
relations between the government and the MB, which particularly under the Mubarak 
regime was often identified as a scapegoat. However, such threats made those who 
were reluctant within the Brotherhood realise that the organization would have been 
the first target of governmental wrath whatever the outcome of the uprisings or the 
extent of their involvement, which made them change their position and release a 
statement on January 26th calling for the regime to “comply to the people’s will”.388  
 
The former MB member quoted above commented on the tensions between the 
organisation’s leadership and its members by saying “We contacted them (the 
Guidance Bureau) and told them “There is a Revolution in the street! Let us 
participate!”.389  On the night of January 27th, some 75 members of the MB were 
arrested by governmental forces, among whom was Mohamed Morsi, reinforcing the 
growing conviction that the organization would have been used as a scapegoat once 
again, regardless of whether its leaders decided to officially endorse the protests or 
not. This realisation was not only essential to the MB’s “race” to politicisation that 
                                                 
386 Wickham, C., The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement, p. 161 
387 ibid., p. 162 
388 El Houdaiby, I., Revolution and Beyond, p. 137 
389 Interview with a former MB member. 
 151 
took place in the following months, but was also another example of how openly its 
members were consistently sectarianized by the regime.390 Subsequently, on the eve 
of the “day of rage”, January 28th, the organization announced its endorsement and 
called upon its members to join the revolutionaries in the streets after the noon 
prayers on Friday 28th.391 When it ordered its member to the streets, the MB became 
a vital part of the uprisings, in line with its revolutionary history in the country’s 
opposition movement. Some would go as far as saying that Mubarak’s removal would 
not have been possible without the Brotherhood’s participation, as the organization 
not only provided an unprecedented amount of manpower, but also lent its historical 
experience in successfully managing protests to the revolutionaries in the street. 
 
Mohamed Soudan, the FJP Foreign Relations Secretary and a MB member for over 30 
years, identified Friday 28th as the day the “real revolution” started. He recalls “From 
the 27th at night, we got an order from the General Guidance saying that everyone had 
to go and join the revolution. We got the plan, the agenda, and a breakdown of who 
was doing what at which time (…) it was not random, everything was planned. We took 
3 million people with us”.392 In his account, the MB’s historical ability to organize and 
mobilise in times of oppression comes across clearly, as because of the regime’s 
shutdown of the internet and the MB’s own reticence to use phones to communicate 
because of security concerns, the top rank of the organisation had to spread the 
message across their membership in the country on a person by person basis, which 
they succeeded to do in just over 5 hours. When asked why the organisation waited 
until the 28th to join the protests, he said that the MB’ General Guidance not only 
feared repercussions from the regime, but they were also suspicious about the nature 
of the revolution, since to them it was not clear who really was behind it and what the 
main aims were.393 Regardless, when the Shura (Consultation) Council voted in favour 
of joining the revolutionaries, the MB shifted the power of balance in their favour by 
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mobilising millions of members and supporters around the country, once again 
confirming its position as Egypt’s most influential grassroots group.  
 
However, Soudan stands behind the doubts that the General Guidance had about 
which one of Egypt’s many actors wanted the revolution to succeed, and now believes 
that the security forces and SCAF in particular used the revolutionaries for their own 
benefit since the very first day. As evidence, he states that the Police Forces were 
clearly on the side of the people, as “What I noticed is that the majority of those who 
were there to prevent the revolution, they did not fire on us. They used tear gas and 
rubber bullets, but they did not fire on us”.394 He adds that, upon sending the Police 
Forces home in the afternoon of January 28th, the Army then took over and started 
spreading the famous slogan “the Army and the people are one hand”, which “was a 
big lie, but many people believed it”. In retrospect, Soudan regrets the fact that by 
taking the side of the protesters the MB facilitated SCAF’s seizure of power, but it 
cannot be denied that the role played by the organization was instrumental in the 
revolution’s success, regardless of its outcomes.395 
 
3.5 The Brotherhood’s revolutionary youth: the key to success? 
Many have argued that the role that the Brotherhood was to play in Tahrir square and 
in other key opposition locations across the country can be seen as directly reflecting 
the organization’s deep internal divisions over tactics, especially when taking into 
account the General Guidance’s reticence, as it was its revolutionary youth that was 
instrumental to the success of January 25th. Indeed, the young reformists that had 
been so heavily criticized by the organization’s senior leadership were quick to gain 
control of revolutionary actions and to use their experience to coordinate anti-regime 
rallies and to keep the revolutionaries safe, which in turn enhanced the perceived 
legitimacy of the Brotherhood as a whole. I have conducted several interviews with 
people coming from different social and political backgrounds, all present in Tahrir 
Square, and the general consensus is that while the MB did not join straight away, 




when they did they brought their renowned organisational capability with them: “they 
led many of the protests, like organizing where they would be starting from, where 
they were going to go, but also providing the cars, and the microphones, and the flags, 
all of this was really organised by the MBs at the time”.396  
 
Despite this, the position taken by the Brotherhood still reflected a deep internal 
divide over tactics, as while activists on the ground were playing a vital role for the 
success of the uprisings, senior members remained anchored to their conservative 
positions as they clearly endorsed the revolutionaries’ demands and opposed the 
regime’s threats, but also “opened the door to a constructive, productive and sincere 
dialogue” with the falling government.397 Therefore, the activists’ actions in the 
unravelling of the 2011 uprisings only further accentuated the senior leadership’s 
dilemma over which role the organization should take in the protests and in what was 
to follow, heightening a long series of internal division that some would argue led to 
the failure of the FJP governance in the Summer of 2013. 
 
Following the Guidance Bureau’s official endorsement of the uprisings, its members 
rallied behind the protesters instantly, multiplying their number; it is estimated that 
on January 28th alone more that 100,000 Brothers joined the demonstration.398 
Moreover, the Brotherhood’s youth was instrumental in defending the revolutionaries 
and people amassed in the squares against the brutal attacks of the Armed Forces and 
hired thugs, as their well practiced discipline and expertise in protesting was key to 
maintaining order and safety across the country. Soudan claims that their orders were 
also to protect governmental buildings such as police stations, NDP headquarters and 
so on, from vandalism allegedly perpetrated by infiltrated revolutionaries to justify the 
regime’s violent treatment of protesters. He added “Also we got the order we had to 
save every particular building belonging to the government: police stations, NDP 
headquarters, we had to safeguard it from people who were infiltrated and there just 
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to make chaos, that was another job for us. I was one of the heads to control this. The 
worst thing for us was to prevent those people from being inserted by the security 
forces to create chaos, and violence…because we would have been blamed otherwise. 
We tried as much as we could”.399 Such actions were instrumental to keeping the 
revolutionaries safe from government-led violence, but also show once again the 
regime’s tendency to target the MB whenever it was faced with public discontent, a 
trend of which MB members were aware and actively attempted to counteract. 
 
The Brotherhood’s young reformists soon began to act as a fundamental point of 
contact between Islamist and secular opposition forces, relying on the ties of 
friendship and cooperation with fellow secular revolutionaries that they had 
established within universities.400 This in turn unified the demands of the protesters 
and accentuated their common aims, which was instrumental for the revolutionary 
movement to gain momentum and spread even to the most rural parts of the country. 
In addition, the Brotherhood also called upon its long term supporters, the country’s 
poorest, to join the anti-regime movement, as its youth activists engaged in direct 
outreach with the residents of the sha’bi neighbourhoods of greater Cairo, which 
helped connect the political demands of the protestors with the socioeconomic 
grievances of Egypt’s poor.401 Therefore, the actions undertaken by the Brotherhood’s 
youth were instrumental in shaping popular and regional perceptions of the 
organization’s role in the uprisings, which led to a sharp increase in the Brotherhood’s 
perceived legitimacy and was arguably key to its success in the post-Mubarak political 
context. Interviews with protesters reveal accounts such as “They (MB youth) were on 
the ground mixing with others and this gave the Brotherhood legitimacy. The Guidance 
Bureau was forced to depend on them, whether they wanted to or not”, while others 
praised the courage of the Brotherhood’s cadres and their skills in outmanoeuvring 
the attackers by saying “they were at the forefront. They defended us all, this is a 
fact”.402  
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However, the increasing organizational role that some of its members were playing in 
the streets presented the Brotherhood’s leadership with two more challenges: 
reassure both domestic and regional observers that the organization was not trying to 
hijack the revolution for its own means, and managing the growing call for reforms of 
the organization’s hierarchical structure that originated within the Brotherhood itself. 
In terms of dealing with the first challenge, while the Brotherhood’s senior members 
were well aware of the fact that a successful outcome of the uprisings could have 
represented a watershed moment for the organization after decades of illegality and 
persecution, they were incredibly careful not to claim the uprising as “Islamist” and to 
downplay their role and participation in them. In order to avoid being seen as 
exploiting the revolution for its own end, the Guidance Bureau was careful to stress 
that Brotherhood members had joined the protests as Egyptians, not Islamists, 
releasing statements such as “the Egyptian protests are not an Islamic uprising, but a 
mass protest against an unjust, autocratic regime, which includes Egyptians from all 
walks of life, all religions, and all sects”403 and “we come with no special agenda of our 
own- our agenda is that of the Egyptian people. We aim to achieve reform and rights 
for all: not just for the MB, not just for Muslims, but for all Egyptians”.404 Similarly, the 
slogan and chants used by the revolutionaries did not make reference to any partisan 
agenda and remained politically neutral, with no religious allusion whatsoever.405  
 
Arguably, the Brotherhood’s effort to remain in the background stemmed from its 
members’ awareness that, as the largest and most popular opposition group in the 
country, a transition to democracy was in the organization’s best interest, and also 
reflected their intense desire for the uprising to succeed and for the long decades of 
marginalization and exclusion to come to an end. However, the Brotherhood’s 
widening internal divide and ideological dilemma over the extent to which the 
organization should engage in politics was much harder to disguise, and would come 
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back to the fore in the post-Mubarak transitional period. Once again, the tension 
between structure and agency that started to emerge in the lead up to January 25th, 
was becoming increasingly prominent and bore considerable implications for the 
political future of the organization as a whole.  
 
3.6 Transition 
After 18 days, the popular struggle for dignity and for the removal of an ancient and 
discriminatory status quo seemed to succeed, as Hosni Mubarak was deposed on 11th 
February 2011, an event that caused equal levels of regional and global concern and 
elation. The significance of the removal of a man who embodied an almost three-
decade-long political stasis is encapsulated by statements such as “Lift your head up, 
you are an Egyptian” and “We can breathe fresh air, we can feel our freedom”,406 
which were being chanted by the thousands gathered in Tahrir Square that day. 
However, the success of the 2011 uprising was not due to “people power” alone as it 
relied on the support of the Egyptian military, the only institution in the country 
capable of forcing Mubarak to resign from power, and therefore was not a thawra 
(revolution). Arguably, rather than leading to the dismantling of the authoritarian state 
and the assumption of power by revolutionary leaders, the concentration of power in 
the hands on the SCAF produced what can be defined as a “change of regime” rather 
than a “regime change”. Indeed, the seizing of power by an institution formerly allied 
with Mubarak exposed the gap between the protesters’ aspirations and their 
capability to translate them into an enforceable political manifesto, mostly because of 
the reliance on the deep state and the fragmentation and disorganization of the 
uprisings’ leaders. 
 
Hosni Mubarak resigned from his post as the fourth president of Egypt on 11th 
February 2011, and many of those who had fought in Tahrir square for 18 days 
welcomed the Army’s new role as the pinnacle of political power, chanting the slogan 
“the Army and the people are one hand”.407 The SCAF announced that the constitution 
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was suspended, that the parliament was dissolved, and that it would remain in power 
in order to oversee a just and democratic transition to an elected government until 
presidential and parliamentary elections could be held, estimating that to be in six 
months time.408 The removal of Mubarak led to the creation of a huge political void in 
Egypt, the gravity of which failed to be immediately recognised because of the 
euphoria brought about being free from a corrupt and brutal authoritarian regime 
enveloping the country. However, the absence of a clear and transparent political 
leadership was going to come with severe consequences for Egypt. 
 
Despite being careful not to hijack the revolution for its own means, and regardless of 
its deep internal division, the MB emerged from 2011 as a victor and as a key player in 
Egypt’s incipient political order. Like many others representing the anti-Mubarak 
political opposition, the Brotherhood saw SCAF’s assumption of power as a means to 
an end to achieve political transition, as its leaders were aware that military support 
was necessary to the installing of a new regime and political order. Additionally, after 
nearly six decades of marginalisation and illegality, the Brotherhood was invited by the 
interim administration supervised by SCAF to participate in a national dialogue on the 
country’s future.409 Because of their historical involvement in the country’s politics, 
the MB’s members were by far the most organised participants in said dialogue, which 
put them in a privileged position that was ill received by the other opposition groups 
who had played an instrumental role in the organising of the protests.410 The 
Brotherhood’s familiarity with the workings of Egyptian politics, its consistent 
availability of funding, and an outreach capability that encompassed million of 
Egyptians also meant that it was in an advantageous position when compared to the 
smaller political groups that formed during the uprisings, which lacked leadership, 
structure, and political experience.  
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Therefore, it did not come as a surprise that, when given the opportunity to solidify its 
political gains and aims after the uprisings, the MB was not reluctant to take it. The 
disorganisation and fragmentation of other political parties and the leadership 
vacuum left by the  fall of Mubarak presented the organisation with the perfect 
opportunity to recover from years of illegality and persecution, setting yet another 
milestone in its history.411 This chance was ultimately presented by the Constitutional 
amendments presented by the Interim Government headed by SCAF, which were 
meant to pave the way to the country’s first free Parliamentary elections in November 
2011. 
 
The proposed Constitutional Referendum was set to take place in March 2011, and, in 
line with the SCAF’s promise to deliver a peaceful and democratic transition to an 
elected government, included reforms to previous articles that severely limited 
political participation and space. Such amendments included a limitation to the 
presidency to at most two four-years terms, judicial supervision of elections, a 
requirement for the president to appoint at least one vice president, a commission to 
draft a new constitution following the parliamentary election, and easier access to 
presidential elections by candidates (to be done by achieving 30,000 signatures from 
at least 15 provinces, 30 members of a chamber of the legislature, or nomination by a 
party holding at least one seat in the legislature).412 While it was clear that the 
proposed reforms were set to increase democratic and liberal practices, the majority 
of the country’s opposition groups were concerned that an election held too soon 
would inevitably be favourable to long established political groups such as the 
Brotherhood over more recent revolutionary ones, because of their fragmentation 
and lack of supporters and funding.413  
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Similarly, waiting too long posed the country to the risk of a military regime taking 
control of its political system once again. The Brotherhood declared itself in favour of 
the proposed Constitutional amendments, also because with its long history of 
grassroots activities and large popular support among the country’s poorest, the 
organization was set to do well whatever the electoral system in place. Despite calls 
of controversy and boycott, the referendum held on 19th March 2011 saw more than 
18 million Egyptians voting, and the amendments being approved with 77% of the vote 
in favour, therefore paving the way to Parliamentary elections.414 
 
3.7 Freedom and Justice Party 
The country’s unprecedented political openness and leadership vacuum presented the 
Brotherhood with yet another set of challenges, first and foremost demonstrating to 
both the Egyptian public and other opposition groups that it did not seek to 
monopolise power in the upcoming political order. To this end, and soon after 
Mubarak’s removal, Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie released a statement saying that 
the Brotherhood “sought to participate, not to dominate” and aimed at advancing the 
interests of the nation as a whole.415 The Brotherhood seized the political chance, and 
on 21st February 2011 announced the intention of creating the Freedom and Justice 
Party (hizb al-hurriyya wa al-‘adala), which was to be led by the organization’s 
parliamentary bloc leader and Guidance Bureau member Saad El-Katatni.416 The Party 
was founded an April 30th, and gained official status on 6th June 2011, a date that set 
yet another milestone in the Brotherhood’s history.417  
 
In its first meeting since 1985, the Brotherhood’s legislative body Shura Council 
appointed Mohamed Morsi as president of the Freedom and Justice Party, Essam al-
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Erian as vice president and Saad al-Katatny as secretary general, and also announced 
that the party sought to claim no more than 30% of the seats in the country’s 
upcoming parliamentary elections, in line with the slogan “participation, not 
domination”.418 In order to appeal to the Egyptian masses and remain faithful to the 
aims of the revolution, the FJP was created to be open to citizens of all faiths, and to 
be “a civil party with an Islamic frame of reference”.419 In its founding statement also 
further underlines the inclusive and revolutionary nature of the party, specifying that: 
 
We are working to rebuild state institutions on the basis of a strong and sound 
commitment to the will of the free Egyptian people, including the institution of the 
presidency, the government, parliament and local councils, and we work to establish 
institutions of civil society; trade unions, public groups, associations and human rights 
organizations to enhance the unity of the national fabric and induce a united coherent 
and solid fusion within the community. We aspire to get everyone in the nation working 
as part of a team, seeking to achieve the hopes and goals of Egypt in the battle of 
renaissance and construction.420 
 
In order to further reinforce its commitment to “participation not domination”, the 
Brotherhood’s spokesmen stressed that the FJP was not conceived to be the 
organization’s political wing, but rather the party would be fully independent and only 
consult with the organization on important policy decisions, something that other 
parties had always done throughout the Brotherhood’s history.421  
 
To further stress the FJP’s independence, its newly appointed leaders had to step 
down from the positions they held within the MB, severing the direct link between the 
two political entities.422 After achieving legal status in June 2011, the party’s leaders 
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released a statement saying “we are wiling to form an alliance with the political forces 
that agree to our principles, whether they are socialists, liberals, or other Islamist 
forces and all forces concerned about this homeland”423, and reported to have  
approximately 9,000 founding members, of whom circa 80% were affiliated with the 
MB.424 Although women were historically barred from full membership in the 
Brotherhood, roughly a thousand of the FJP’s founding members were female and the 
party appointed a Christian Copt as their chairman, once again stressing inclusivity and 
independence from the Brotherhood.425 However, undermining the claim to 
autonomy, the MB leadership wrote the FJP’s platform and ratified its bylaws, which 
clearly state that “the party is dedicated to peaceful and gradual reform along Islamic 
lines”, which includes “the reform of the individual, the family, the society, the 
government, and then institutions of the state”.426 In essence, the (debated) 
separation of the FJP from the Brotherhood gave the group more room for political 
manoeuvres, wherein the official party could adopt a politically correct and inclusive 
stance while the MB as a whole maintained its focus on religious authenticity. 
 
Therefore, the freest and most inclusive time in the history of the Brotherhood was 
soon overshadowed by its crippling internal divisions that, quickly put to the side 
during the uprisings, came back to the core over the creation of the FJP. The schism 
between reformists and traditionalists outlined in the previous chapter was further 
encapsulated by the creation of what was effectively the Brotherhood’s political arm, 
which also polarized conservative members within the Brotherhood. While the 
country’s new electoral rules did not represent a threat for the organization, 
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challenges arising from its own ranks caused the Brotherhood to lose some of its most 
prominent reformist leaders, who started to defect the organization in Spring 2011.  
 
Most of those who planned and participated in the January 25th uprisings felt that the 
creation of the FJP went against the aims of the revolution, and that the mainstream 
organization was seeking to manipulate the emerging political context for its own 
means. Reformist leaders did not oppose the creation of a political party per se, but 
harshly questioned its autonomy because of the uninterrupted consultation between 
the Brotherhood and the FJP’s guides, and because of the exclusion of young activist 
members in these talks.427 They also argued that the FJP’s leaders should have been 
elected by the party members and supporters, rather than appointed by the senior 
leadership of the Guidance Bureau.428 Once again, internal tensions between 
organizational structures and individuals’ agency, between young and old, were 
coming to the fore, setting yet more obstacles on the Brotherhood’s path to 
governance. 
 
In what was an unprecedented move, hundreds of young Brothers came together 
against the organization’s Supreme Guide, asking for “better representation of young 
Brothers in the group’s higher power structures and the full independence of the MB’s 
nascent FJP from all proselytizing bodies”.429 Consequently, many of them defected 
from the Brotherhood and created their own political parties, such as the Egyptian 
Current Party, which was composed by both ex young Muslim Brothers and members 
of the April 6 Movement.430 One of its founders, a MB member at the time, recalls the 
reasons that led him to leave the organization by saying “we told them (the GB) ‘You 
cannot go by yourself, create a party, you’ll burn yourself. Wait 3 or 4 years, and then 
create a party. (...) We knew that the MB was the most powerful organisation at the 
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time, but there were still a lot of steps we needed to take if we wanted our revolution 
to succeed. If in 4 years, after the revolution, we have equality, and justice, freedom, 
and free elections, the MB would naturally come to power. This is a very pragmatic 
issue when people are in the streets. You need to take a step behind and let them 
fight. But they did not listen to us.”431  
 
At the same time, the Brotherhood’s leadership was also facing discontent arising from 
those in its most conservative ranks. There were many who questioned the extent to 
which the organization should get involved in “real” politics, therefore arguing against 
the very creation of a political party in principle. According to these traditionalists, no 
one but the Prophet Mohamed had the right to fuse religion and political authority, 
and therefore these two domains should have been kept separate in order to “prevent 
tyranny”.432 They argued that the MB should remain faithful to its origins as a da’wa 
organization and therefore only operate within the field of civil society, while its 
members should be free to support any party they wanted if they sought to directly 
engage in politics.433 As said in Chapter 2, that is something that had already stopped 
happening in 1939 after the MB 5th Conference in Cairo, in which Hassan al Banna 
stated “We need to become political”.  
 
However, it is worth flagging up that Mohamed Soudan, who played an instrumental 
role in the creation of the party, rejects all claims of divisions splitting the MB into 
factions when it came to the establishment of the FJP. He added that the only internal 
discussion that took place regarded the membership of the party, and the possibility 
to open it up to non-Muslims, which was overwhelmingly voted in favour of in the 
Shura Council. He also wanted to stress the inclusive nature of the party, pointing out 
that membership was not restricted to MBs “Only 45% of the FJP members were MBs, 
the vice president was a Coptic Christian. The party was for everyone. We had 
meetings every couple of weeks with all representatives (of revolutionary groups) in 
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our headquarters because we were the most organised, here was the coalition, in 
every province in Egypt! We did not want to be the sole ruler, we wanted to 
cooperate”.434 The claims would also go against one of the main accusations moved to 
the FJP while in power, which was their perceived refusal to cooperate with 
revolutionary groups from the very start. While it is difficult to assess the truthfulness 
of claims on both sides, it is indeed fair to take both into consideration. 
 
3.8 FJP: Significance and Political trajectory  
By now it is clear that throughout its long history the MB had always refrained from 
being a revolutionary movement and always argued for a gradualist approach to 
politics and social change, therefore being evolutionary in its approach. One could go 
as far as to argue that the organization has been historically characterised by caution 
and moderation in its approach to high politics, as these two features were 
fundamental for the Brotherhood’s survival, and even made it thrive under Mubarak’s 
authoritarian regime. However, this struggle for survival has also made the 
Brotherhood incredibly reluctant to directly engage in activities that openly challenged 
the regime despite its politicisation in the 1900s, which makes the organization fit into 
what is defined as the “Paradox of Moderation”.  
 
Moderation Theory is based on three distinct casual mechanisms, these being the 
effects of free electoral competition, the effects of state repression, and the effects of 
organizational resources, and analyses how these three effects shape political 
behaviour.435 It argues that once “radical” political groups or organisations that aim to 
overthrow an authoritarian regime, such as the Brotherhood, organise as vote-seeking 
parties, electoral consideration inevitably leads to such groups refuting their reformist 
goals.436 This is the case as ideologically heavy platforms usually fail to appeal to 
majorities, and groups that were once illegal now need to widen their agenda in order 
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to gain votes, remain politically viable, and win elections.437 Moreover, the former 
ruling elites and the state apparatus are likely to remain wary of these groups, which 
in turn adopt more cautious and conciliatory policies in order to avoid repression and 
outlawing.438 Lastly, commitment to democratic structures is likely to cause internal 
schisms within organisations that are characterised by a hierarchical and centralised 
decision making process, as is the case with the MB. In essence, the self-restraint of 
an anti-system group decreases the likelihood that its members will participate in a 
democratization movement. In the case of the Brotherhood, the trait that enabled it 
to survive and thrive under an authoritarian regime became its biggest obstacle in 
post-2011 Egypt, as embodied by the reactions to and implications of the creation of 
the FJP. 
 
The Brotherhood’s typical caution and uncertainty were clear throughout the 
uprisings, as the organization vacillated between endorsing the protests and 
negotiating with the regime, leading some to say that the group had “one foot in the 
square and another one with the regime”.439 However, the formation of a political 
party was the first and most significant indication of the Brotherhood’s newfound 
commitment to politics, together with the inevitable internal restructuring that it 
caused. Wilmot argues that the foundation of a political party comes with important 
consequences, in particular the implication of a tangible distinction between an 
Islamist social movement concerned with its own survival and a political party fuelled 
by political imperatives, which should exist as two separate entities.440  
 
This was one of the main challenges faced by the Brotherhood in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings as, arguably, the way in which the FJP was created and 
structured in relation to the MB did nothing but reinforce the pre-existing hierarchy 
within the movement. However, some degree of organisational change became 
increasingly evident in the way in which the FJP structured its policies and orientation 
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that, by necessity, needed to be more inclusive than the Brotherhood’s in order to 
appeal to a wider portion of the Egyptian population. 
 
First of all, since its foundation in 1928 the Brotherhood had been a resistance 
movement fighting against the prevailing order, and therefore most of its popular 
support stemmed from its challenge to the repressive political context and status quo. 
However, the creation of the FJP after Mubarak’s removal significantly reoriented the 
MB’s stance towards politics, as the movement finally, if reluctantly, committed to 
mainstream politics. This meant that the newly formed FJP openly sought an 
influential (although not dominating) role within the emerging political system, 
moving away from being “just” a pillar of resistance.  Moreover, aware of the necessity 
to put forward a more inclusive manifesto441 and of the International Community’s 
fear over Islamic Resurgence, the MB consciously tried to give its political wing a more 
liberal edge, once again relying on its capability to compromise that was a direct 
heritage of the decades spent under repressive and authoritarian regimes.  
 
Ideologically, the most prominent difference between the two platforms was that the 
FJP’s omission of a rather controversial provision that granted clerics a formal role in 
both politics and legislation, while the MB’s 2007 programme explicitly called for the 
formation of a committee of senior religious scholars to advise parliament and the 
president, which would have created something rather close to the Iranian model.442 
In a clear leap to autonomy and inclusivity, the FJP also removed an article underlining 
the importance of state’s religious functions, which would have implicitly prevented 
Christian Cops, non-Muslims, and women from becoming head of state.443  
 
However, despite the FJP identifying itself as a “civil party” (hizb madani), therefore 
implying secularity, religious aspects had quite a heavy presence throughout its 
platform. Also, the party declared that its primary objectives were not to gain power, 
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but to “enhance Islamic morals, values, and concepts in individuals’ lives and society”, 
a narrative and goals that are more similar to those of a religious group that of a 
political party.444 This could be the case as, understandably, it would have been rather 
difficult for the FJP to heavily distance itself from the MB, as the organisation provided 
it with funds, personnel, and political and ideological support. However, the FJP has 
avoided engaging in issues that could have polarised and hindered its growing 
influence, such as bans on alcohol, gambling, or attempts to further Islamise the 
constitution.445 Instead, in the first 18 months following the 2011 uprisings, the FJP 
succeeded to distance itself from the MB’s historical caution and self restraint, and its 
activities displayed the growing presence of two features: a concern for the public 
image of the MB and of its party, and an unprecedented level of political ambition.446   
 
3.9 Parliamentary Elections and the road to Presidency  
Released from the constraints of semi-authoritarianism, which considerably contained 
the organisation’s scope given its illegal status, the MB invested in and committed to 
the political process for the first time in its history. This was the time for the MB to 
bridge the gap between what they knew how to do well, it being informal politics, and 
to finally engage in the country’s formal politics. It did so with two specific goals in 
mind:  wanting to secure a legitimate position of influence for the FJP, and 
demonstrating to both Egyptians and the International Community that the 
organization could be a moderate and responsible political entity.447 In particular, the 
FJP was anxious to demonstrate its ability to govern and to tackle the country’s most 
pressing problems, namely economy and public security, and sought to shift the MB’s 
focus away from morality and towards the provision of technical expertise and 
competence, given the varied composition of the organization’s members.448 
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Ultimately, these efforts from both the MB and the FJP sought to underline the fact 
that Islamist movements are not solely about political power, but also remained 
faithful to their original reform agenda, only a part of which could be achieved through 
the political process.  
 
After several months of reiterating the slogan “participation, not domination” and of 
containing its own electoral ambitions in fear of both internal and external 
repercussions, the MB-backed FJP formally dove into the electoral process with 
unprecedented enthusiasm and commitment, focusing all of its efforts and 
organisational capabilities on the lead up to the November 2011 Parliamentary 
elections. At the beginning of the political campaign, the FJP stated that it would not 
contest more than 1/3 of the seats, which interestingly was the the threshold that the 
MB adhered to during semi-authoritarian elections, as a stronger showing would have 
granted the movement an element of authority in the form of veto power over the 
government constitutional amendments.449 However, as the campaign progressed, 
this element of self restraint that reflected the MB’s political strategy under 
authoritarianism was replaced by the FJP’s growing political ambition, as the party 
reversed its earlier statements and announced that it would contend up to 50% of the 
seats.450 Mohamed Soudan explained this contentious move by saying that it had 
always been a MB strategy to put forward more candidates than the seats they sought 
to gain, and that they did not expect the overwhelming support they received, 
consequently awarding the FJP with more seats than what they initially claimed they 
would contest.  
 
Moreover, to avoid being accused of wanting to monopolise the emerging political 
order, the FJP fielded its candidates a part of the wider Democratic Alliance coalition, 
composed of more than 40 religious and secular parties, whose aim was to ““mobilize 
political forces that are committed to the principles of democracy and a civil state” 
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and “secure a representative parliament that will lead to a government of national 
unity”.451 The unifying factor of an alliance grouping together such diverse political 
parties was a fear that the parliament would be taken over by figures associated with 
the old regime, who would have rid the cabinet of any element of opposition.452 
However, when the elections started, the FJP’s candidates represented 60% of the 
Alliance’s 46 closed lists, in addition to running candidates for 70% of the individual 
seats in local districts.453 
 
The months leading up to the first round of the Parliamentary elections in November 
2011 were characterised by yet more popular protests, aimed at overthrowing the 
SCAF and its practice of military trials of civilian protesters and suppression of 
revolutionary activities.454 The most significant was the Mohamed Mahmoud street 
protest, in which the MB decided to side with SCAF, making was arguably was one of 
the top 3 mistakes that led to the population losing faith in the organization, the 
significance of which will be analysed further in Chapter 5. Despite more uprisings and 
SCAF-led violence, about 28 million people, representing 54% of the country’s eligible 
voters, participated in the elections, demonstrating a strong sense of confidence in 
the election process.455 The MB’s superior organisational machine was evident from 
the start, as its members maintained a strong presence in polling stations all across 
the country, and successfully mobilised their supporters in the poor neighbourhoods 
relying on their established infrastructures.  
 
Farag notes that approximately 29% of Egyptians eligible to vote also happen to be 
illiterate and to come from hugely deprived neighbourhoods, where the MB’s 
extensive social networks are most developed, arguing that the organisation’s 
decades-long provision of social services in economically disadvantaged areas was key 
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in mobilising voters and in the FJP achieving such unprecedented results.456 Overall, 
the Democratic Alliance won a staggering 10,138,134 votes, over a third of the total, 
meaning that the FJP emerged as the largest bloc in Parliament, with 235 or 47% of 
the seats.457 In addition, when the heads of the parliamentary committees were 
announced, 12 of them, including the most high-profiles posts, went to the leaders in 
the FJP.458 Once again, the Islamists had proven to be the most successful in organising 
and mobilising support and voters. 
 
The results of the parliamentary elections meant that, for the first time in the history 
of the country, Islamists were dominating 70% of the Assembly. This was mostly due 
to the combination of the MB representatives and those of the Al Nour party, which 
also marked the Salafists’ first ever formal engagement with Egypt’s political 
process.459 Mohamed Soudan commented on this displaying the MB’s typical distrust 
of outsiders, and displaying conviction that the Salafists’ sudden desire to participate 
in politics must have been fostered by a third party, such as SCAF, in order to make all 
Islamists lose credibility later on, because of the outrageousness of their claims. 
Regardless of the above allegations, the world watched in apprehension as Egypt was 
taken over by the first elected Islamist-dominated parliament in the history of the 
region. Even if the FJP technically stuck to its promise not to hijack the elections for its 
own advantages, by running its candidates under the banner of the Democratic 
Alliance, the MB’s political wing was essentially dominating the People’s Assembly, 
something that generated fears for both the SCAF and external observers. In the space 
of one year, the MB had gone from being an illegal opposition group to effectively 
ruling the country, which presented the organisation with unprecedented challenges 
and matters of responsibility in governance. 
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The most pressing challenge that the FJP faced soon after winning the majority in 
Parliament, was a series of bureaucratic and institutional barriers put in place by the 
secular opposition, the judiciary, and the military. In essence, those belonging to 
Mubarak’s deep state were not ready to relinquish power, in particular to an Islamist 
majority, and effectively made it impossible to govern or to take any meaningful choice 
for the newly elected parliament. This is why, when the time to nominate a candidate 
for the upcoming presidential elections came, the MB had to break its promise of not 
running a presidential candidate of its own. The organisation had stated several times 
that they did not wish to elect a MB official to run for the presidency, as they professed 
no desire to become a complete ruling majority anytime soon.460 However, the FJP 
soon found itself unable to govern and, in the absence of an external candidate that 
was a partner rather than a rival, the MB leadership saw no option but to run a 
candidate of its own.  
 
This decision triggered the outbreak of yet more schisms within the Brotherhood, as 
several members belonging to the reformist wing rejected such a proposition, arguing 
that breaking the MB’s previous promise would tarnish its reputation, or as a member 
put it “The MB can’t come out now and refute its promise not to nominate one of its 
members. No one will trust us anymore”.461 Moreover, the fact that the MB never 
really intended to field a presidential candidate is further supported by the fact that, 
upon finding its members unable to agree, the MB had to refer the question of 
contending the presidency to the Shura Council, where it was passed by a narrow 
margin462 of 56 to 52 votes. Mohamed Morsi himself, at the time head of the FJP, even 
stated that “We have chosen the path of the presidency not because we are greedy 
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for power, but because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulfil its 
duties”.463 
 
3.10 Internal Divisions come to the fore 
It follows that the Brotherhood’s incentives to participate in the Presidential elections 
were two-fold: the obvious leading motive was to secure the FJP’s capacity to govern 
and keep the increasingly intrusive SCAF in check. Secondly, the organization was 
greatly concerned with the maintenance of its own internal unity.464 In fact, the 
already existing historical rivalries between Reformists and Qutbis came to the fore 
over this very issue, and arguably set the precedent for one of the very reasons that 
eventually led to the downfall of the FJP. While these schisms might appear to be 
uniquely tactical in nature, they are underpinned by profound ideological differences. 
 
Both ex-MB members and activists that have been interviewed for this research point 
to the decision to put forward a presidential candidate as one of the most divisive in 
the history of the organization.465 This was also a time in which the decades-long 
struggle for power between Abdel Fotouh and Khairat al Shater reached its peak. 
When asked whose decision it was to go against the organization’s promised and 
decide to run for presidential elections, an ex-MB said:  
 
It was all Khairat al Shater’s idea, as he was one of the most influential leaders in the MB. 
(...) During the transition, we spoke to them and said ‘you have to wait 3-4 years’, if in 4 
years, we have equality, justice, freedom, and free elections, the MB would naturally come 
to power. (...) We have to make sure not to overdo ourselves, we need to make sure that 
people do not think that this is going to be an Islamic state. But al Shater wanted a 
president. They just wanted to take over. They kept saying “this is our time, after 80 years, 
we must take over”. They waited 80 years, could they not have waited 4 more?466 
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Someone who was really close to the MB at the time reinforced these rumours, 
explaining that al Shater had been allegedly grooming “his people” for years, with 
Morsi being one of them, ready to place them in positions of power: “He (al Shater) 
restructured the Brotherhood in such a way that it will always be in his favour. He 
created people in the past twenty years to put them in key positions. He can be in 
control behind the curtains. People like Mursi (...)”.467 These allegations will be 
explored further in Chapter 5. With the decision to put forward a presidential 
candidate being one of the hardest in the history of the organization, essentially 
splitting the Shura Council into two, al Shater was awarded the candidacy with 85% of 
the votes. The struggle for power between the two leaders is still one of the most 
controversial moments in the history of the organization, leading Fotouh to leave and 
form his own party. The impact of such event on both the organisation and the psyche 
of its members is further evidenced by the fact that, invariably, each MB member I 
have interviewed either refused to talk about it, or was clearly uncomfortable while 
doing so. 
 
Effectively, Mohamed Soudan and other MB members reject these claims, together 
with those accusing al Shater of being the one really ruling the country through Morsi 
in 2012 and 2013. Mohamed Soudan also claimed that the MB was pressured into 
putting forward a presidential candidate when it became clear to them that SCAF was 
effectively still running Egypt, and that it had no intention of relinquishing that power. 
He points to a particular episode that took place in December 2011, when the 
parliament’s Financial Committee, headed by MB Saad el Katatni, had to review SCAF’s 
budget. “The SCAF refused to cooperate, said their budget was a state secret and could 
not be reviewed. (...) So Katatni went to speak to al Tantawi (the general who would 
then be removed by Morsi), but he was told the Army would still not cooperate, and 
was threatened by saying that the SCAF already had the order to suspend the 
parliament in the draw, ready to go”.468 After this incident Soudan tells that Katatni 
went back to the organisation and made them realised that “is a façade, we are not a 
                                                 
467 Interview with a prominent secular activist. 
468 Interview with Mohamed Soudan, FJP Foreign Relations Secretary. 
 174 
democracy but a military state, we are just actors fighting SCAF and the deep state at 
the same time, we cannot change anything, we have no real power”.469 Soudan then 
claimed that the MB felt pressured to take responsibility, and that was what sparked 
the Shura Council voting. He further added “We did not like it, but we had to, or the 
country would come back to square one again.”.470  
 
Regardless of the reasons that might have led the MB to run a presidential candidate, 
following from the divisive Shura Council vote, the Brotherhood put forward Khairat 
al Shater as its presidential candidate, essentially sealing the Qutbists victory over the 
Reformists. One of the four deputies of Supreme Guide’s Mohamed Badie, al Shater’s 
influence went way beyond that role, given that as a multimillionaire businessman he 
was also one of the Brotherhood’s main financers, and because of the position of 
power he held in the past, the strategist Brother would give the group a strong grip on 
both the country’s legislative and executive branches.471 Even more important and 
strategic was al Shater’s ideological position: belonging to the pragmatic conservative 
mainstream wing of the group, he was close to those in the Old Guard but also had 
good relationships with leaders in the Brotherhood’s reformist wing; at time of 
internal division and confusion, al Shater was perceived as the only individual who 
could keep the two factions united.472 Imprisoned in 2007 under the Mubarak’s 
regime, the businessman was regardless considered one of the most important 
strategist and more experienced leaders of the Brotherhood, hence the belief that its 
choice as a candidate placated internal divisions in the organization.473 
 
However, al Shater’s candidacy was short lived. The Presidential Election Commission 
(PEC), a panel of senior judges appointed by the SCAF to oversee the upcoming 
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presidential race, disqualified ten candidates on 14 April 2012, among whom there 
was al Shater himself. The PEC did so on the basis that, according to new elections 
rules stating that a candidate had to have been released from prison for 6 years before 
being allowed to run, al Shater did not fit that requirement as he was only released in 
2011.474 Brotherhood leaders criticised this ruling as evidence that the deep state-
affiliated PEC coordinated efforts with the SCAF to remove strong Islamist leaders from 
the competition, arguing that almost all members of the PEC were “sympathisers with 
the old regime”.475  Despite such an hostile environment, the MB leadership was aware 
of the uniqueness of the occasion to run its own Presidential candidate, and therefore 
put forward its back-up candidate Mohamed Morsi, head of the FJP, Guidance Bureau 
former member, head of the MB’s parliamentary bloc in 2000-2005, and one of al 
Shater’s closest pupils.476 Despite his developed political career, Morsi’s association to 
the more conservative wing of the Brotherhood and his lack of charisma when 
compared to al Shater arguably limited his appeal.  
 
When asked about Morsi’s candidacy, an ex-MB commented: “Morsi was not even the 
second choice, he was the third one. (he was chosen because) he was a student in the 
class of al Shater, so obviously he trusted him. He belonged to Ezzat’s wing before 
that”.477 Therefore, everything seems to suggest that all the appointments made in 
the FJP, starting with Morsi’s own, were made on the basis of loyalty rather than 
expertise, something that will be examined further in chapter 5, and arguably one of 
the crucial mistakes that eventually led to the fall of the FJP. 
 
The first round of Egypt’s first free and competitive Presidential elections took place 
on May 23-24 2012. The feelings surrounding these elections marked a stark 
difference with the past, as according to my interviewees, for the first time “People 
                                                 
474 BBC News, “Egypt sets presidential elections rules”, (January 2012) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16785829  
475 Leyne, J., “Egypt Election Bans Threaten Fresh Political Turmoil”, in BBC News, (April 2012) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17732164  
476 BBC News, “Profile: Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi”, (April 2015) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-18371427  
477 Interview with a former MB member. 
 176 
literally believed they were voting for a different Egypt, that they were picking their 
representatives”.478 When speaking to someone who worked as an electoral monitor, 
they said: 
 
From the turnout, it was probably the most memorable elections we have ever had, and it 
would probably remain that way. I don’t think it was rigged, I disagree with people who say 
it was. Even if any sort of rigging took place, it would have been very low compared to any 
other elections we had before. So I think it was fair, and even though from the turnout 
there were some violations taking place, like people campaigning outside the polling 
stations, which definitely impacted the voters, but in general I think it was a fair elections 
compared to the ones we had before.479  
 
Despite this, with an official turnout of 46% of eligible voters, the first round of 
elections revealed just how fragmented the Egyptian electorate was, as none of the 
candidates won an absolute majority. FJP’s Morsi came first with 24.7%, which still 
represented a huge decline in support for the Brotherhood; the FJP-led Democratic 
Alliance had won more than 10 million votes in November 2011, while Morsi only 
gained 5.4 million, roughly half that number.480 The second round of Presidential 
elections saw Morsi, renamed “the candidate of the revolution”, running against 
Mubarak-affiliated ex-Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq, and despite the discouraging 
precedents, the percentage of voters increased to 51.7%.481 once again, the MB’s 
impressive organizational capability was clear throughout the process, with at least 
one Brother present at each polling station, keeping a close eye on the ballot box. 
Mohammed Morsi won with 13.2 million votes or 51.7% of the ballot, against Shafiq’s 
12.3 million votes or 48.3%.482 Morsi’s appointment as President on 24th June 2012 
was a watershed event, as it was the first time Egypt had democratically elected its 
leader. Moreover, his inauguration also represented an unthinkable breakthrough for 
a group that had spent most of its existence under siege. 
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3.11 The Islamist takeover? 
Mohamed Morsi’s victory came as a shock for both regional and international 
observes, who were worried over the potential radical tendencies that an Islamist 
government could bring about. However, following the liberal and almost secular 
trend that characterized the run up to elections, upon taking office Morsi stayed well 
clear of policies regulating morality or private life, but rather pledged to tackle five 
ordinary issues that negatively impacted Egyptians’ everyday life and eventually 
forced people to the streets. These were these were: lack of security, inadequate 
sanitation infrastructure, traffic, and shortages of bread and fuel.483 Moreover, when 
put into context, the Islamists’ victory of the presidential race does not come as a 
shock.  
 
First of all, in the last round of the Presidential elections, the competition was between 
MB’s Morsi and former prime minister Ahmad Shafiq, which essentially gave Egyptians 
the choice to either go back to the deep state they had just managed to remove after 
nearly 30 years, or take a leap into the unknown and give trust to a group that for 
decades had essentially been a state within a state, providing essential social services 
to the country’s poorest. When asked about this, one of the activists that I have 
interviewed said “we need to remember that the MB weren’t really embraced, it won 
because we also campaigned for them. I myself, as a secular activist, I convinced my 
parents to go and vote for him, because we just didn’t want someone from the old 
regime to win”.484  
 
This was further aided by the fact that since the mid-2000s the MB had successfully 
managed to develop a political narrative that was not exclusively ideology-driven, but 
rather coherent and inclusive in its nature. Essentially, the organization reflected 
mainstream, liberal, political ideas, which Egypt’s authoritarian rulers always voiced 
but never implemented. Thirdly, despite its commitment to the notion that Islam is a 
complete and total system, the MB and the FJP in particular successfully managed to 
                                                 
483 Kenney, J., “The New Politics of Movement Activism: The Society of Muslim Brothers after Egypt’s 
Arab Spring”, p. 96 
484 Interview with a secular activist. 
 178 
keep their activities separated in practice, therefore widening their appeal to include 
less pious citizens. Furthermore, the MB’s conceptualization of state and governance 
starts with the notion of the people, and they see empowerment and participation as 
essential to the working of a democratic Islamic state.485  
 
Therefore, looking at the Brotherhood’s decades-long history as an essential civil 
society actor and as a pillar of resistance against the status quo, it is not that surprising 
that, once their political manifesto embraced some liberal notions, the organization 
had such traction and appeal to the Egyptian people. In line with this narrative, Morsi’s 
first major policies focused on alleviating economic and social hardship rather than on 
religious matters or on the citizens’ private behaviour. Something that is not usually 
mentioned by external commentators is also the degree to which most of the MB’s 
ideas regarding the nature of an Islamic state are shared by Egyptians, therefore 
making their narrative not that unapproachable, but rather something that is easy to 
share and subscribe to. Surveys conducted soon after the removal of Mubarak showed 
that a full 62% of Egyptians believed that Egyptian law should strictly adhere to the 
word and teachings of the Quran, and that the majority of Egyptian Muslims 
completely supported the idea of a democracy, while they rejected the idea of a 
theocracy based on the Iranian model.486 Finally, when taking into account the chaotic 
conditions and the leadership vacuum of the country post 2011 Uprisings, it is not that 
hard to understand why, presented in a certain why, the MB’s narrative was so popular 
amongst Egyptians. 
 
3.12 Conclusion: Preachers, not Leaders 
In the absence of a Constitution, Mohamed Morsi assumed the presidency at a time 
in which the exact nature of the authority embedded in that position remained vaguely 
defined and therefore open to conflicting interpretations. The presidential runoff took 
place in the total absence of an elected legislative parliament, a constitution, or even 
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checks on the authority of the PEC. While the Brotherhood had never rejected its 
historical commitment to working within the system, political engagement, while 
necessary, it is not always sufficient to ensure success. Being an Islamist party 
governing for the first time, the FJP faced several challenges, none of which any of its 
members had ever had to deal with before. Because of the MB’s illegal status and its 
nature as a resistance and opposition organization, its members had proven to be 
experts in protesting and opposing political regimes since 1928, but lacked both the 
experience and the opportunities to govern. As Al Anani states, “the Brotherhood 
trains its members to become preachers (du’a), not leaders”. While the Brothers were 
excellent at running mosques, syndicates, and welfare and educational networks, they 
were never trained to be professional civil servants, which represented an 
insurmountable obstacle for the MB once it gained power in 2012. 
 
Although Morsi had won the presidential race, even if by a narrow margin, his capacity 
to govern was significantly constrained by a series of military decrees and judicial 
rulings. In addition to the challenges posed by the remnants and institutions of the 
deep state, the Brotherhood was learning how to act politically in the new Egypt, while 
at the same time trying to re-invent what it meant to be a movement in a radically 
different regional environment. The FJP had to go about executing mundane 
governmental tasks such as developing a failing economy and providing security in an 
emerging political system, while some of the key institutions still in place strongly 
opposed the existence of an Islamist government. Yet the most taxing challenge, and 
the one that was the MB’s undoing, was having to gain the trust and confidence of 
diverse sectors of the Egyptian society without losing the support of its base, or, 
pursuing the party’s political agenda without marginalizing the other sectors of 
Egyptian society.  
 
According to some, what the MB’s political struggle represents is nothing but the 
“coming” of Post-Islamism, which is to say, what happens when an Islamist group 
becomes compelled by both its own internal contradictions and by societal pressures 
to re-invent itself, and embraces notions of democracy and modernity, while also re-
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secularising the role of religion in their narrative.487 Regardless of the perspective 
adopted, it is undeniable that the post 2011 political context led the MB to 
unprecedented levels of internal restructuring and direct engagement with politics, 
that therefore need to be carefully analysed in order to understand the role that their 
particular understanding of Islamism played in post-revolutionary Egypt, and the 
effects that it had on the oldest Islamist organization of the Arab world. 
 
To conclude, this chapter has critically analysed the historical and political conditions 
that led to the establishment of the FJP and, consequently, to the official start of the 
MB’s direct engagement with governance. Following from the tensions between 
agency and structure already outlined in Chapter 2, it could be argued that the 
Brotherhood’s history of repression and consequent political moderation represented 
one of the biggest obstacles in the final stage of the organization’s transition to 
becoming a fully committed political actor. Tensions between practice and ideology 
are evident from the very start of the January 25th uprisings and only intensified during 
the post-revolutionary transition period, therefore adding to the set of already critical 
external challenges that the MB faced in its quest to legitimate governance. These 
tensions, which were undoubtedly shaped by the political environment the MB found 
itself operating within, will be further contextualised in the next chapter, where the 
obstacles to the application of a certain understanding of Political Islam to governance 
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Mohamed Morsi was sworn in on 30th June 2012, as Egypt’s first democratically 
elected president and as a representative of one of the very few Islamist organizations 
to gain power in the region through a democratic process. These conditions made it 
clear from the start that the president-elect was set to face unprecedented 
expectations and challenges, some of the most prominent being the task of governing 
a post-revolutionary country while also guiding it through its transition to democracy, 
and facing the remnants of Mubarak’s deep state488 that had not been wiped out by 
the events of January 25th. Moreover, while the FJP candidate won the elections, he 
did so by a very narrow margin, with approximately 12 million voters who supported 
Mubarak’s ex prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, against the Islamist candidate. This data 
alone suggested that while Hosni Mubarak had been toppled, his regime had remained 
largely intact and determined to fight its way back to the top.  
 
The vast majority of the Egyptian activists interviewed for the scope of this thesis have 
confirmed that the Islamist candidate had been elected as he was the only option 
representing an alternative to the return of the authoritarianism that had ruled Egypt 
for decades, and that parts of the population who would not have normally supported 
an Islamist candidate voted for him on the basis of “when it came to the presidency, I 
supported Fotouh in the first round and Morsi in the second because, as most people, 
we did not want Shafiq into power. So we did not have much room to manoeuvre”.489 
This also led to the labelling of those who voted for Morsi as “lemon-squeezers”490, a 
nickname that refers to the Egyptian costume of squeezing lemon juice over food on 
the verge of going off in order to make it edible and not too unpleasant to consume. 
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These being the conditions from the start, it was clear that Mohamed Morsi was far 
from being the “people’s president” he claimed to be, and was dealing with a country 
that was deeply divided along political and ideological lines. 
 
Following this, the chapter critically analyses the MB’s time in government placing it 
within the Egyptian context, focusing on its policies, political choices, and varying 
relationships with the other political actors, in order to understand what led to the 
premature departure of Morsi from the presidency. The analysis will focus on the 
impact than a history of “moderation” had on the MB political manifesto (or lack of 
thereof), and on the ideological and tactical challenges posed by the move from the 
periphery to the centre of Egyptian politics. The chapter then moves to the 
examination of Morsi’s attempts to contain the Army, the Brotherhood’s “Renaissance 
Project”, and to the assessment of Morsi’s 100 Days Plan. Ultimately, Morsi’s 
November 2012 Constitutional Declaration is examined, as this event is considered 
pivotal to the removal of the MB government. This goes hand in hand with the 
examination of the December 2012 MB Constitution whose text, much like in the case 
of the Constitutional Decree, was left largely unscrutinised, as domestic and 
international observers focused mainly on the protests and popular uprisings 
surrounding their issuing, rather than on a critical analysis of their content. Therefore, 
the very institutional and bureaucratic impacts and consequences of these documents 
have been left largely unanalysed. In order to address this gap, the chapter will rely on 
the combination of primary and secondary sources to try and make sense of such 
controversial and pivotal documents. 
 
The MB’s performance while in government is indeed inseparable from the party’s 
troublesome foundation process, which will become clear as this chapter tracks 
internal and external tensions that, arising at the time of the FJP formation, carried on 
to become distinctive features of the MB rule. Following from this, the chapters sets a 
framework for the analysis of the four main factors contributing to the downfall of the 
MB that will be discussed in Chapter 5, these being: the MB’s legacy of internal 
divisions, its “arrogance” and refusal to cooperate with revolutionary groups, its 
miscalculations regarding the extent of power the group actually held, and failure to 
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take into account the prominent and historical role of the Army within the Egyptian 
context. 
 
During his first speech addressing the population in Tahrir Square, Mohamed Morsi 
purposely unbuttoned his jacket to reveal that he was not wearing a bulletproof vest, 
a hugely symbolic gesture that temporarily won him the sympathies of even those who 
did not vote for him in the crowd.491 Knowing that he could not rule a country in which 
half of the population was against him, Morsi’s immediate priority should have been 
building bridges with those who did not support him, especially liberals and Copts. 
Several other pressing issues to be addressed straight away were the setting up of a 
framework for national reconciliation, defining what kind of relationship was to be had 
with Egypt’s ever-present military forces (SCAF in this particular instance), tackling the 
worsening security and domestic economic situation, and defining what sort of 
rapport a MB government would have with external powers such as Israel and the US. 
These matters were central to address for several key reasons. In terms of national 
reconciliation, Morsi had to show that he could at least officially distance himself from 
the MB and be a much needed “president for all Egyptians”.  
 
When it came to his relationship with the SCAF, at the time of his election the military 
was essentially still attempting to run the country, issuing a constitutional declaration 
that had the power to heavily cut down on the president’s authority as soon as the 
presidential stand-off started. The MB’s troubled relationship with the Army is one to 
pay close attention to, especially in light of the events of June 30th.  On the domestic 
front, Morsi inherited a country in which 40% of the population was still living below 
the poverty line, with security being at an all-time low since the outbreak of the 2011 
uprisings because of continuing clashes between the population and the armed forces. 
Furthermore, relationships with Israel and the US were fundamental to address, as the 
majority of Egyptians were critical of Mubarak for being “subordinate to the US”, and 
the MB had historically seen the Palestinian case as their own.  
                                                 
491 Kingsley, P, “”How Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s First Elected President, ended up on death row”, in 




Considering the above conditions, it could be said that the MB president was faced 
with a variety of challenges from the start. Brotherhood official Ahmed el-Khoufi, now 
sentenced to death together with his president and interviewed in 2015, stated that 
“The struggle was inevitable. (...) It was inevitable that there would be a clash between 
[the supporters of] a revolution that called for freedom, social justice, and dignity, and 
a regime that ruled Egypt for decades”.492 However, it did not necessarily have to be 
that way. In order to unify the country and fight off the very lively remnants of the 
Mubarak regime, president Morsi had to keep his revolutionary bedfellows, the 
liberals, leftists and moderates that later partnered up with the deep state, very close 
to him. This could have been done through offering their representatives seats in 
government, and by establishing dialogues and alliances. Rather, in retrospect, it is 
evident that the president-elect did entirely the opposite, alienating them rather than 
developing a working relationship, and putting the interests of the MB first. Abdel 
Fotouh, a prominent ex-MB and who also ran for presidency, summarises this by 
stating that “The Brotherhood had a degree of political stupidity (...) They thought they 
could protect themselves from the conspiracy of the Mubarak regime through [just] 
their own organisation. They were arrogant. But it’s impossible in the aftermath of any 
revolution to be protected by anyone other than the owners of that revolution: the 
people.”493 
 
Building on the analytical framework and background established so far, this chapter 
uses Historical Sociology to critically analyse the MB’s time in government, focusing 
on its policies, political choices, and varying relationships with the other political actors 
in Egypt, in order to understand what ultimately led to the premature departure of 
Morsi from the presidency. It does so following on from the previous chapter, in which 
the formation and rise to power of the FJP has been critically analysed and put into 
context. The MB’s performance while in government is indeed inseparable from the 
party’s troublesome foundation process, which will become clear as this chapter tracks 
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internal and external tensions that, arising at the time of the FJP formation, became a 
distinctive feature of the MB’s rule. While there is a growing body of literature looking 
at the so called “Brotherhood rule”494, this is a topic that still remains largely 
unexplored.  
 
There seems to be four main factors that contributed to the downfall of the MB, these 
being: the MB’s legacy of internal divisions, its “arrogance” and refusal to cooperate 
with revolutionary groups, its miscalculations regarding the extent of power the group 
actually held, and failure to take into account the prominent and historical role of the 
Army within the Egyptian context. This chapter does so with the aim of setting up the 
framework for analysis of the final events leading up to the July 3rd Coup and, more 
importantly, for the critical discussion of the MB’s achievements and mistakes that will 
take place in the following chapter. This analysis’ contribution to the thesis is two fold. 
Firstly, it completes the genealogy of the MB by examining the final stage of their 
political evolution, particularly focusing on the nexus between Islamism and 
governance. Secondly, the understanding of what led to the MB’s demise is crucial to 
reflect upon Political Islam as a whole in the contemporary context, in order to 
challenge the wide-spread perception that the MB’s removal represented the failure 
of the ideology itself. Rather, it is one example of an Islamist group that attempted to 
balance ideology and governance, while arguably misjudging the challenges posed by 
a democratic transition.  
 
4.1 The ‘Moderation Paradox’ & the downfall of the MB 
Part of what made the MB stand out when compared to the other parties running for 
elections, and appealed to parts of the population that would not have normally 
supported Islamists, was its history of maintaining a moderate stance in the face of 
repression. The group’s embodiment of informal structures in the country can be 
analysed by relying on Historical Sociology.  Always prevented from taking an active 
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part in politics because of its illegal status, the MB instead opted for engagement 
through democratic strategies such as provision of social services and education, 
effectively becoming what could be defined as a “state within a state”. I have argued 
that the organization owes a great part of its success in the 2012 presidential elections 
to these moderate policies and civil society activities, which for decades have been 
far-reaching and inclusive. Moreover, being an evolutionary rather than a 
revolutionary group, through its moderate stance the MB has also historically 
displayed a certain commitment to a democratic system of governance compatible to 
its aim of a slow Islamization, on the bases that the umma (Muslim Community) is the 
source of sulta (political authority), therefore appealing to Islamists and liberals alike, 
or at least presenting itself as the “least dangerous” option.495 
 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the organization’s moderation could 
also be seen as its ultimate downfall. Facing continuous threats and repression in the 
pre-revolutionary context, the MB used moderation as a defensive weapon and made 
the organization’s survival its top priority. The long lasting trend of an institutionalized 
“state of emergency” in Egypt, initiated by Nasser, was also what kept the group 
unified for years, allowing the leadership to prevent recurring and crippling debates 
over ideological differences from actually dividing the organization. The MB’s 
celebrated organizational unity was also a result of this focus on survival and 
moderation, as the group responded to recurrent security threats by developing a 
“pyramid-shaped hierarchy (which) ensures that members execute the aims of its 
national leadership at the local level”.496 As a consequence, the historical opportunity 
to pose an end to decades of depression and marginalization that January 25th 
represented for the organization, also brought about a deep qualitative shift. As 
underlined in Chapters 2 and 3, gradualism was an ethos that the MB’s founder, 
Hassan al Banna, had always promoted, together with the notion that the organization 
should pursue the Islamization of society over a long term period, developed in 
response to the state’s crackdowns on the MB in the 1950s. Using Historical Sociology, 
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it can be seen that the MB’s ideology had always involved politics, but only as a 
consequence of social change: 
 
Our doctrine does not rely on revolutions, but on pyramid-shape gradualism; it begins from 
the base, which is the individual and the family, and climbs up to society, which (once 
Islamized) engenders the Muslim state. We have already seen that dynamic at work with 
the 2011 parliament, where the Muslim society we have built voted for us in large 
numbers.497 
 
Moreover, internal unity and efficiency, although admittedly shaken by the events of 
2011, has historically been achieved and maintained through the MB’s centralized 
decision-making and de-centralized implementation, despite recurring internal 
schisms. Nevertheless, the eighteen days preceding Mubarak’s ousting have had a 
profound impact on the MB, and pushed the group outside of the “comfort zone” 
provided by the focus on identity politics. The FJP’s call for a “civil state with an Islamic 
reference” undoubtedly helped to differentiate the MB from more militant Islamist 
groups such as the Salafis, and to present itself as a more moderate and mainstream 
movement, which acted as a bridge between the two competing sides of the Egyptian 
political spectrum: the Islamist and the secular civil forces.498 While that historical 
dichotomy had been removed during the years leading up to January 25th, the post 
revolutionary transitional context polarized secular and religious actors against each 
other once again, as finding common ground and agreeing on transitional policies 
became incredibly difficult.  
 
In opposition to its secular counterparts, and according to the Moderation Paradox 
theory proposed in the previous chapter, the MB’s historically moderate political 
stance could also be its greatest downfall, as the decades spent focusing on survival 
meant that the MB was entering governance without a clearly defined political 
manifesto. Moreover, the organization’s shift from the periphery to the centre of 
Egyptian politics also meant that the MB had to rethink and leave behind its cautionary 
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and moderate approach that, as it has been shown in the previous chapter, inevitably 
led to schisms over ideology, practice, and internal divisions. 
 
4.2 Ideological and Organizational Challenges 
Aside from the obstacles represented by the responsibility of governing a post-
revolutionary country, the MB was arguably facing an even bigger challenge, namely 
finding a way to maintain its organizational unity and ideological integrity while 
avoiding to alienate the portion of the population it was supposed to represent. These 
sort of internal challenges naturally originated from the rapid transformation that the 
organization underwent soon after the outbreak of January 25th, when through the 
creation of the FJP the MB’s position shifted from the periphery to the centre. This 
political ascent meant that the organization had to quickly rethink its ways, and come 
up with new strategies to uphold both internal unity and external support, while facing 
the need to undergo deep structural change. 
 
It is important to stress again that throughout the vast majority of its history so far, 
the MB had been an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary organization. Because of 
its marginalised, although embedded, historical position within Egyptian political and 
social life, for decades the MB centred its ideology and narrative around identity 
politics. That is to say, the organization gained its ideological legitimacy by focusing on 
the need to uphold and defend Muslim identity against the West, which was to be 
achieved through implementing legislations compatible with Islamic law.499 Therefore, 
this rhetoric was also used to maintain the strong organizational unity that the MB had 
always been renowned for, which remained mostly unchallenged despite internal 
divisions, at least until the creation of the FJP. On the other hand this also meant that, 
being one of the country’s most powerful opposition entities, the MB always spent 
little to no time on developing alternative policies to those of the “anti-Islamic” 
regime. It follows that with the FJP coming to power, a new reality had to be created, 
and one of the the main post-revolutionary challenges for the organization became 
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how to successfully make this shift from identity politics to policy, from ideology to 
governance.  
 
The MB’s rapid growth and shift from the prison to the presidential palace therefore 
meant that the group was soon faced with the necessity to abandon some of its 
historical ideological positions, in favour of more inclusive and relevant ones. 
According to El Houdaiby, while these sort of compromises can be overlooked in the 
short term, they can also considerably hurt an organization’s credibility and generate 
both internal and external legitimacy crises if not handled correctly.500 Oliver Roy and 
Asef Bayat both address these issues in their works, “The Failure of Political Islam” and 
“Post Islamism”501, leading many to believe that the lenses they provide could be 
useful when applied to the analysis of the MB’s time in government. These claims will 
be assessed further in the next chapter, but it is worth noting that the organization’s 
key decisions and choice of policies outlined in this chapter reflect the ones that are 
generally used by observers to reflect upon the MB’s political “experiment”. 
 
It follows that in order to smoothly make the shift from identity politics from policy in 
a post revolutionary context, the MB had to start developing coherent political 
strategies, balancing its Islamic principles with popular demands for democracy and 
socio-economic reforms. That meant that there was a strong urgency to focus on 
services and policies that were central to the Egyptian public debate, such as the 
economy, provision of resources, national reconciliation, and foreign policy. However, 
El Houdaiby underlines that the real obstacle in 2012 was represented by the 
authenticity-modernity/relevance dialectic. That is to say, the MB’s long decades of 
passive participation in Egyptian politics and focus on survival had led to the stagnation 
of Islamist scholarship in socio-political domains, and to the lack of a clear, workable 
project of “Islamization”. Therefore, the argument is that the absence of a clear 
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political project makes it harder to strike a balance between organizational/ideological 
authenticity and practicalities.502  
 
In the particular case of the MB, El Houdaiby warned that the MB’s tendency to adopt 
a pragmatic stance relying on its organizational structure and Islamist narrative would 
put practicality before authenticity, therefore creating the risk of a legitimacy crisis 
emerging over the nexus between ideology and practice.503 In essence, when Morsi 
came to power, the MB’s immediate challenge was to tackle the paradox between the 
FJP’s promise for change (as in the slogan “Islam is the solution” and in the 
“Renaissance Project” discussed below) and the maintenance of the status quo, which 
was essential to avoid being directly targeted by the Military. As El Houdaiby argues: 
 
The Brotherhood is now trapped between two threats. Holding on to identity politics implies 
discarding more serious policy questions that are gaining in importance in light of economic 
hardships and security sector reform challenges. (...)Entering the realm of policy would take 
out the group’s common denominator for internal unity. Contradictions between different 
classes, ideologies and other biases will come to the fore, leading to a multitude of political 
manifestations. If the MB continues to have the FJP as its sole political representative, splits 
and cracks will be unavoidable, eventually leading to the group’s complete breakdown.504 
 
It follows that, as many predicted, the MB had to confront internal challenges over 
leadership and ideology even before it started to face external ones, such as those 
presented by the remnants of the deep state. While the organisation’s relationship 
with other revolutionary groups was still in place, the MB started facing internal 
challenges soon after the creation of its legal party, the FJP. Chapter 3 showed that 
some MB members saw the establishment of the FJP as a distraction from the 
organization’s main historical aim: the long-term, gradual Islamization of Egyptian 
society through the provision of social services. Others, mainly the younger 
generations, saw the MB leadership’s insistence that its members should support the 
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FJP when it came to elections as too limiting, and the escalation of these sort of tactical 
internal tensions contributed to the split of the MB into separate political factions.  
 
This is a trend that seems to affect in particular the youth factions of the MB, which 
were also the most active during January 25th, and cooperated with other secular 
revolutionary groups in the development of the uprisings. Their inability to share the 
“mother” organization’s ideological aims  and tactics after the fall of Mubarak led 
several leaders of the youth factions to leave the MB, while others were expelled, and 
to found the Hizb al-Tayyar al-Masry (the Egyptian Current Party), in June 2011.505 
Opposing the MB top-down leadership structure and the circumstances surrounding 
the creation of the FJP, members of Hizb al-Tayyar al-Masry were open to dialogue 
with their secular counterparts, and were living proof of the deep internal dissent that 
was enveloping the organization.506 
 
One of the founders of the Egyptian Current Party, when interviewed for this research, 
reiterated several times the frustration that he felt as a MB member since the very 
start of the 2011 Uprisings. He claims that because of al Shater’s own desire for power, 
the MB leadership was too eager to get to power, and not only compromised the 
organization’s ideology, but also the Revolution’s aims in the process of achieving it. 
He left when it became clear that the MB was going to go back on its promise to 
cooperate with the revolutionary and secular groups it fought alongside within Tahrir 
Square, as he believed, and still does, that cooperation and coalition were the only 
options to successfully tackle the remnants of the deep state.  
 
That’s why I left. When they started the party (FJP) we decided to go out and make a new 
one, the MB leaders selected the president of the party, that’s not a party, it is still the MB! 
We decided to leave because there is no separation. (...) They took all the power away from 
the revolutionary groups. They worked alone, there was no cooperation. They fought against 
the military and the deep state alone. They should have cooperated with someone else.507 
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Furthermore, when asked about the MB’s decision to enter negotiations with the SCAF 
during the transitional period, and refusal to take part in the November 2011 
Mohamed Mahmoud protests, he said: 
 
I think they did not make a deal with SCAF (...) But they said this time we have to rule; after 
80 years we have to rule. There is finally an opportunity for us to take over and have 
authority. So they felt that the revolution was a threat for them, not an ally, but an enemy. 
(...) That’s the same issue that made the MB and the SCAF meet in the middle. They said “we 
have the same issue, we need to contain this revolution” there is a big change happening in 
Egypt and we need to take it to our side again.508 
 
Statements like this clarify just how much internal unity and cohesion the MB had to 
relinquish in 2011 in order to make the shift from the periphery to the centre of 
Egyptian politics and, in the process, compromised the very organizational strength 
that gave it a chance to stand over other opposition groups in the aftermath of 
Mubarak’s removal. It follows that, after finally being elected into government, the 
MB appeared to be facing both internal and external challenges. In particular, the 
organization’s splits into different factions because of internal ideological/tactical 
disagreements and lack of a coherent political plan preoccupied most observers, and 
raises the question “if the MB cannot even represent its own followers, how would it 
be suitable to govern a deeply divided and post-revolutionary country?”.  
 
4.3 A Rocky Start 
Upon being elected president on 24th June 2012 with 51.73% of the popular vote, with 
a 51% turnout, Morsi immediately resigned from the presidency of the FJP to further 
emphasize his (at least apparent) distancing from the MB and will to become the 
“people’s president”.509 In an attempt to emphasise his commitment to democracy, 
during his victory speech the president-elect stated his intention of building a new 
constitutional, democratic, and modern country with the help and cooperation of his 
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people, saying “We Egyptians, Muslims, and Christians (…) are advocates of civilization 
and construction”510. He further stressed his inclination toward building a tolerant 
constitutional democracy granting equal rights to men and women, replacing 
authoritarianism with transparency and human rights, and promised “an Egyptian 
renaissance with an Islamic foundation”.511 However, Morsi soon had to come to 
terms with the SCAF’s unwillingness to relinquish power, and with the remnants of 
Mubarak’s deep state still strongly embedded within the country’s Army and 
institutions. 
 
As soon as the FJP won 47% of the seats in the People’s Assembly (PA) elections in the 
beginning of 2012, which amounted to 70% if one takes the shares of other Islamist 
factions into consideration,512 both the SCAF and the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(SCC) set out to challenge the rise of the Islamists, and dissolved the first 
democratically elected PA through a constitutional decree on 15th June 2012.513 
However, upon being elected, and in a clear attempt to challenge the armed forces, 
Morsi issued his own decree commanding the dissolved PA to reconvene, and 
successfully re-instated the Islamist-led parliament on 10th July 2012.514 Such a bold 
move was pivotal in Egypt’s tumultuous transition from dictatorship to democracy, 
and central to the struggle over authority and executive powers between the 
presidency and the military forces.  
 
In a further attempt to assert his authority, on 12th August 2012 Morsi asked the head 
of the country’s armed forces and chief of staff to resign, (respectively Field Marshal 
Tantawi and and Chief of Staff Hafez Anan), annulled SCAF’s constitutional 
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amendments that restricted the powers of the presidency, and transferred the powers 
of the generals as well as the legislative authority to the presidency.515 These two army 
men in particular were perceived as being the architects of the SCAF’s bid to increase 
their power after the 2011 uprisings, and therefore their forced retirement was 
acclaimed by the vast majority of the revolutionary groups, with liberal political activist 
Shady al Ghazaly Harb stating “We had been chanting, ‘Down, down with military rule 
(…) Today it came true.”516 
 
Soon after, Morsi unexpectedly appointed the former head of military intelligence, 
General Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi as his new defence minister, leading many to believe that 
he may have struck a deal with younger officers within the SCAF.517 These allegations 
are also supported by Mohamed Soudan, who said Morsi decided to forcibly retired 
the two generals after suffering a failed assassination attempt that took place in July 
2012, when the two strongly encouraged him to attend a public funeral of officers who 
lost their lives in the Sinai. He claims that Morsi, having the police, Army, and judiciary 
against him, had no choice but to accept the deal offered to him, which was the 
retirement of Tantawi and Anan in exchange for Sisi’s appointment.518 Even more 
controversially, al Sisi was found by external observers such as Amnesty International 
to be the principal instigator of the shooting on protesters during key clashes such as 
Tahrir Square and Mohamed Mahmoud, and also to be the mind behind the “virginity 
tests” female protesters were subjected to in Tahrir.519 Soudan also told me of a secret 
investigation launched by Morsi in January 2013 into the Armed Forces’ violence on 
protesters that, even though it was never made public, pointed to al Sisi as the main 
instigator. “He was a mass murderer, but he was part of the government. What was 
there to do?”.520  
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Despite these allegations, this particular move was described by Al Jazeera as a 
“stunning purge” and as part of an “escalating power struggle” between the president 
and the military.521 Regardless of international preoccupations, Morsi was asserting 
his authority as the first president not to come from the military establishment, and 
with the SCAF pretending to be temporarily neutralised, it was time for the MB to 
forget its moderate ways and to embark on the shift from the periphery to the core. 
 
4.4 The Brotherhood’s “Renaissance Project” 
Sworn in as Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi was facing 
a daunting and almost impossible task: to guide the country through the key stages of 
the post-uprisings transitional period, and to establish an inclusive, democratic, and 
post-revolutionary government. Stepping up to fill the leadership and political vacuum 
that Egypt had been existing in since the removal of Hosni Mubarak, Morsi unveiled a 
“100 days plan”, a roadmap based on the MB’s Nahda “Renaissance Project” that the 
organization had been promoting since Al Shater was its presidential candidate of 
choice.522 Developed by the MB’s most influent businessmen, the “Renaissance 
Project” was an economic policy-focused manifesto that outlined the necessary steps 
to tackle poverty and the country’s ever-worsening economic situation, which 
appeared to have worsened even more after Mubarak’s removal. However, its text 
was heavily ambivalent and accentuated the MB’s external critics’ claims that the 
organization was formed by “free market capitalists”, who were just waiting for the 
right moment to pursue foreign investments and strike economic deals with the 
West.523 
 
Nevertheless, far from being a capitalist manifesto, the “Renaissance Project” 
reflected the confusion and lack of a clear message and ideology that had been 
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characteristic of the MB throughout the transitional period. Some sections of the 
document indeed echoed the critics’ concerns, as the organization seemed to call for 
capitalist practices such as reducing bureaucratic regulations that prevent the 
emergence of new businesses, reducing the country’s budget deficit, and encouraging 
foreign trade.524 On the other hand, it also argued in favour of state-support for 
farmers, envisioned a larger role for the state in managing the country’s economy, and 
sought to eradicate the remnants of the Mubarak-era’s state-owned enterprises.525 
Moreover, the Renaissance Project also included clear instances of Islamist economic 
agendas, such as the tackling of poverty through zakat (religiously mandated charity) 
and waqf (Islamic endowments), and the intention to establish governmental Islamic 
institutions.526 The ambivalence and confusion that was evident throughout the 
Nahda should not come as a surprise, as at the time of its commission the MB was 
facing two of the most arduous tasks in its history: the evolution into a legitimate and 
ruling political party, and the need to address and reform the economic policies it 
inherited from the Mubarak government. 
 
Market-oriented reforms had been implemented under Mubarak, leading to 
temporary economic growth, but because of well established elites and the corrupted 
nature of the regime and deep state, the economic benefits were not distributed 
evenly and resulted in some of the key grievances behind the January 25th Uprisings: 
a sharp increase in income and wealth inequality.527 Together with the difficulty of 
having to come up with an achievable economic plan, Mohamed Morsi also faced the 
challenge of filling the leadership vacuum that had been enveloping the country since 
Mubarak’s removal, and had to do so despite the very narrow margin that saw him 
elected president.  
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4.5 Morsi’s “100 Days Plan” 
Despite his lack of political experience, flagged up in the previous chapter, the newly 
elected president was aware of the enormity of the tasks that lay in front of him, and 
inaugurated his rule with a speech that outlined his 64 promises to the country, and a 
plan to meet each of them in the first 100 days of his rule. The main areas that the 
“100 Days Plan” was set to tackle were related to security, traffic, bread, 
environmental footprint/cleanliness, and fuel, all major issues that had been plaguing 
the country for decades and hugely contributed to fuelling the grievances behind the 
outbreak of January 25th. In the eyes of its critics, the MB’s belief to be able to address 
and reform such deep rooted problems was a major sign of the organization’s lack of 
ruling experience, and of its naivety when it came to making promises that could not 
be delivered. It follows that as soon as Morsi released his roadmap, several 
organizations aimed at scrutinizing and keeping track of his government’s 
performances formed, which in retrospect offer a very detailed and objective insight 
into the first ever 100 days of the MB’s rule. 
 
One of these associations was the newly-created “Forum of Independent Egyptian 
Human Rights Associations” that, constituted of 17 human rights-focused NGOs, 
aimed at “evaluating the performance of the president-elect during his first 100 days 
in office”528. Through the launching of their “Human Rights in 100 days” campaign, the 
association sent Morsi a 7-page memo stating that his 100 Days Plan did not 
sufficiently address the severe lack of human rights in the country, and containing 
suggestions as to what decrees to adopt and which to avoid, in what was a 
comprehensive document composed by 30 demands and divided into 6 sections.529 
This memo reminded the president-elect of the necessity to meet the people’s 
demand and expectations, and to address the tragic legacies that decades of gross 
human rights abuses had left behind.  
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Similarly, “independent youth with no specific ideology or political bias” came 
together to create “MorsiMeter”, an interactive online platform aimed at monitoring 
the effectiveness of Morsi’s 100 Days plan, by comparing what was being achieved 
against what had been promised.530 The online platform is divided into five sections 
reflecting the problem areas that Morsi vowed to tackle and the number of promises 
associated to them, these being: security (17 promises), traffic (21 promises), bread 
(13 promises), environmental cleanliness (8 promises), and fuel (5 promises). 
MorsiMeter works by comparing statements and statistics released by the media 
(independent and official) to what is released by the official presidency office, by 
conducting opinion polls, and by giving its online visitors the possibility to report 
whether or not they felt that the MB government was fulfilling its promises or not, 
under the categories “spotted as achieved”, “spotted as in progress”, and “not 
spotted”. Its interactive nature makes its content easy and straightforward to engage 
with, all the while collecting primary data that is essential to the scope of this chapter. 
 
While relying on a single organization to assess the government’s performance in its 
first 100 days is analytically limited and unlikely to lead to reliable and objective 
results, comparing results and findings from different monitor groups leads to some 
gloomy conclusions. Addressing a large crowd in October 2012, 3 months after taking 
office, Morsi claimed that 70% of his security goals had been reached, and similarly 
that 40% of the promised rubbish collection target had allegedly been met, and that 
he was over 80% of the way to ending the ongoing shortage of bread.531 However, 
data gathered by various observer organization painted a much less optimistic picture, 
and concluded the the MB government was already proving to be inadequate, or at 
least too disconnected from the actual potentiality of achieving their promises, just 
over 3 months after being established.532  
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According to data gathered on MorsiMeter, 24 out of his 64 promises were still under 
the “work in progress” category, while only 9 promises had been achieved, meaning 
that 58% of Egyptians declared their disappointment in how little had been achieved 
thus far.533 Despite the words of Rashad Bayoumi, spokesman for the FJP, who stated 
“I think his performance has been great”, the Washington Post reported that “Piles of 
garbage continue to line some streets of the capital. Strikes over wages and overdue 
benefits have halted some public-sector services, particularly in Egypt’s woefully 
underfunded hospitals. One man even filed a police report against Morsi for failing to 
implement all of his 100-day promises.”, but nothing more came of it.534 
 
While it is undeniable that in its first 100 days the Morsi’s government had not 
achieved what it promised, the conditions under which said government was elected 
need to be brought into the analysis. The MB found itself transformed from an 
embedded opposition group into the country’s ruling party in a matter of months, and 
its politically-inexperienced leaders were left with an inherited political and economic 
situation on the verge of collapse, which would have been nearly impossible for 
anyone to tackle. Moreover, the country’s internal security had continued to decrease 
after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, making events such as murders, sexual violence, 
and gross abuses of human rights a daily occurrence. At the time of Morsi’s election, 
approximately 40% of the Egyptian population still lived in poverty535, the country was 
deeply divided in terms of its citizens’ choice of President and was under the watchful 
scrutiny of international powers concerned by the rise to power of Islamists. All 
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considered, Morsi managed to meet at least some of his promises, which came as 
unexpected for several external observers. 
 
Furthermore, despite the undeniable failure of his 100 Days Plan, Morsi still managed 
to achieve something quite extraordinary in his first 3 months in power: he seemed to 
be asserting his own authority over that of the SCAF and the Army, which only 
contributed to the MB’s huge miscalculation of the balance of power in the country, 
which will be examined in the next chapter. The question now was whether that would 
have been enough to keep the people on his side, despite the growing popular 
discontent. 
 
4.6 The Brotherhood’s Constitutional Decree: the beginning of the end? 
During his first 100 days, Morsi also successfully oversaw a treaty between Israel and 
Hamas, and stipulated a preliminary deal with the International Monetary Fund for a 
much needed loan.536 For a short while, it looked like Morsi was the pragmatist and 
leader that the country needed, committed to returning Egypt to the centre of the 
regional political balance. However, the president’s basking in international acclaims 
was set to be short lived. Egypt was still without an operating constitution 18 months 
after Mubarak’s removal and on November 22, 2012, Morsi released a Constitutional 
Decree (see Appendix) that expanded the presidency’s legislative and judicial 
authority, essentially granting himself extraordinary powers. This move triggered a 
surge of popular protests and mobilization that would eventually culminate in the July 
2013 Coup, and is now accepted in the literature as the beginning of the end of the 
MB government. However, it needs to be noted here that, while this event is 
considered pivotal to the removal of the MB government, its causes, impacts and 
consequences have been left largely unanalysed. Therefore, this chapter will rely on 
the combination of primary and secondary sources to try and make sense of such a 
controversial and crucial decision. 
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Morsi’s decree is so significant because it brought about some troubling questions 
regarding the nature of Egypt’s transition. It caused large popular protests, 
resignations for his administration, judicial backlash, and reinforced the already 
existing doubts about the true political intentions of the MB. However, while domestic 
and international critics alike braced for the rise of “religious fascism”, Morsi’s move 
has to be placed and understood in the context of Cairo’s intensively polarised politics, 
rather than just as an expression of Islamist intent. As Mark Lynch notes, “Morsi’s 
power is more impressive on paper than in reality”, although there is no doubt that 
with such a declaration the MB passed the point of no return.537  
 
There is a considerable gap in the literature, both in the academic and in the media-
based one, that focuses on the reasons behind the issuing of such a controversial 
Constitutional Decree. The FJP presidency attempted to justify it as the only way to 
overcome the country’s political deadlock, and as a necessary step towards achieving 
“revolutionary demands and rooting out remnants of the old regime”.538 Gehad El-
Haddad, a senior presidential advisor in the FJP, even turned to Twitter to informally 
defend the government’s decision, tweeting “Someone needed to get real”, in a 
gesture that perfectly encapsulates the fragility of the country’s equilibrium at that 
point in time.539 However, the consequences of the constitutional declaration were 
clear: Morsi had stripped the judiciary of almost all of its influence over the presidency, 
immunising his decisions from judicial oversight, pre-empting legal challenges to an 
Islamist-dominated constitutional process, and making himself legally untouchable.  
 
What confused both internal and external observers was the fact that Morsi declared 
the Constitutional Decree at what was the highest point of his 5 months old rule thus 
far, when the MB administration was being praised internationally for the crucial role 
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it played in overseeing the above-mentioned ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.540 
However, while the country’s international reputation was rising, Egypt’s internal 
situation was far from stable, something that arguably played a big part in triggering 
the declaration of the Constitutional Decree. The Constitutional Assembly tasked with 
drafting the country’s new constitution was on the verge of collapsing because of 
disagreements between its Islamists and non-Islamist members, all the while still being 
subjected to the SCAF’s power to veto whatever document they eventually produced.  
 
Such a situation was causing several representatives of secular and liberal parties, such 
as the Kefaya Movement, to call for a boycott of the document that was being 
produced, as they argued that it did not take into account popular consensus nor the 
aims of the 2011 revolution.541 Moreover, clashes between revolutionaries and police 
forces regularly occurred in the capital’s streets and squares, as popular frustration 
over the slow pace of change continued to escalate. Therefore, internal turmoil and 
the very real possibility of yet another Constitutional Assembly failing to produce a 
new document, nearly 20 months after Mubarak’s removal, were likely the main 
triggers behind Morsi’s controversial decision. Accordingly, the President publicly 
declared that his decree represented an attempt to safeguard the country’s transition 
to a constitutional democracy and aimed at fulfilling popular demands for justice, but 
he definitely did not foresee how profound the consequences of such a decision were 
going to be.542  
 
The seven-point decree radically altered the already fragile balance of power in the 
country by taking away the judiciary’s authority to challenge presidential decisions, 
and pre-empted legal actions aimed at the dissolution of the constituent assembly and 
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of the upper house of parliament, as it happened in June 2012.543  The declaration 
stated that, after January 25th,  the Presidency held the responsibility to wipe out 
remnants of the Mubarak regime from the country’s institutions, and to achieve 
revolutionary demands calling for the institutions of “a new legitimacy built on a 
constitution that protects freedom, justice, and democracy”.544 Moreover, Article VI 
stated “The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect the 
country and the goals of the revolution.”, essentially granting Morsi the authority to 
seize extraordinary powers without having to face legal recourses.545 
 
While the popular protests and violent governmental response with which they were 
met will be discussed later on, it is now safe to say that in seizing dictatorial powers in 
the name of safeguarding Egypt’s democratic transition, Morsi was starting to look 
more and more similar to his deposed predecessor, renowned for his dependency 
upon Emergency Laws. 
 
4.7 The MB’s Constitution Examined 
Once again, much like in the case of the Constitutional Decree, the text of the MB 
Constitution was left largely unscrutinised, as domestic and international observers 
focused mainly on the protests and popular uprisings surrounding their issuing, rather 
than on a critical analysis of their content. Therefore, this chapter will focus its analysis 
on the text of the Constitution itself, in order to identify its institutional and 
bureaucratic implications and consequences. 
 
Despite the ongoing protests, the drafting of a new constitution continued, producing 
a document that was contentious not only in its content, but also in the process behind 
it. A constitution that was meant to represent a united post-revolutionary Egypt 
instead embodied the country’s lack of political consensus. Moreover, the drafting 
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process in itself was far from being transparent. Initially supposed to take two months, 
it was sped up due to Morsi’s fear of a judiciary retaliation after the issuing of the 
Constitutional Decree, which resulted in most of the Parliament’s non-Islamist 
member walking out in protest of what they perceived as a process dominated by the 
Islamists.546 Regardless of the tense political and social situation, the text of the new 
Constitution was put to the test through a referendum that took place on 15th 
December 2012, when it passed with 64% of the popular vote.547  
 
Notwithstanding the controversies surrounding it, the passing of the constitution did 
not come as a surprise, as to much of the politically exhausted population, a “yes” vote 
represented a further step towards stability. However, it needs to be noted that only 
33% of Egypt’s 52 million eligible voters cast their ballot – in the lowest turnout since 
the transition’s beginning—meaning that the MB Constitution lacked popular support 
and legitimacy from the very start.548 This also meant that, for the first time since its 
creation, the much praised MB’s mobilization capabilities failed to live up to 
expectations, and numerous reports of electoral violations painted a problematic and 
worrying picture of the state of democracy and security in the country.  
 
Aside from the allegations of a flawed and unengaging referendum, the text of the 
Constitution itself (see Appendix) was regarded by critics as highly problematic. While 
the MB constitution makes for a stronger parliament, limits the presidency’s powers, 
and poses severe obstacle for the practice of torture and imprisonment without trial, 
the document still grants Egypt’s generals the power and privileges to which they were 
entitled under Mubarak. There are several reasons why this is the case: for example, 
the document was drafted on the basis of the 1971 Constitution, and while there have 
been improvements, a lot of the issues contained in the original document remained. 
To start with, the approved Constitution does nothing to challenge Egypt’s highly 
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centralised system of governance, and while Article 188 allows for the election of local 
councils, it also states that their authority can be overturned by the central 
government at any time for reasons of “public interest”.549 This grants no transparency 
regarding the way in which these local governors are to be elected, and essentially 
ensures that high levels of poverty will continue to be widespread outside of Cairo.  
Nevertheless, The MB Constitution does impose checks on presidential powers, 
limiting the President elect to two four-years terms and taking away the individual 
power to declare a state of emergency, which would have to be approved by a majority 
in both houses of government (Art. 148. “For the state of emergency to take effect, 
the consent of the majority in each of the two chambers is necessary.”).550 However, 
the President still gets to nominate the Prime Minister, governors, and a tenth of the 
Shura Council, making true accountability hard to achieve.551 Article 2 remains 
untouched, stating that “the principles of Islamic Law are the main sources of 
legislation”, but another article now clearly defines the principles of shari’a Law as 
those of Sunni Muslim jurisprudence (Art. 219 “The principles of Islamic Law (sharia) 
include general evidence, the foundational principles of Islamic jurisprudence, the 
reliable sources from among the Sunni schools of thought (madhahib)”.552 
 
Another major issue is represented by the fact that the MB Constitution is negligible 
at best when it comes to the protection of freedom and human rights. While it 
provides some sort of protection against arbitrary torture and detention (Articles 35 
and 36 “Anyone who has been arrested, jailed, or restricted in his freedom in any form 
is entitled to being treated in a way that respects his dignity. He must not be tortured, 
threatened, or degraded. He must not be harmed physically or mentally.”), Human 
Rights Watch points out that the document fails to actually enforce freedom of 
                                                 
549 Mabrouk, M., “The View from a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution”, in Brookings: 
Middles East Memo, (January 2013), p. 5 See Appendix. 
550 Kirkpatrick, D., “Egypt Islamists Approve Draft Constitution Despite Objections”, in The New York 





expression and religion, which are long running issues in the country.553 On freedom 
of expression, while Article 45 guarantees freedom of thought and opinion (“The 
freedom of thought and opinion are guaranteed. Every person has the right to express 
his opinion in speaking, writing, image, or otherwise.”), preceding articles prohibit 
insulting prophets, but fail to define what constitutes an insult, therefore remaining 
unclear (Article 44 “It is forbidden to insult any messengers or prophets.”).554 When it 
comes to freedom of religion, things seems to have regressed rather than progressed, 
as the Constitution does grant freedom of worship, but only allows the followers of 
the three Abrahamic religions to build places of worship, leaving Egypt’s ethnic and 
religious minorities largely unprotected.555  
 
Recurring inconsistencies also affect women’s rights, as Article 9 now refers to equality 
without mention of gender (“The state commits itself to providing security, tranquillity 
and equality of opportunity for all citizens, without discrimination.”), but then Article 
10 specifically states that “the State shall balance between a woman’s obligations 
towards family and public work”, while it does not do so for men, essentially leaving 
the gap between genders unaddressed and unchanged.556 Moreover, any hope of 
seeing some degree of military accountability enforced in the Constitution have 
vanished, as the Army still gets preferential treatment, controlling its own budget, 
while military trials for civilians are still allowed in cases that “harm the armed forces” 
(Article 198 “Civilians may not be tried by the military judiciary unless they are accused 
of crimes that hurt the armed forces.”), with no further clarification.557  
 
Finally, the most confusing and worrying feature of the new Constitution is 
encapsulated in article 81, which states that “rights and freedoms shall be exercised 
insofar as they do not contradict the principles set out in the Chapter on State and 
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Society in this constitution”. This is in conjunction with problematic terminology 
surrounding the role of the state in “preserving the true nature of the Egyptian family” 
(Article 10) and “protecting ethics and morals and public order” (Article 11), which 
therefore gives the state the power to place public and social obligations above 
personal freedoms.558 
 
Therefore, what had to be a document that sealed Morsi’s position as “the President 
for all Egypt” turned out to be the MB’s biggest downfall, the the turning point that 
sparked a series of popular protests and discontent that would lead to the July 2013 
Coup. The Constitution validated most Egyptians’ fear that the MB was primarily 
concerned with the implementation of an Islamic Project rather than the overall good 
of the whole country, a perception that was also shared by Egyptians who supported 
and voted for Morsi in the Presidential elections. However, as mentioned above, it is 
also true that the hurried and controversial drafting of the 2012 Constitution took 
place at a time when the MB was in the midst of an existential fight, battling with both 
internal and external oppositions, which led to the suspension of the “normal” rules 
of politics.  
 
Interestingly, prominent MB members were aware of what a dangerous step this was, 
but made it clear that at the time there was no other choice for the organization and 
the party. When the Constitutional decree was first issued, one of the FJP 
representatives stated “yes, the decree isn’t democratic and it isn’t what you would 
expect after a revolution”, but also shared his belief that the MB’s hands were tied.559 
Regardless, the articles in the Constitution that gave the state a powerful role in 
determining the moral and religious values of a nations were perceived by both 
revolutionary groups and the population as being inherently antithetical to democracy 
and to the demands of January 25th, which kick started a series of protests that would 
eventually culminate in Morsi’s removal 7 months later. 
 
                                                 
558 ibid., pp. 7-8 
559 Hamid, S., “Is There an Egyptian Nation?”, in POMEPS Briefings: The Battle for Egypt’s Constitution, 
(January 2013), p. 26 
 208 
4.8 The Beginning of the End: The Battles of Ittihadiya 
Up until November 2012, the MB presidency seemed to be proceeding without major 
setbacks, excluding the ongoing power struggle with the military and the deep state, 
which was far from being surprising or unexpected. The much feared 
“Brotherhoodization” of the state, a process according to which MB members would 
dominate official institutions that had previously been closed to Islamists because of 
their illegal status, was somewhat underway, but personnel changes had not been 
drastic or widespread. If anything, it seemed that the opposite was taking place, and 
that Egypt was witnessing a “stratification” of the Brotherhood, where the 
organization was struggling to adapt to its newly achieved powers, and trying to figure 
out how to be several things at once.560  In its quest to efficiently govern a country in 
transition, it seemed that the MB was almost moving away from its original reason 
d’etre, with Morsi having to behave as a “president for all”, rather than just as a 
devoted Islamist. However, everything changed after the issuing of the Constitutional 
Decree on November 22nd, with the release of a document that immunized all 
presidential decisions from judicial objections and subsequently added judiciary 
powers to the president’s existing legislative and executive authority. Such a move 
gave the opposition and the revolutionary groups that had been excluded from 
consultation the spark they needed to start re-launching street protests, and 
November 22nd 2012 marked the beginning of a political crisis from which the Morsi 
government would never recover. 
 
Popular sit-ins and marches in opposition to the MB Constitution started soon after 
the announcement of the Constitutional Decree, but it was not until December 1st, 
when Morsi declared his intention to go ahead with the drafting of the document and 
called for a popular referendum to take place on December 15th, that Egypt’s internal 
situation started to become even more tense. Thousands of Morsi’s opponents flocked 
to Cairo’s Tahrir Square to protest the president’s “power-grab”, where they were met 
by pro-Brotherhood demonstrators chanting “The people support the President 
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decision” and “the people want the implementation of God’s law”.561 While it became 
clearer that the country was deeply divided, the rising tensions between 
demonstrators on both sides and the police forces charged with maintaining public 
order kept escalating, and would eventually culminate in a defining set of protests that 
would take place between the 5th and the 9th December 2012, subsequently named 
“The Battles of Ittihadiya”. It needs to be noted that, in response to the violence 
gripping the country one again, Morsi released yet another Constitutional Decree on 
9th December 2012, revoking the previous one issued in November, but still kept the 
plebiscite date set for December 15th 2012.562 
 
On December 5th, thousands of protesters marched to Ittihadiya Square to protest 
against what they perceived as the start of a new dictatorship, aiming to hold a 
peaceful sit-in outside the Presidential palace. Anti-Morsi demonstrators chanted the 
slogan “the people want the fall of the regime” that came to define the 2011 uprisings, 
and were met by unprecedented violence on the hands of both the police and the 
MB’s supporters.563 What was shocking and exceptional was the violence inflicted on 
demonstrators by alleged pro-Morsi militias, who unleashed on the crowds, chanting 
Morsi’s name, painting over revolutionary graffiti on the presidential palace, and 
tearing down tents.564 Moreover, these episodes were particularly unexpected as 
most of the protesters gathered in the square belonged to Egypt’s middle class, which 
had traditionally provided a reliable source of support for the MB, and were now being 
targeted by “thugs” allegedly belonging to the same organization.565 
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The pro-Morsi demonstrators chanted “the people want to cleanse the square” and 
“the president has legitimacy”, but displayed little of the MB’s famous organizational 
and coordination capabilities, leading many to question their allegiance to the 
organization.566 There are several allegations as to who these militants might have 
been, which will be further examines in the next chapter. Several interviewees, both 
members and critics of the MB, had no problem in stating that they genuinely believed 
that the SCAF staged most of what happened in Itthihadyia, with the clear aim of 
setting the protesters and the MB against each other once and for all. One particular 
participant, who was very close to the MB at the time of the revolution, claimed that 
Morsi genuinely believed that he was going to be killed that day, and that he stated 
“Today is the day I will become a martyr”.567 This belief is based on the fact that, after 
decades of confrontation, the SCAF knew exactly how the MB would react to a similar 
threat, which mirrors exactly what happened. Interviewees say that al Shater called a 
“war meeting” when protesters started pushing at the gates, and: 
 
He started mobilizing people and he started saying that now is the day to become either 
a martyr or either become victorious. He succeeded in mobilizing (people), so the youth 
went out, willing to die. The security had their thugs standing on both sides, shooting at 
each side, so that both sides really believed that they were under attack by the other. To 
heighten the violence many made actual attacks between both. This trap was for Mursi to 
call the Brothers to come down to his defence so they could clash with the opposition. 
Because they would not gain anything if he would actually be killed, on the contrary, if he 
would be killed he would gain national sympathy, he would become a martyr.568 
 
This could explain the violence that took place afterwards. Over the course of 4 days, 
large gangs of armed men violently clashed with the anti-Morsi demonstrators, 
capturing and torturing 49 men for over two days, before handing them over to the 
police.569 Armed thugs splashed water on women, threw molotovs at protesters, and 
injured hundreds, all under the eyes of the police forces, who at this initial stage 
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remained largely inactive. However, as the days went by, and despite the approval of 
the new Constitution by popular referendum, the real consequences of the Battles of 
Itthihadiya became apparent.  
 
First of all, Morsi’s claim to be “president for all Egypt” rather than just a 
representative of the MB collapsed, together with public support for Islamist parties 
and organizations. Moreover, as a result of the riots, the armed forces started to move 
away from Morsi, and from the deals that were maintaining some sort of peace 
between the government and the deep state. A fragile agreement of support had been 
secretly sealed between Morsi and the Army in July 2012, in exchange for privileges 
such as control over their own budget and impunity for the massacres perpetuated by 
SCAF in 2011 and 2012.570 However, on December 8th the Army released a statement 
saying “The armed forces... realise their responsibility to preserve the higher interests 
of the country and to secure and protect vital targets, public institutions and the 
interests of innocent citizens”, and "The opposite of that will bring us to a dark tunnel 
that will result in catastrophe and that is something we will not allow", making it clear 
that they wished to keep a neutral position and would not automatically side with the 
government.571 The withdrawal of what little Army support Morsi could count on 
marked the beginning of the end of the Morsi  government, as in the following months 
the presidency’s authority was eroded little by little, eventually culminating in the June 
30th 2013 protests and in the removal of Mohammed Morsi by a coup d’etat. 
 
4.9 Back to Square One 
In the months that followed the Battle of Itthihadiya, popular protests and violent 
clashes between protesters and government supporters continued, as Morsi 
scrambled to maintain power and reassert his authority. Soon after the approval of 
the MB Constitution, it became clear that the Brotherhood’s lack of a strong political 
vision and their crippling identity crisis was starting to take its toll, as the ruling party 
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alienated all the revolutionary groups it was once allied to, refused to take part in 
dialogue, and increasingly conformed to the stereotype of its members being 
preachers, not leaders. This was a sharp shift from the previous two years’ electoral 
successes and the organization’s rapid rise after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, which 
had led to the perception of MB leaders as almost “liberal democrats” committed to 
guiding the country through transition, rather than solely pursuing the organization’s 
Islamic narrative. For decades the MB’s leadership had operated under the 
assumption that the values they stood for were also shared by the country’s silent 
majority, which seemed to have been confirmed by the events following the 2011 
uprisings. However, just over six months into the MB’s presidency, it became clear that 
the organization was not primarily built for high politics, and certainly not for 
governing, as its crippling internal divisions and inexperience with handling direct 
power demonstrated.572 
 
Throughout Morsi’s presidency, the MB struggled to find a new identity, and 
attempted to be too many things at the same time. The organization’s leaders also 
struggled to let go of the historical sense of being besieged, which resulted in the 
movement being pulled between its past as a hounded victim and its reality as a 
governing party. The FJP government’s shortcomings undoubtedly resulted from these 
internal tensions, which translated into a weak legislative agenda antithetical to 
revolutionary demands, failure to restructure the state, a disappointing 100 Days 
program, and the FJP’s failure to represent a real alternative to the policies it had 
previously so vocally criticized. Faced with unprecedented challenges, it appeared that 
the MB leadership preferred to continue with “business as usual” rather than 
attempting to come up with strategies and a viable political manifesto. Arguably, this 
is partially due to the fact that the MB leadership in 2012 had been elected before the 
2011 revolution, meaning that it was the result of years of political stagnation and 
brutal governmental repression.  
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Consciously or not, the MB then decided to keep focusing on the only strategy they 
knew to maintain unity, identity politics, and struggled to let go of their tendency to 
present themselves as victims.573 However, this strategy backfired, and alienated the 
sizeable majority of the Egyptian population that had looked at the Brotherhood as 
providing an opportunity for change. To understand why, we must once again use 
Historical Sociology to look at the history of the organization, its relationship with the 
Egyptian population, and the mutual shaping process between the organization’s and 
other state actors and institutions. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
On the second anniversary of the beginning of the 2011 uprisings, several thousand 
people gathered in Tahrir Square, initiating a series of protests that would continue 
for days, and were characterized by violence between protesters and security 
forces.574 The uprisings quickly spread across the country, with several hundred people 
injured and 33 reported dead by the end of January 27th.575 On the same day, in a 
speech to the nation, a worried Morsi declared a state of emergency and the 
imposition of a curfew in the port cities of the Suez canal, which only reinforced his 
opponents’ perceptions of the growing similarities between their ousted and current 
leaders.576 In an attempt to maintain some of his authority, Morsi also called for 11 
political parties and four of the main opposition leaders to come together to discuss 
the growing unrest, but the leading opposition party, the National Salvation Front, 
refused to engage in dialogue until the Constitution was reformed and a new 
government was put in place.577 To further reinforce the gravity of the situation, on 
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29th January, the then Egyptian Defense Minister Abdul Fattah al Sisi issued a warning 
to protesters on both sides, stating that “their disagreement on running the affairs of 
the country may lead to the collapse of the state and threatens the future of the 
coming generations”.578 In retrospect, it could be argued that the fate of the MB 
government had already been sealed. 
 
Amid recurring clashes and escalating violence, Morsi was also quickly losing what 
little support he had from the deep state, which was reverting to its old strategy of 
using the MB as a scapegoat on which to blame the country’s issues. Ali Gooma, the 
head of Egypt’s religious establishment, progressively distanced himself from the MB, 
while the military stood on its own and reinforced the judiciary’s campaign against the 
president.579 Facing enemies on all sides, Morsi lacked the political expertise to build 
an alternative support base from outside the state, and arguably failed to realize just 
how quickly his authority was being eroded. Another meaningful factor that is usually 
ignored, is the fact that the MB government was put in charge of a state that was still 
in transition, and lacked a basic political framework on which to build new institutions 
and implement reforms. In addition to being burdened by the reality of governance, 
the MB also had to operate within a state apparatus that it did not control, and that 
consistently attempted to dismantle the government from within. 
 
Soon popular campaigns holding that the Morsi’s presidency was a failure started 
gaining momentum throughout the country, together with the claim that new 
Presidential elections should be held before the set date in 2016. Several opposition 
movements gathered in Tahrir Square on 30th June 2013, a final uprising that was 
quickly adopted by the Army as a justification for enacting a coup d’etat and arresting 
Morsi and his cabinet. Headed by the then Defense Minister Abdul Fattah al Sisi, those 
supporting the coup proclaimed themselves a second revolution, and promised full 
democracy. Just over 3 years on, it can now be argued that they did so only in the most 
formal sense. 
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It is undeniable that the MB failed to rise to the challenge presented by the evolution 
from an evolutionary movement to a political party, but it also needs to be 
acknowledged that they only stayed in power for one of the fours years allocated to 
them. The main downfalls and flaws of the organization that arguably led to the MB 
failure will be detailed and analysed in the next chapter, but it is now worth concluding 
on a post shared on Facebook by an anti-al Sisi page on 23rd June 2016, stating: 
Some of us never voted for Morsi, but never supported the military coming into power. 
Some of us were critical of the Muslim Brotherhood administration, but we never chanted 
or called for their execution even when that became the mainstream in the media. Some 
of us warned the world of the catastrophic results of June 30th, but nobody listened when 
the euphoria of protest images took them over. It's June 2016. Had he remained as 
president, Mohammed Morsi would have finished his term this month without all the 
atrocities, bloodshed, executions, life sentences, and all what your call for "early elections" 
and "military intervention" caused Egypt, Egyptians, and the world. Thank you for your 
shortsighted selfishness. 580 
This is also a sentiment echoed by all the interviewees who took part in this research, 
regardless of their class, faith, or political affiliations. If anything, there seems to be a 
shared awareness of all the opportunities that were lost after the return of the deep 
state, which is now the driving force behind contemporary manifestations of social 
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5. July 2013 Coup d’Etat/Morsi’s deposition= failure of Political Islam? 
 
 
“If the price of protecting legitimacy is my 
blood, I’m willing to pay it (…) And it would 
be a cheap price for the sake of protecting 
this country.” 
(Mohamed Morsi, July 2nd 2013) 
 
 
Just over two years after the beginning of a popular movement that led to the removal 
of the Mubarak regime, it seemed like Egypt was back to where it all started. Daily 
clashes between protesters and police, growing popular grievances, and the 
disintegration of the people’s trust in the FJP government painted a picture that was 
far from one of a country that should have been on its way to a peaceful, democratic 
transition. Following the Battle of Itthihadiya, this chapter looks at the events leading 
up to Morsi’s removal and examines the reasons behind popular discontent and the 
perceived failure of the MB. Once again, the legacy of division characteristic of the 
organisation and certain perceptions of Political Islam played a major role in the 
unravelling of these events. Justifications, accusations, and political choices are 
examined within the framework of Political Islam and that of Egypt itself, with the aim 
of identifying the extent to which they were influenced by history and ideology. 
Ultimately, this chapter identifies four main reasons that have arguably led to the 
deposition of the FJP, these being the MB’s legacy of internal divisions, its “arrogance” 
and refusal to cooperate with revolutionary groups, its miscalculations regarding the 
extent of power the group actually held, and failure to take into account the prominent 
and historical role of the Army within the Egyptian context.  
 
Drawing on Historical Sociology and on what has been said so far, it is now possible to 
bring together the MB’s ideological tensions discussed beforehand with internal 
schisms and approaches to politics. This chapter does so with the aim of offering a 
conclusive analysis of what led to Morsi’s toppling, and of what that means for the 
organization’s history and for its domestic and international perception. In the past 
few years, many have engaged with the events of June 30th 2013 and with the 
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subsequent coup d’etat perpetrated by the Egyptian Army, with the general narrative 
“blaming” the military takeover on the MB’s lack of political engagement. However, 
this chapter will put forward four main reasons that have arguably led to the MB’s 
deposition, which go beyond the mainstream arguments and provide a much more 
detailed analysis and explanation of the events. In turn, this also comes with significant 
implications for the contemporary understanding of Political Islam, which is reflected 
in the aggressive foreign policies that are internationally aimed at the region. 
 
In order to do this, and following from the initial analysis set up in Chapter 1, the 
chapter critically engages with Oliver Roy’s account of the “failure of Political Islam”, 
as it is necessary to clarify and understand exactly what the scholar meant by that in 
order to challenge his position. Therefore, Roy’s account of Islamism and “failure” will 
be explained and criticised, with the aim of setting a comprehensive framework for 
analysis. It should be made clear that this is not an attack on Roy himself. Rather, this 
thesis seeks to address and problematize a much broader trend that homogenises the 
understanding of Political Islam, ultimately represented by Roy’s “The Failure of 
Political Islam”. This is a necessary exercise as there has been a return to the 
monolithic understanding of Islamism in the aftermath of events such as the War on 
Terror and the rise of Da’esh, with the MB’s removal further emphasising this. In turn, 
the homogenising of Political Islam has led to its equation with violence, extremism 
and incompatibility with democratic governance, contributing to the growing rise of 
Islamophobia and to the construction of Muslims as the “other”.  
 
Therefore, using the MB’s example to critically engage with Roy’s work comes with a 
set of much broader implications. In particular, this thesis uses it to argue that it is 
necessary to acknowledge the heterogeneous nature of Political Islam and the fact 
that it is a modern, ever-evolving phenomenon that is inextricably linked to sources of 
power and legitimacy. This is an understanding that is largely absent in international 
foreign policy-making circles, leading to the “fight against Islamism” being the priority 
of hugely influential global actors such as the US.  This is why approaches based on 
Historical Sociology, which take into account the influence of different social, political, 
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and historical contexts, are key to understanding what a group like the MB embodies 
and to comprehend its identity and message. 
 
Following from this, the chapter will engage with the question of whether Morsi’s 
government can be considered to have been Islamist in nature, as that relevance is 
necessary when trying to address Roy’s account. The chapter argues that the MB’s 
short year in power indeed laid down the foundations of Islamist rule, providing three 
different explanations as to why, and is therefore fit to be analysed under such a 
framework. It then goes on to propose four reasons/sets of events that can be 
understood as triggering the events leading up to the July 2013 coup d’etat, and I argue 
that it would be more appropriate to talk about a deposition, rather than failure, of an 
Islamist regime in the making. Once again, this stresses the much wider contribution 
that the thesis makes beyond the study of the MB, specifically when it comes to the 
implications of the FJP’s destitution for the wider understanding of Political Islam.  
 
5.1 Tamarod, Sisi, and the Coup 
On June 30th 2013, the day marking the one-year anniversary of Morsi’s presidential 
inauguration, millions of Egyptians gathered in squares across the country chanting 
“the people want the fall of the regime”, echoing the cry that became the symbol of 
the protests that removed Hosni Mubarak in February 2011.581 Two and a half years 
and a free presidential election later, revolutionaries were back on the streets, 
demanding the Islamist government to step down and asking for early presidential 
elections.582 Demonstrators accused the MB of having hijacked the Revolution for their 
own means, and of using their power to impose Islamic law. The events of June 30th 
were the peak of a series of popular protests that had been escalating in numbers and 
frequency in Egypt over the previous few months, and that eventually led to the 
removal of the country’s first freely elected government. 
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One of the main forces behind the June 30th Revolution was the Tamarod (“revolt”) 
movement, a grassroots youth group that formed in April 2013 and quickly gained the 
sympathies of most of Morsi’s opponents, ranging from the secular Kefaya Movement 
to Fatouh’s own “Strong Egypt” Party.583 The movement quickly earned a lot of 
traction among those who feared the “Ikhwanization” of the state, and a potentially 
indefinite Islamist authoritarian rule, therefore bringing together activists from 
completely different religious and secular backgrounds, and even some remnants of 
the Mubarak regime.584 The identity and political affiliation of those who took to the 
streets therefore remains greatly unclear, with members of the deposed FJP 
attributing the protests to a carefully orchestrated SCAF’s “conspiracy” or, in the 
words of Morsi’s Foreign Minister Mohamed Soudan “Many of these people were 
counter-revolutionaries and loyalists of the former regime. To give you an example, 
Mubarak’s portrait was raised high in Tahrir Square on 30th June (2013). This shows 
that something was wrong. This was a counter-revolutionary crowd.”585  
 
Regardless of their composition, the protests on June the 30th were arguably sparked 
by the government’s lack of response to a petition launched by Tamarod, asking Morsi 
to resign and allow for new presidential elections to be held, for which they group 
claimed to have collected over 22 million signatures, although this number is highly 
disputed.586 Being the main force behind the revolution, Tamarod issued an ultimatum 
giving Morsi two days to step down, and called for "state institutions including the 
army, the police and the judiciary, to clearly side with the popular will as represented 
by the crowds".587 What the revolutionaries probably did not expect, was the extent 
to which the Egyptian Armed Forces seized the occasion to do just that. 
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Following Tamarod’s example the SCAF gave the government a window of 48 hours to 
meet the demands of the Egyptian people until it “stepped in to restore order”, 
referring to the ultimatum as a "a final chance to shoulder the burden of a historic 
moment in our country."588 Morsi refused to meet both the protesters’ and the Army’s 
demands, issuing an emotional speech on the night of July 2nd in which he insisted he 
was the legitimate leader of the country, and that his removal would only lead to more 
violence: 
 
The people empowered me, the people chose me, through a free and fair election (...) 
Legitimacy is the only way to protect our country and prevent bloodshed, to move to a new 
phase (…) Legitimacy is the only thing that guarantees for all of us that there will not be any 
fighting and conflict, that there will not be bloodshed. (...) If the price of protecting legitimacy 
is my blood, I’m willing to pay it,” he said. “And it would be a cheap price for the sake of 
protecting this country.589 
 
Despite his powerful words, 12 months of perceived political ineptitude and 
controversial policies caught up with the leader of the Islamist government, as SCAF 
removed him through a coup d’etat the following day. This also came to embody one 
of the darkest times in the MB’s history and officially welcomed the return of military 
authoritarianism to Egypt. As the revolutionaries got crushed once again, and now that 
the country is in the midst of one of the worst Human Rights crises it has ever 
experienced, it is worth analysing the reasons that led to the FJP’s removal, and its 
implications and ramifications for Political Islam as a heterogeneous movement. 
 
5.2 The “Failure of Political Islam?” Assessing Roy’s Claim 
When looking at the rise to power of Islamist forces in the region, be it through 
revolutionary or “democratic” means, one of the most prominent analyses of such 
phenomenon is that provided by the Oliver Roy in his 1994 book “The Failure of 
Political Islam”. In both this work and in several subsequent articles, Roy puts forward 
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an argument that starts by assessing and challenging what had been the mainstream 
perception of Political Islam in Western policy circles up to that point in history, namely 
the view of Islam as a religion of political extremisms, as something anachronistic, and 
therefore as incompatible with the Western ideal even when politicised. Roy 
undeniably challenged such a-historicism and tendency to reduce the regional 
geopolitics of the time to a mere “clash of civilisations”; however, while countering 
such gross generalizations, Roy arguably established a new set of equally damaging 
ones, which will be further analysed below. This is the case because, as explained in 
the first chapter of this thesis, it is necessary to engage with Roy’s position when 
looking to assess whether the MB “failed” in their Islamist journey in 2012 or not. 
Having already established that Morsi’s time in power can indeed be recognised as the 
making of an Islamist government, Roy’s claim therefore needs to be measured against 
it.  
 
Firstly then, in order to address the question of whether Islamist rule as embodied by 
the MB’s year in power has failed or not, there is the need to understand what exactly 
Roy meant by “failure”.  By doing so, the purpose of this thesis is to argue that it is 
necessary to take a more nuanced approach to the analysis of what happened in Egypt 
in 2012, and to move away from the narrative of an (Islamist) government either failing 
or succeeding while in power, as that is too reductive and does not add to the 
discussion of this topic at all. Rather, it is more useful to challenge Roy’s fixed 
terminology and criteria while looking at the staggering diversity of Islamist 
movements across the region, and at the differences found not only within the same 
national context, embodied in Egypt by the struggle between the MB and the Salafis, 
but also at schisms within the same Islamist organisation. This can also be done by 
looking at the particular conditions that led to Morsi’s appointment as president in 
2012, arguing that ultimately it is not about failure as Roy understands it, but about 
the inability to maintain power. 
 
Seeking to break down and challenge the binary between either failing or succeeding 
when talking about an Islamist government, in particular that of the MB, it is first 
necessary to engage with the terminology used by Roy, and to really understand what 
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the scholar means by “failure” when referring to the Islamist “quest” to governance. 
In “The Failure of Political Islam”, Roy puts forward a rather compelling argument 
attempting to explain contemporary forms of Islamism as “third world movements”,590 
inspired by Western ideologies such as communism or socialism. However, rather than 
differentiating between the different ideologies and strategies that set each Islamist 
group aside from the other, Roy seems to be grouping them all together under the 
label of “neo-fundamentalism”. What he means by that is a distinction between 
“Islamism” as such and “neofundamentalism”, with the former referring to the drive 
for political power, and the latter meaning a much narrower focus on the family and 
the mosque instead.  
 
Therefore, in Roy’s opinion, neofundamentalists would be represented by the Saudi 
regime, while Iran would embody “Islamism” as a comprehensive notion. In doing so, 
Roy claims that unlike the “original” Islamists, contemporary groups (neo-
fundamentalists) have distanced themselves from the intellectual challenges posed by 
modernity and instead limit themselves to channelling the discontent of the urban 
youth into political opposition. Therefore, Roy is essentially arguing that “Neo-
fundamentalists worry about morals, mixed education, veiling, and the corrupting 
influence of the West, but they have no real political or economic program. If they 
come to power they will resemble the repressive, one-party regimes that they are 
likely to replace, and will in turn face the opposition of these same disaffected 
classes.”.591 Consequently, in Roy’s view, “neofundamentalism represents a 
"degradation" and an "enfeeblement" of Islamism, for it challenges "the political, 
economic, and social realms…only in words."592  
 
Roy further claims that “aside from the Iranian Revolution, Islamism has not 
significantly altered the political landscape of the Middle East. Political Islam does not 
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pass the test of power”.593 In essence, at the time of writing, Roy believed that Islamist 
movements were running out of “revolutionary steam”, and that they would either 
become normal political parties or lead to individualistic neo-fundamentalism. 
Consequently, he predicted that Islamists would disappear from the political arena, 
and solely focus on social and ethical issues rather than on the creation of an Islamic 
State.594 He therefore understands “failure” as being primarily an intellectual one, by 
saying that “Islamism is a failure historically: neither in Iran or in liberated Afghanistan 
has a new society been established. The failure of Islamism does not mean that parties 
such as the Algerian ISF will not achieve power, but only that those parties will not 
invent a new society.”595 Ultimately, reflecting on the Egyptian context in 2013 after 
Morsi’s removal by the military-led coup d’etat, Roy stated that “The failure of Political 
Islam is not the political failure of the Islamists; it is the collapse of Islamism as a 
political ideology”596, claiming that Islamism as a whole has lost its credibility as a 
champion of change. 
 
Although this is an admittedly short summary of Roy’s position, it should already be 
apparent that although such an argument might come across as compelling and 
convincing at first, a deeper analysis reveals a number of shortcomings. Therefore, 
before moving onto the specific discussion of how Roy would look at the events of 
2012 in Egypt as the demonstration of his “failure” theory, it is necessary to 
contextualise and criticise its foundations first. To begin with, Roy’s choices of case 
studies while developing its original theory are questionable. The supposed inability 
of the Afghan mujahedeen to seize power was disproved in 1996, when the civil war 
ended with the overarching victory of a specific branch of the Afghan Taliban 
movement over the country’s more secular forces. Similarly, Roy’s claims that 
“Islamists have changed, or at least they have understood that the world has changed. 
Even where they have taken control, as in Iran or Gaza, they have been unable to 
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establish a successful model of an Islamic state”.597 Further claims that, aside from the 
Iranian Revolution, Islamism has not significantly altered the political landscape of the 
Middle East, are equally hasty if not just simply incorrect in the light of contemporary 
events.  Even more importantly, it is necessary to note that the binary that Roy draws 
between “original” Islamism and neofundamentalism is also too narrow and incorrect, 
as it does not take into account the diversity of practices and ideological leanings that 
are manifested even with the same Islamist movement. For example in the case of the 
MB, it has been underlined in the previous chapters how its membership has 
historically been split between these two tendencies, with groups focusing on the 
achievement of political power while other factions argued for the need to maintain 
their primary focus on the individual rather than the state.  
 
Therefore, claiming that contemporary neofundamentalist movements have hijacked 
the original notion of Islamism is again incorrect, as it draws an unnecessary binary, 
and groups the many different manifestations of Islamism under a monolithic label, 
without taking diversity of experiences and practices into account. Moreover, Roy also 
ignores socio-economic contexts that play a key role in shaping the aims and strategies 
of these groups, as this thesis has shown in the case of the MB in Egypt. 
 
Reflecting on the impact of his main work in 2006, Roy attempted to defend his thesis 
by stating “By my title, I meant that the Islamist ideology is simply not working. It didn't 
provide the basis to create a new society, a new state, or offer an alternative to the 
(then) two paths of western democracy and communism.”598 However, this claim once 
again underlines how general Roy’s approach is, and his failure to take into account 
the broad range of Islamist groups in the region, whose aims and strategies widely 
differ depending on their historical and socio-political context. In claiming that the 
overarching aim of an Islamist ideology is the creation of a “utopian Islamic State” and 
the creation of a new society, Roy severely reduces this diversity and, in doing so, 
excludes the majority of Islamist movements from his analysis. This is the case as most 
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Islamist groups, such as the MB, never strove for the creation of a new society, but 
rather for the gradual reformation of the current one, in line with the organization’s 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach. Similarly, the claim that an Islamist 
government has never successfully manage to establish a new society (when wanting 
to do so) is equally wrong, and it can be proved by the case of Iran which, ironically, 
was one of Roy’s main case studies in the 1990s. 
 
Moreover, Islamists have arguably done the opposite of disappearing from the 
political arena, with various groups still heavily influencing the region’s geopolitics 
today. Therefore, one question needing an answer is, in the eyes of whom has the 
Islamist state/movement lost its credibility? Is it in the eyes of the Islamists 
themselves, whose policies reached their highest point in 2012 in countries like Egypt 
and Tunisia? Or is it rather in the eyes of the West that, failing to recognise an Islamist 
government when there is one, as demonstrated above, therefore also fails to 
recognise the pull and relevance of an ideology that is far from being defeated today? 
This question is particularly relevant now, when international foreign policies seem to 
be increasingly driven by the narrative calling for a “war against Islam”, understood in 
a monolithic sense, which is alienating entire communities rather than building peace 
 
To conclude, in opposition to Roy’s understanding of “failure”, this thesis refers to the 
MB’s removal as a “deposition” instead. This is not to say that the actions that led to 
the events of July 2013 do not embody various degrees of political failure in its broader 
sense. However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to use a different 
terminology in order to challenge the understanding of “failure” as that of a broader 
ideology as a whole, which would be too homogenising and would therefore hinder 
the understanding of the impacts that the MB’s removal had on regional dynamics. 
 
5.3 The FJP in power: Islamist government or democratic transition? 
When looking at the violent end of the MB’s rule in July 2013, several critics such as 
Roy adopt such event as a proof of the incompatibility of democracy and Islamic rule. 
However, before attempting to address the question of whether “Political Islam” (as 
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embodied by the MB’s rule) has failed in its quest for governance or not, there is the 
need to first establish whether Morsi’s government could be defined as Islamist.  
 
This is a necessary step as “we”, as Western observers, have our own biases and 
expectations regarding what an Islamist government would and should look like, 
regardless of rejections of Orientalism599 and breaking down of prejudices. To a 
“mainstream” external observer an Islamist state would display some core criteria, 
some of the most common ones being the enforcement of the hijab on women, or the 
severe constraint of freedom of worship, and so on. However, these expectations are 
strongly biased and not reflective of what the goals and strategies of the MB, here the 
case study Islamist organization, would be. Therefore, these perceptions need to be 
challenged when addressing the questions as to whether the Morsi’s government was 
laying down the foundations for Islamist governance or not.  
 
An initial answer can be provided by looking at the way in which the FJP labelled itself 
since its foundation and throughout the electoral campaign. Despite referring to the 
group as a “civil party” (hizb madani), the FJP also declared numerous time that its 
primary objective was not to gain power, as one would expect of any political party, 
but rather to “enhance Islamic morals, values, and concepts in individuals’ lives and 
society,” which are goals closer to that of a religious group.600 It is also worth 
mentioning here the dilemma presented by what Wael Hallaq defines as the 
“impossible state”, this being the inherent incompatibility of the modern nation-state 
and of an “Islamic” State because of modernity’s moral predicaments.601 It is likely 
that, whether acknowledged or not, these were some of the challenges that the FJP 
faced in 2012. 
 
In the aftermath of the July 2013 coup d’etat that posed a violent end to the MB’s rule, 
most regional and international critics explained the events of the previous 12 months 
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as yet another example of authoritarian rule in the country. It is undeniable that the 
MB took some questionable decisions and consistently alienated all other political 
forces in the country, therefore failing to fulfil Morsi’s promise of being “the people’s 
president”. However, this thesis argues that the Islamist element was a strong 
component of the FJP’s regime, and that their time in government can therefore be 
identified as at least a strong attempt to establish some sort of an Islamist rule in the 
country.  This claim can be supported by taking into consideration the “top three” 
decisions taken by Morsi and his advisors while in power, and analysing whether they 
are Islamist in nature and whether they fit with the organization’s historical narrative 
and ideology. These decisions have been identified after interviews conducted with 
both Morsi’s supporters and opponents, and are also recognised as fundamental to 
understanding the nature and downfall of the MB’s rule by international bodies (such 
as the FAC report) and observers. These decisions are the forced retirement of some 
of the Army’s oldest key generals, the Gaza ceasefire, and the MB Constitution of 
December 2012. 
 
5.3 (1) Morsi and the SCAF: legacy of civil-institutional relations 
As explained in the previous chapter, one of the biggest obstacles faced by Morsi after 
being appointed president was SCAF’s unwillingness to relinquish (informal) power. 
This was the case as there has historically been a tension between formal and informal 
power in Egypt, with institutions such as the Army unofficially holding both political 
and economic powers.  The SCAF had been de facto ruling Egypt from February 2011 
to June 2012, a fierce reminder of the fact that the country’s status quo was far from 
being gone even after the 2011 uprisings.  Throughout Egypt’s modern history the 
Army has always held a central place in both the political and the economic realms 
and, consequently, in the citizen’s psyche. Therefore, until 2011 the military forces had 
enjoyed a considerable amount of political and decisional power, which is why the 
revolutionaries actually welcomed the SCAF involvement during the last few days 
leading up to Mubarak’s removal. Even though the SCAF and the MB established some 
sort of dialogue during the initial stages of the transitional period, it soon became clear 
that both groups were doing so in the pursuit of purely selfish interests, rather than 
having a shared vision of what the future of the country should look like.  
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Moreover, Morsi was the country’s first president without a military background or 
connections, breaking an historical trend and also limiting the army’s control over the 
political sphere. With the SCAF representing the status quo and embodying the 
remnants of Mubarak’s deep state, and Morsi representing the MB, these two 
historical enemies found themselves facing each other once again, with profound 
consequences. In the words of Mohamed Soudan “Without the MB support to the 
revolution the SCAF would not have come back to power. Many of other MBs are not 
happy with me saying this, but we accidently supported SCAF in 2011, helped them to 
steal the power back and go back into a military state, this is unfortunately what 
happened.”602 
 
SCAF’s unwillingness to relinquish power to an elected authority became clear after 
the last round of the presidential elections, when the military body, backed up by the 
country’s Constitutional Court, dissolved the Islamist-dominated parliament on June 
30th 2012, just a few days before Morsi’s instalment as Egypt’s first democratically 
elected president.603 To maintain its historical power to legitimately intervene in 
politics, the SCAF was arguably seeking to establish a parliament with limited powers 
and a presidency subordinate to the armed forces.604 These intentions became even 
clearer in July 2012, when the SCAF ruled a constitutional addendum that granted it 
the powers of the dissolved parliament, including the fundamental right to form a 
constitutional assembly, and prescribing the formation of a national defence council 
dominated by 11 Army commanders.605 Such actions could be understood as being 
akin to a declaration of war or, at least, as a very clear manifestation of the Armed 
forces’ intention to prevail over their historical MB enemy once again. However, the 
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MB had just obtained the political power they had been seeking for almost a century, 
and finally saw the opportunity to stand against SCAF once and for all. 
 
Mohamed Morsi initially attempted to shift the balance of power between the elected 
civilian administration and the military establishment, attempting to reinstate 
Parliament to no avail. However, in August 2012, the FJP government successfully 
managed to freeze the Constitutional addendum and to forcibly retire the generals 
who had issued it, these being Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawy, also 
Mubarak’s Minister of Defence since 1991, and his deputy General Sami Anan.606 The 
order to removed the head of SCAF itself marked the first time in Egyptian history that 
an elected civilian head of state had altered critical decisions made by the heads of the 
military establishment and then removed them, establishing an historical step 
forward.607 This decision was the first influential one taken by the Morsi government, 
and arguably shaped the rest of the FJP’s time in government. By forcibly retiring some 
of the oldest Army’s generals, Morsi was attempting to assert his power over that of 
the deep state and, by doing so, seeking to kick-start a transitional process that was 
free from the Army’s influence. This fits with the MB’s historical narrative as it can be 
interpreted as the culmination of the schisms between the organization and the 
regime, which as previously argued have shaped Egypt’s modern political history, and 
have been fundamental for the development of the MB’s evolutionary Islamist 
ideology. It is this ideology that the FJP attempted to incorporate into their rule, as the 
MB constitution makes clear. 
 
5.3 (2) An Islamist Constitution 
On December 25th, 2012, after the MB Constitution was approved by a national 
Referendum, Morsi publicly stated: “This is a historic day. A free Constitution has come 
to Egyptians. Not by a king’s endowment or a president’s imposition or a dictate by 
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colonialists. Rather, it’s a Constitution chosen by the Egyptian people of their own free 
and conscious will.”.608  
 
The controversial nature of the drafting of the MB’s constitution and its implications 
has been discussed at length in the previous chapter, so it is now necessary to 
determine whether or not the document is Islamist in nature, in order to understand 
the nature of the FJP government itself. To start with, there are some elements in the 
2012 MB Constitution that heavily resemble that of 1971, stipulated under “believer 
President” Anwar Sadat, and even some similarities to that regulating the country 
under deposed autocrat Hosni Mubarak. The most relevant of these continuities is 
embodied in Article 2, stipulating that “Islam is the state’s religion, and Arabic is its 
official language. The principles of Islamic law (sharia) form the main source of 
legislation.”.609 While the implications of this particular article will be discussed below, 
it is worth noting that the shari’a element is what really makes this document an 
undeniably Islamist one. The 2012 Constitution indeed embodied a fundamental 
tension, having been on one hand modelled on the Constitutions of Western Liberal 
Democratic states, while also stating that its constitutional provisions would only be 
valid as long as they did not contradict the precepts of shari’a.610 
 
When looking at the 2012 MB constitution as a whole there are three Articles in 
particular that stipulate its Islamist nature, these being Articles 2, 4, and 219. Article 
2, mandating that shari’a is the main source of legislation, had also been featured in 
the previous constitutions, but gained a new relevance under Morsi’s presidency. This 
is the case as an immediate question that arises when looking at this article in 
particular is how to enforce the principles of shari’a in the 21st century, as it is not a 
legal code, but rather a body of jurisprudence developed by various schools and 
thinkers over a period of over 13 centuries. For this reason, Article 2 had always been 
quite vague in its stipulations before 2012, when it was then complemented by Articles 
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4 and 219, which really stress the Islamist nature of this document. Article 4 states 
that: 
 
The noble Azhar is an independent Islamic institution of higher learning. It handles all 
its affairs without outside interference. It leads the call into Islam and assumes 
responsibility for religious studies and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. The 
Azhar’s Body of Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law 
(sharia). The state guarantees the financial means needed to fulfil these tasks.611 
 
Therefore granting the power of judging the compliance to shari’a to religious scholars 
rather than to the Judiciary. This meant that an academic institution would be the 
arbiter of Islamic Law and also had the power to overrule the country’s Legislative 
body, which embodied once again the separation between the MB government and 
the remnants of the deep state. Additionally, Article 219 rules that “The principles of 
Islamic law (sharia) include general evidence, the foundational principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), the reliable sources from among the Sunni schools of 
thought (madhahib).”612, therefore identifying a particular interpretation and school 
of Islam, of the Sunni denomination, on which to build the normative framework of 
the country’s jurisprudence.613 This amount of details concerning religion and its role 
in the daily governing of the country had not been found before the MB took power, 
giving an undeniable Islamist characteristic to the document and its implications. 
 
Moreover, other Articles throughout the Constitution further reinforced the role of 
the state in patrolling morals, and while Article 64 states that freedom of belief is 
absolute614, it then contradicts itself by limiting the freedom of religious practice and 
of establishing places of worship to the followers of the “heavenly religions,” meaning 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Overall, a particular interpretation of Sunni Islam, 
regulated by the religious scholars of al Azhar, is what should have ruled Egypt 
according to the 2012 Constitution, which is arguably the country’s most Islamist one 
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to date, embodying many of the core principles guiding the MB’s ideology. To 
conclude, when looking at the MB constitution’s key articles and message, it is 
undeniable that it is Islamist in nature. This can be demonstrated by looking at the 
enhanced role of the state in “patrolling” morals, and by the fact that a particular 
branch of Sunni Islam was defined as being the source of shari’a, and therefore of the 
rule of law in the country. 
 
5.3 (3) Morsi’s Moment on Gaza 
Of all the foreign policies pursued by the MB while in power, the most telling and 
significant one was the reshuffling of the country’s relationship with Israel. When it 
comes to its neighbour, Egypt has historically played a fundamental geopolitical role 
as a “buffer zone” since the 1970s, entering into a special relationship with the US 
meaning that the country is the second biggest receiver of US military and monetary 
aid in the region after Israel in itself.615 Consequently, when Morsi was elected in June 
2012, there was a preoccupation arising in Washington over what Egypt’s approach to 
Israel would be, since the MB does not recognize Israel as a legitimate state and has 
historically seen the plight of Palestinians as that of Arabs as a whole, with Hamas 
being a direct outshoot of the MB itself.  
 
Reacting to the results of the June 2012 presidential elections, Israel publicly stated its 
respect for the democratic process in Egypt and its outcome, as well as its intent to 
continue cooperation with the Morsi administration on the basis of the peace 
treaty.616 However, it appears that the president elect had other intentions. As Gerges 
underlines, in his first speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 
2012 Morsi demanded that the UN granted membership to the Palestinians, with or 
without a peace agreement with Israel, saying “The fruits of dignity and freedom must 
not remain far from the Palestinian people,” and adding that it was ‘shameful’ that UN 
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resolutions aiding the Palestinians were not being enforced.617 Such bold statements 
made clear that the Islamist president was about to be the first to break the historical 
special relationship with Washington over Israel, or that he was at least about to 
severely alter the pre-existing balance of power. His intentions met praxis in 
November 2012, when the Egyptian president played a key role in the stipulation of 
the Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.618 
 
Upon the outbreak of Israeli aggression and airstrikes against Gaza, Morsi responded 
by immediately summoning Egypt’s ambassador from Israel and calling for an 
emergency session of the United Nations Security Council.619 He also opened the Rafah 
border to allow Gazan casualties to cross over to the Egyptian side to get treatment 
and, in an unprecedented move, dispatched his prime minister, Hisham Qandil, to visit 
the Gaza strip during the war.620 Ultimately, he played a key role in overseeing the 
stipulation of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in a series of evens that definitely 
differentiated his foreign policy choices from those who ruled the country before him. 
 
To conclude, it is clear that the key role played by Morsi in overseeing the stipulation 
of the Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas fits with the organization’s Islamist 
ideology and narrative. This is the case as it reinforced the MB’s commitment to the 
Palestinian cause, which has historically characterised its narrative and policies. The 
MB has always considered the Palestinian struggle as that of “all Arabs”, fought 
alongside Palestinian forces several times, and gained supporters by being outspoken 
about their commitment to the removal of the State of Israel. Morsi’s choices also 
brought about a reshuffling of the pre-existing balance of power, as before (and after) 
the FJP rule Egypt had always acted as a buffer zone between Israel and the rest of the 
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Arab world, by conforming to US’s interests and foreign policies goals in exchange for 
monetary and military aid. Morsi was therefore the first and only president to break 
this trend, pursuing foreign policies that conformed to the MB’s vision and practice of 
Islamism. 
 
5.4 The MB Government 
It should now be clear that, despite Roy’s argument being somewhat convincing at 
first, some of the claims it is based on appear to be highly problematic and reductive 
after a further analysis. This is also true of Roy’s interpretation of the 2012 MB 
government in Egypt, and of the reasons behind the June 30th coup d’etat. Therefore, 
this is why it would be more correct to refer to those events as the MB’s inability to 
maintain power, rather than referring to it as a prime example of Islamism failing in its 
quest for governance. It is now more important than ever to engage with Political 
Islam as a heterogeneous doctrine, especially in the light of contemporary events such 
as Donald Trump’s Muslim Ban and the constant rise of Islamophobia in the UK and 
Europe. 
 
In his 2012 essay “The Transformation of the Arab World”, in which he reflects on the 
Arab Springs and their implications, Roy makes the statement “The failure of political 
Islam that I pointed to twenty years ago is now obvious”.621 However, Fradkin points 
out that this seems to be a contradiction of his original argument to start with, as 
twenty years prior one of the grounding criteria for Roy’s account of the “failure” of 
Islamism was its inability to take power and the expectation that it never would.622 
Clearly, such a paradoxical argument could not possibly stand anymore in 2012, 
especially given the recent successes of Islamist groups in both Egypt and Tunisia. 
Therefore, in “The Transformation of the Arab World” Roy restructured his thesis by 
saying that “their utopian conception of an “Islamic state” has lost credibility623. 
Islamist ideology is now finding itself challenged both by calls for democracy that reject 
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any monopoly claim on power by a single party or ideology, and by neofundamentalist 
Salafists who declare that only a strict personal return to the true tenets of religious 
practice can serve as the basis of an ‘Islamic society’ ”.624 Once again, there is the need 
to ask the question of according to whom this credibility had been lost,  and the need 
to stop using “Islamism” as an encompassing label. 
 
Furthermore, some of the reflections that Roy made when referring to the MB 
government might lead to the understanding that the scholar has a very narrow view 
of what the organization stands for, and also fails to take into account the diversity of 
its membership and the MB/FJP split analysed in previous chapters. To start with, Roy 
asserts that there was a distinct lack of “revolutionary dynamics” in Egypt in 2011, and 
that the MB consequently “is no longer a revolutionary movement, but rather a 
conservative one”.625  To say that Egypt lacked revolutionary dynamics in 2011 is quite 
a bold statement in itself, as the diversity of protesters who came together in Tahrir 
square and the rise in political engagement demonstrate. 
 
Moreover, while he does not explain what he means exactly by “revolutionary 
dynamics”, it appears that Roy also happens to misunderstand the role and practices 
that have characterised the MB’s historical political growth, most importantly of all, 
the fact that the MB was never a revolutionary movement, but rather an evolutionary 
one.  If the MB does not behave like a revolutionary movement, it is because it has 
never been one. As has been made clear throughout the development of this thesis, 
the MB has always argued for a gradual reformation of society, starting with the 
individual rather than with institutions. Again, this is an example of why Roy’s binary 
between “true” Islamists and neofundamentalists does not stand when applied to the 
praxis. Secondly, Roy also asserts that the 2011 Uprisings had taken the MB by 
surprise, another statement that seems paradoxical when put into context. While it is 
true that the MB was largely absent from the street during the first days of January 
2011, that was because of their fear of governmental persecution rather than because 
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of its members being unaware of what was about to happen. As argued in Chapter 4, 
the youth factions of the MB had been instrumental in the organization of the events 
leading up to Mubarak’s removal, and it is argued by many that without the MB 
presence in Tahrir and support they offered to the revolutionaries it is unlikely that 
Mubarak would have been ousted. 
 
In addition, when looking at the MB rule, Roy once again falls victim to his own 
generalist approach and lack of specificity. He looks at the MB as having lost credibility 
by attempting to pursue an “utopian conception of an Islamic state”, therefore failing 
to put forward an approach that would lead to the creation of a new society. Khairat 
al Shater, the mastermind of the FJP platform and policies, addressed these critiques 
in a speech he gave in April 2011. In said speech, al Shater made clear that the MB was 
not seeking a new direction, path, or vision. Rather, he insisted that the current 
circumstances offered yet another chance to reaffirm al Banna’s aim, this being: 
 
Restoring Islam in its all-encompassing conception; subjugating people to God; instituting 
the religion of God; the Islamization of life, empowering of God’s religion; establishing 
the Nahda [Renaissance] of the Ummah [the global Muslim community] and its 
civilization on the basis of Islam.626 
 
Once again, this confirms that fact that Roy seems to fundamentally misunderstand 
the aims and strategies of Islamist movements such as the MB. The Islamist message 
and practice they embody is not about inventing or imposing a new society, but about 
laying the basis for the society to gradually transform itself into an Islamist one over 
time. This is the “method” that al Banna himself preferred, arguing for the need to 
“build” in progressive order, beginning from the “Muslim individual” and proceeding 
through the “Muslim family, the Muslim society, the Islamic government, the global 
Islamic State and [eventually] reaching the status of Ustathiya [pre-eminence or 
mastership] with that State.”627 To conclude, when trying to analyse and explain 
events such as the MB’s rule and removal, there is the need to put forward a more 
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nuanced and balanced analysis. Ultimately it is not about failure, it is about the 
inability to maintain power. Neither it is a binary between failing or succeeding, 
therefore such a limited approach does not add do the discussion of this topic at all. 
 
5.5 Reasons for Failure 
Following from the analysis and critique of Roy’s position, this research has established 
that it would be more appropriate to look at the reasons that led to the deposition of 
the MB, rather than understanding the June 30th coup merely as its failure. Since the 
events of July 2013 and al Sisi’s seizure of power, there are several accounts in the 
literature around the topic that look at the MB deposition as the direct result of what 
they call their “authoritarian tendencies”628, while several scholars and analysts have 
come up with less biased explanations and series of reasons that have arguably led to 
the demise of the MB. One of the most objective accounts is that given by al Anani, 
which ascribes the fall of the Islamist government to three key factors, these being: 
the MB’s lack of a revolutionary agenda, its organizational stagnation and inertia, and 
its leaders’ incompetence and inexperience in government.629 While these factors are 
in line with the findings of this research, there are others that need to be considered, 
such as the resistance of the deep state, together with its unwillingness to relinquish 
power, and the role of the media in shaping perceptions and narratives.  
 
Following from this, this research identifies four main reasons why the MB did not 
succeed in maintaining power while in government in 2012, which can be linked to 
both internal and external factors. These are the MB’s legacy of internal divisions, their 
refusal to cooperate with revolutionary groups, their lack of expertise and of 
understanding of the balance of power in the country, and the role of the Army/deep 
state. These factors have been identified relying on both primary and secondary 
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sources, and have been complemented by official documents such as the UK’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee’s “Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood Review”.630 
 
5.5 (1) Loyalty over Expertise: the high price of internal divisions 
All the MB members and supporters that have been interviewed throughout this 
research have denied the presence of deep internal fractures within the MB. However, 
the organization’s historical internal schisms have been largely documented in the 
literature surrounding the topic631, and their legacy arguably represents one of the 
main reasons that led to the FJP’s demise. This is the case as after 2011 the MB 
appeared to be controlled by its conservative faction, which therefore influenced its 
political growth and led to the appointment of Brothers to positions of power on a 
loyalty rather than expertise base, with dramatic implications.  
 
Chapter 4 examined the deep fractures, both tactical and ideological, that allegedly 
split the organizations between its “revolutionary” and conservative wings in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, when the MB was faced with the dilemma over 
whether to create its own political party or not, but these are worth assessing again 
here. For the sake of context, it is important to remember that the MB has historically 
been split between two main groups, these being the “Tilmisanis”, led by the expelled 
presidential candidate Abdel Fotouh, and the “Qutbis”, led by businessman Khairat al 
Shater and Mahmoud Ezzat, with the more conservative wing effectively being in 
control of the organization’s decision making since the early 1990s.632 The rivalry 
between these two factions and their leaders was mostly based on their competing  
strategies, with Fotouh being more open to dialogue with external actors and al Shater 
representing the more conservative, closed side of the organization. In particular, the 
figure of al Shater needs to be taken into closer consideration, as he is perceived to be 
one of the MB’s most influential leaders, controlling the organization not only because 
of his vast financial resources, but also acting as one of its key policy-makers.  
                                                 
630 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood 
Review”  
631 Wickham, C., The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement 
632 Al Anani, K., “Upended Path: the rise and fall of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood”, p. 536 
 239 
 
One of the interviewees who was close to the MB at the time of the transition 
confirmed what I have already been told by others, reiterating allegations of al Shater 
working behind the scenes for years to gain as much executive power as possible, and 
preparing members close to him for power. “He does not want to be the murshid, 
rather, he wants the murshid to be under his wing”.633 Despite the fact that all the MB 
members and supporters who have been interviewed throughout the scope of this 
research strongly deny these claims, there are also strong historical and primary 
evidences of internal divisions undoubtedly crippling the organization’s unity, which is 
why these are still being examined here. 
 
Looking at the role allegedly played by al Shater is essential to understanding the way 
in which the MB behaved during the transitional period, and the reasoning behind the 
seemingly illogical appointment of members of the Morsi cabinet. According to 
someone who was very close to the MB during the post-2011 transitional period, Al 
Shater used two techniques in order to gain as many supporters as possible within the 
MB’s Shura Council: starting in the 1990s he modified the organization’s membership 
process, making it so the lengthy process to become an active MB member, which 
could previously take up to 15 years, was significantly shortened. Even more 
importantly, al Shater and his affiliates focused heavily on recruiting new members 
from the peripheries and the countryside, therefore attracting some of the more 
conservative youth who, because of their background, were more easily dogmatised 
and directed. This meant that by the time of the 2011 Uprisings, al Shater not only had 
the murshid by his side, but also controlled nearly half of the MBs sitting in the Shura 
Council, which gave him an incredible amount of leverage. 
 
These internal divisions came clearly to the fore in 2011, when the Shura Council had 
to vote to decide whether to field a presidential candidate. Given the MB’s tense 
relationship with the SCAF at the time, the first round of voting took place rather 
hastily, and also happened to be one of the most closely contested votes in the history 
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of the movement. The first round saw the Shura Council narrowly voting in favour of 
fielding a candidate for the presidential elections, with 56 votes in favour and 52 
against out of 108, putting al Shater forward as the presidential candidate.634 Despite 
being nominated as the MB primary candidate, al Shater was barred from running 
because of his recent imprisonment. The MB support shifted to Morsi, who had always 
been close to the businessman while also being a loyal and committed member of the 
MB’s leadership since he joined in the 1970s.635 A member of the Shura Council 
commented on the controversial process of selecting a presidential candidate by 
saying: "When we took the decision to nominate Mursi, after the withdrawal of Khairat 
El-Shater, he (Mursi) returned home weeping: he had been given a responsibility that 
he had not sought (...) It was known that whoever took responsibility at this time 
would not find the road covered in roses. But we also knew that there was nobody at 
that time who could undertake this the way we could."636 
 
As Al Anani points out, the selection of al Shater and then Morsi as presidential 
candidates is an accurate reflection of what the balance of power was within the 
organisation at the time. While al Shater was one of the key leaders, “Morsi was a clear 
example of how conservatives created their loyal cadres and members within the 
organization”637, therefore emphasising just how divided the MB was when it came to 
one of the most defining moments in its history. Despite not being elected president, 
al Shater was one of the minds behind the FJP’s “Nahda Project” and continued to play 
a key role in the MB in both strategizing and policy-making, all the while remaining the 
organization’s point of contact between the MB and the SCAF.638 This high level of 
influence gave way to speculations that al Shater was essentially using his position to 
influence Morsi’s decisions, both when it came to the appointment of his cabinet and 
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during his time in government.639 It can indeed be seen that those who were 
appointed to ministerial positions came from the MB’s conservative inner circle, and 
that once again loyalty was chosen over expertise, once again a dramatic 
manifestation of the MB’s historical divisions, and arguably one of the main reasons 
behind the FJP’s collapse while in government. 
 
5.5 (2) MB’s “arrogance” and refusal to cooperate with revolutionary groups. 
Another mistake made by the MB, which arguably led to the Morsi government’s 
demise, was their refusal to cooperate and engage in dialogue with the secular groups 
that had taken part in the revolution, even after promising to do so. When 
interviewed, several secular and religious activists that took part in the 2011 Uprisings, 
some less willingly than others, admitted to supporting Morsi when it came to 
presidential elections in order to avoid having Mubarak’s prime minister elected. In 
the words of one of them, “When it came to the presidential elections, I supported 
Futuh in the first round and Morsi in the second because, as most people, we did not 
want Shafiq into power. So we did not have much room to manoeuvre.”. They did so 
on the understanding that the FJP would set aside its ideological goals in order to put 
forward the goals of the revolution, a promise they failed to maintain when they 
eventually got to power, which in turn considerably decreased their perceived 
legitimacy within revolutionary groups and, down the line, turned the general 
population against them. 
 
Gaining power in a time of great political uncertainty, the MB was expected to stabilise 
the political arena through bargaining and sealing alliances with the groups they 
fought alongside in Tahrir square. This was the case as it was clear to most that none 
of the three contenders for power in Egypt at the time, these being the MB, the 
SCAF/deep state and civil activists, was strong enough to rule alone, therefore making 
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alliances a necessity.640 Instead, the FJP seemed to forget about the promises they 
made and instead closed upon itself, even selecting its cabinet members solely from a 
small group of trusted, long-time Brothers. By doing so, the MB alienated the 
politicians essential to solving Egypt’s problems and declared war against the 
bureaucracy it needed to govern, arguably setting up the conditions for its own 
demise.641  
 
In order to consolidate its power and to at least attempt to successfully co-opt the 
remnants of the deep state, the MB should have reached out to the opposition seeking 
to establish a coalition, which would have granted it more power when confronted by 
the Army, and mitigated the lack of trust and popular support that was quickly 
spreading throughout the population. Instead, the MB sought to consolidate its power 
too quickly, alienating both its secular and Islamist allies and failing to confront the 
institutional power base.642 Most of all, the MB underestimated just how angry and 
betrayed the revolutionary and secular groups it fought alongside in Tahrir square 
were. Feeling like they had been tricked, these groups reacted negatively to the MB’s 
attempt to dominate the political process, with the organization gaining yet another 
enemy in the process. 
 
Such behaviour could be explained (although not justified) when looking at the 
organization’s history of repression and illegality, and at the fact that the MB’s 
paranoia was far from being born out of fantasy. As one of the interviewees put it, 
“they simply did not trust many people”.643 This is the case because, as I argue 
elsewhere644, for almost eight decades the MB had been consistently sectarianized 
and persecuted by the regime, which perceived the group and its growing influence as 
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the main threat to its legitimacy. The Egyptian security apparatus assassinated Hassan 
al Banna, persecuted its members, and incarcerated its leaders, causing the MB to 
develop a so called “bunker-mentality” that leads to perceiving outsiders as potential 
threats.645 This explains the fact that Morsi’s cabinet was heavily dominated by MB 
members that were chosen according to their loyalty rather than their expertise, and 
his refusal to pursue the creation of a coalition government which would have been 
more representative of the population’s demands and needs. Moreover, another 
interviewee stated:  
 
The big problem is that the MB was still controlled by the older generation, and they were 
fixed back in time way before 2011. I don’t think they understood what happened and how 
big and dynamic it was; I don’t think they understand it today (...) Every time it came to 
taking a decision that was going to either please the revolutionaries or the old guard/deep 
state, they went with the deep state. They were thinking that rather than dismantling the 
deep state and its institutions, they thought they could use it for their benefit. That was so 
naïve.646 
 
Regardless of their motivations, the MB refusal to include revolutionary groups in 
government led to them being perceived as if they were taking an authoritarian turn, 
and also alienated thousands of Egyptians who fought hard to bring about a change of 
regime in 2011 and had entrusted the MB with the responsibility to guide the country 
throughout its democratic transition. Because of their paranoia, the MB made the 
decision to distance themselves from the shabbab al taher (pure youth) that made the 
uprisings possible to begin with, a decision that they would come to regret. When 
asked about what they thought were the biggest mistakes made by the FJP while in 
power, all of those interviewed who did not identify with or support the MB gave 
answers that could be summarised by the statement below: 
 
One of their biggest mistakes was trying to build on loyalty rather than on competence (...) it 
was all about the inner circle and the clique, all the while there were excellent people from 
the MB and from the outside who were willing to work with them in the early stages. 
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Everyone later avoided them as if they were the plague, but in the earliest stages there were 
some excellent people who were reduced to tears because of direct exclusion.647 
 
Mohamed Soudan claims that the MB indeed attempted to establish a coalition 
several times, offering ministerial positions to key secular and revolutionary leaders 
such as el Baradei and Wael Gonim, who refused because they allegedly did not want 
to be affiliated to an Islamist government. While there is no evidence of this, he claims 
that these particular cases have been covered by Arabic media. Similarly, he rejects 
accusations of the MB’s attempt to hijack power by pointing to the composition of the 
cabinet and saying: “how many people that Morsi appointed to be ministers belonged 
to the MB? It was 7 only.  For 10 months, and after, he elected 2 more for 2 months. 
In one year, only 9 were MB, from 35 ministers, all the rest were from the Mubarak 
regime or from secular groups (...) many people did not want to work under the 
umbrella of the MB”.648 While these allegations are hard to verify, it is worth noting 
here how a key MB responded to this particular “accusation”. 
 
5.5 (3) Overestimation of how much power the MB actually held 
Once elected into power, the MB not only faced the challenge of winning over the 
sympathies of the almost half of the Egyptian population that did not vote for Morsi, 
but also had to find ways to placate the remnants of the deep state in order to keep 
them at bay. As outlined above, its historical internal schisms and the strong 
hierarchical structure of the organization meant that loyalty seem to have been 
prioritised over expertise, therefore leading to the FJP’s cabinet being composed of 
MB members who had little to no political experience and were therefore unequipped 
to deal with the enormous tasks ahead of them. Because of this, at the very start of 
the Morsi presidency it seemed like the MB was convinced that winning the elections 
was going to be enough to provide legitimacy to their rule, but this proved to be just 
one of their many miscalculations. One of the main reasons behind the fall of the FJP 
is arguably the MB’s repeated overestimating of how much power they actually held, 
and its underestimating of the lengths to which the Security Apparatus and Deep State 
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were willing to go to in order to regain power. Throughout Morsi’s presidency, the 
FJP’s political analysts failed to correctly assess the balance of power in the country, 
the real objectives of the deep state, the size of the opposition, and the surprising rate 
at which the MB’s popularity was dropping. 
 
El Sherif claims that the MB misread the situation they were in right from the start, by 
moving toward political domination too quickly and believing Morsi’s victory was the 
equivalent of a popular mandate.649 By doing so, they failed to understand the balance 
of power at the time, which saw the Security Apparatus and the remnants of the deep 
state effectively remaining the holders of decisional power in the country, and 
therefore failed to address them correctly. The best thing to do would have been 
attempting to forge a working relationship with the institutional power bases that 
were effectively still in charge of military power and legislation, these being the 
military, the police, and the judiciaries.650 However, while attempting to appease and 
co-opt these institutions would have been an arduous task even for a coalition 
government, the MB was arrogant and overly-confident in its power and decided to 
face them alone, engaging in an unwinnable battle that was driven more by ideological 
zeal rather than by a realistic assessment of the current political environment in the 
country.651 This decision was also influenced by the legacy of the MB’s troubled 
relationships with the state, which was deeply embedded within its members’ 
psyches. While it is correct to assume that, given historical political tensions, a conflict 
between the MB and the deep state would have been unavoidable in the long term, it 
is also arguable that the MB’s incapability to correctly assess where the power lay and 
to engage with the relevant institutions in a more constructive way accelerated this 
process, and ultimately led to their demise. 
 
The considering miscalculations of the political context they found themselves in could 
be justified by the fact that, in the aftermath of 2011, there was a widespread 
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assumption that Mubarak’s removal had also triggered the elimination of the status 
quo, therefore redistributing the balance of power between the country’s new and old 
political actors. In reality, very little had change. The structures of political and 
economic power remained controlled by the old elites, hence the deep state,  while 
revolutionaries and secular groups failed to dismantle the old regime in favour of a 
new one, and were faced with marginalisation and exclusion.652 On this note, the MB 
also failed to understand just how much the secular and revolutionary groups that 
they had shunned after the presidential elections resented them, which is surprising 
when taking into consideration their paranoid mindset when it came to outsiders. 
Similarly, their distrust of external actors also meant that, when they were warned 
multiple times of the fast approaching coup d’etat, they dismissed these suggestions, 
once again failing to realise just how thin their level of popular support had become. 
Indeed, there are documented instances of members of the parliament and Morsi’s 
personal advisors being warned several times by both their secular counterparts and 
international figures about the increasingly likeliness of being overthrown, but these 
claims were repeatedly disregarded. This blindness to what was obvious to everyone 
else is what critics and commentators refer to as “naivety” and “stupidity”, when faced 
with the task of determining what ultimately brought down the FJP government.  
 
In particular, it appears that al Shater was approached several times by both 
international and domestic actors warning him against the intentions of the Armed 
forces, but the MB leader failed to react effectively to these claims. Two months 
before June 30th al Shater met with the US ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson, who 
allegedly warned him about the escalating domestic situation, but failed to get an 
appropriate reaction.653 Similarly, a month before the coup, al Shater met with Amr 
Moussa, foreign minister under Mubarak, who suggested that in order to avoid 
confrontation “Mursi should heed opposition demands, including a change of 
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government."654 The MB leader allegedly replied that the government’s problemS 
were due to the “"non-cooperation of the ‘deep state'" - the entrenched interests in 
the army, the security services, some of the judiciary and the bureaucracy”655, and that 
the FJP was not open to compromise, therefore dismissing yet another warning.  
Soudan also told me he was approached by the US Consul just a week preceding the 
coup, in what he believes was both a warning and an attempt to gauge what the MB’s 
reaction to the protests would be: 
 
On 21st June 2013 the US consul called me and said she absolutely needed to see me 
because it was very urgent (...) She came to my office and asked me what Morsi was going 
to do on the 30th. I told her, Morsi had faced lots of protests since he came to office, and 
he always treated them softly, he would never use violence against them. She told me 
“this time is different, what is he going to do?” I knew he considered the protesters like 
sons, he would never hurt them. She said “are you sure?” I said I’m not in the cabinet, I 
just work in the party, I don’t know what they are doing. Than she stood up and asked me 
“How much does Morsi trust Sisi?” and she was smiling. I didn’t tell her the truth, I told 
her, as much as I know, he still trusts him. And she said “Still? Good luck Mohamed, see 
you later Insh’allah.”. (...) She wanted to know how much we knew, and how far we were 
willing to go, if we were going to send people to protect the palace as we did in December 
2012 for Ittihadiya.656 
 
Soudan claims he tried to warn Morsi about the coup, but the president once again 
failed to listen. “Morsi trusted too much some generals in the army, trusted the 
judiciary, he was very soft towards the republican guards, while all of them were 
members in the conspiracy”.657 While the belief that there was a conspiracy between 
the armed forces and external actors will further examined later on, this fits once again 
within the psyche of the MB. It is easy to understand that, as the organisation and its 
members had been persecuted for decades, the idea of a conspiracy put in place to 
remove Morsi does not sound too absurd when placed within that context. 
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Particularly when it comes to the role of the Army, one of the MB’s biggest 
overestimations was the belief of having dealt with it effectively when Morsi forced its 
oldest generals to retire, which was far for being the case. One colonel allegedly said 
“They (the Brotherhood) misread what happened. We allowed it to happen (…) Mursi 
believed the military would not act against him, especially if the Brotherhood took care 
of the army's economic interests when drafting a new constitution (...) He thought Sisi 
was his guy. He didn't understand the power dynamics.".658 In retrospect, the 
statement released by the Armed forces following the Battle of Ittihadiya, in which 
they pledged to remain a “solid and cohesive block” in the face of political unrest, 
could be interpreted as a clear declaration of intent and an indication of a planned 
military intervention.  
 
Of all the fatal overestimations that cost the MB its power, their failure to assess al 
Sisi’s position and intentions is the most compelling one. It seems like popular rumours 
depicting al Sisi as a “covert Muslim” and as an “Islamist in disguise” had bought over 
some of Morsi’s closest advisors, who repeatedly urged him to trust the Army.659 
Commenting on this, one of the interviewees said “I know people who used to say that 
Sisi was even more religious than some MB members, with the Arabic expression 
‘fasting and praying throughout the night’, and that he was an Islamist in disguise, they 
were disillusioned, a lot of them believed that. They have even interpreted Morsi’s last 
address when he said in the army we have a “man made of gold” as referring to al Sisi 
(...)”.660 This shows just how misled the MB leadership was, and the huge difference 
that preferring expertise over loyalty would have made. 
 
More than anything, the MB’s most significant miscalculation was its failure to 
recognize just how much had changed in the relationship between subjects and 
authority in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings.661 This meant that by relying on the 
very same mechanisms of subjection that had ruled Egypt for decades, they failed to 
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properly adapt to the character of their time, and attempted to keep protesters at bay 
by invoking the sanctity of the “ballot box”. However, they also failed to realise that 
legitimacy had rarely resided in the ballot box in Egypt, and when July 2013 came 
along, the protesters gathered in Tahrir square as the Army took over chanted “The 
legitimacy of your ballot box is cancelled by our martyrs' coffins!”.662 
 
5.5 (4) Role of the Army/Deep State 
The final reason behind the fall of the MB government was Morsi’s failure to 
understand and successfully address the role and influence that the Army still held in 
the country. Historically, the armed and military forces have acted as political and 
economic actors in the country, a trend that further intensified during the Mubarak 
regime. All of the participants I have interviewed for the scope of this research, 
regardless of their political affiliations or religious approach, agreed that the Army 
element is something that must be looked at when trying to understand the fall of the 
FJP government, and they all agree with the statement that “the Army would have 
gained power regardless of who was in government anyway”663. Therefore, when 
looking at the main “mistakes” committed by the FJP government that eventually led 
to their demise, it could be argued that the overestimation of the role and influence 
of the army was one of the most irreparable ones. Interestingly, this mistake is not 
unique to the MB, as one secular activist leader told me:  
 
It was also on us (the secular revolutionaries). We could have been better at understanding 
that SCAF was never going to give up power… that it was playing a “divide and conquer” 
strategy. This happened because most of the people, even the majority of those in the 
square, they still thought that it is SCAF, it is the Egyptian military, it is noble, it could never 
do anything against its people, it even stood against its own president when Egyptian said 
so (...).664 
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Therefore, when looking at the main “mistakes” committed by the FJP government 
that eventually led to their demise, it could be argued that the overestimation of the 
role and influence of the army was one of the most irreparable ones. 
 
Upon being elected president Morsi was immediately faced with the Army’s refusal to 
relinquish power, which set out from the very start a struggle for power between the 
Islamists and the remnants of the deep state. The blurring of the lines between the 
armed forces’ military responsibilities and their political and economic influences in 
Egypt started with Nasser’s government in the 1950s, but particularly strengthened 
under Mubarak, meaning that by the time 2011 came around the Army had already 
established itself as a major political player in both the country’s institutions and in 
the people’s minds. There are several reasons as to why this is the case, first and 
foremost the fact that before Morsi Egypt had always been rule by presidents who 
came from a military background, and therefore relied on the armed forces as both a 
source of legitimacy and as a power base.665  
 
Since the Free Officer’s coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1952 the military had 
gained a disproportionate share of political power, leading to the blurring of the 
separation between military and civilian authority, and the utter lack of subordination 
of the former to the latter.666 This meant that whenever the country went through a 
crisis, such as the one brought about by Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the armed 
forces and their authoritative control proved to be vital for the regime’s survival.  To 
some extent, this is what happened in 2011 after Mubarak’s removal, with the sole 
difference being that the SCAF sought to create its own regime rather than supporting 
the existing one, and in the process of achieving that it perceived the MB’s power and 
popularity as both a commodity and a threat. 
 
Despite coming from a military background, Sadat attempted to disengage the military 
from political life during the last few years of the presidency, following the perceived 
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failure of his foreign policies towards Israel. However, this trend was quickly reversed 
under Mubarak’s presidency, who embraced and encouraged the Army’s participation 
in non-military affairs, essentially making it one of the pillars of the deep state. The 
Mubarak regime effectively witnessed the creation of a new dynamic between politics 
and the Army, which led to the revitalisation of the military as an active player in 
national affairs, granted it the control of an increasing share of central government 
expenditures and domestic activities, and the assumption of the principal 
responsibility for the regime’s security.667  
 
Satloff identifies two main reasons that led Mubarak to rely so heavily on the armed 
forces as a source of legitimacy, these being his need to gain support for the 
reconstruction and democratic challenges, and most importantly the fact that 
Mubarak himself was appointed president because of his wartime accomplishments 
as an Air Force Commander, and therefore viewed the military as part of the solution 
rather than as a component of Egypt’s larger problem.668 Therefore, under Mubarak’s 
rule, the army grew both as a political and economic player, with his officers enjoying 
high salaries and preferential treatment in medical care, housing, and transport, all 
the while reaping US$1.3 billion every year in military aid from the United States.669 
 
By 2011 the Army’s political and domestic role had been ingrained in both the 
country’s institutions and in the people’s mind, leading to the crowd of revolutionaries 
cheering and welcoming troops when the Army was deployed to Tahrir Square on 
January 28th.670 Egypt’s High Military Court assumed power on 11th February 2011, 
with the public aim of “restoring stability, putting the country on the road to 
democracy and restoring civilian government in the wake of the popular uprising that 
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began in January.”.671 This was also the first time since the Free Officers Coup that the 
Army did not support the existing regime in a time of crisis, but rather sided with the 
revolutionaries, arguably to pursue its own political aspirations. Barany notes that 
there are a few clear reasons as to why this may have been the case, first and foremost 
the fact that the rising violence and disorder perpetrated by governmental forces in 
Tahrir Square took away what little credit the regime still had in the eyes of the people, 
and would also have hurt the military’s legitimacy and influence were it to side with 
Mubarak.672 Moreover, military elites made no secret of their dislike for Gamal 
Mubarak, the President’s son and presumed successor, making a future alliance 
unlikely. Even more importantly, Egypt’s army is made up of mostly conscripts who 
therefore had ties to society and to the revolutionaries, meaning that many officers 
and enlisted men would have refused the order to shoot on the demonstrators.673 
 
To conclude, it is now clear that by the time Morsi was elected president, the remnants 
of the deep state represented by the armed forces were unwilling to relinquish power, 
having finally removed the already blurred lines between civil and military power. 
Everyone I have interviewed, regardless of their political or religious leanings, agreed 
that the Army would have eventually seized power anyway. This is due to the historical 
role the armed forces have always played in the country, which is also engrained in 
the psyche of Egyptians. Admittedly, the MB miscalculated the extent to which the 
Army was “tricking” them, and tried to co-opt elements of the deep state into their 
government without realising that it was impossible to do so. There are also “hear-
say” allegations that suggests that the Army had deeply infiltrated the MB even before 
2011. This is corroborated by the fact that the SCAF “pardoned” and released over 800 
prisoners with an Islamist and Jihadists background during their year in power, 
supporting the argument that these individuals could then have infiltrated 
organisations and political parties after being freed.674 
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5.6 Organizational breakdown or sabotage? 
Having analysed the organization’s deep internal fractures, inexperience, and 
misunderstanding of the balance of power in Egypt, it is now clear what were the main 
shortcomings that led to the demise of the Morsi government. However, despite the 
relevance of all of these elements, some questions still remain, as most of the 
decisions made by the MB while in power seem rather counterintuitive, just as it is 
hard to believe that someone in the top ranks of the organization – other than al 
Shater of course – failed to realise what was happening and to act accordingly. How 
did this happen then? Was the MB really blind, or was it all part of a bigger plan 
orchestrated by the Security Apparatus and the deep state to gain back control? Some 
of the participants interviewed for the scope of this research seems to think so. The 
MB’s paranoia and distrust of outsiders has been discussed above, together with the 
dramatic consequences that this particular mind-set brought about for the Morsi 
government. Therefore, it should not come as surprise that without fail, the several 
MB members that have been interviewed for this research have claimed that the 
organization fell victim of a “conspiracy” orchestrated by the Armed Forces to regain 
power. 
 
What is interesting, however, is the high number of interviewees who, with no 
connection to the MB whatsoever, also think that has been the case. While all of the 
participants agreed that the Army would have somehow seized power back anyway, 
regardless of whoever was in government, some of them believe that the organization 
has been infiltrated by the regime, with some of his members working with the 
Security Apparatus all along to sabotage the whole venture. One interviewee stated 
“There is this idea that they (the MB) must have been penetrated by the regime, 
because they seem to have sabotaged themselves”675 and continued to say that there 
is a history of Salafis and Islamists working with the government after spending time 
in prison, and then being pardoned and going trough a process of “repentance”. While 
this is well documented in Arabic, there is very little in the English literature concerning 
this, but several people agreed that some preachers have come out of prison having 
                                                 
675 Interview with a secular activist. 
 254 
repented and then gone back to preaching, but with a very different, less critical, slant 
in their sermons.676 Despite the lack of English sources, there seems to be a well 
established “hear-say” narrative in the country concerning governmental infiltration 
of Islamist movements in the past, which is entirely possible considering just how 
powerful the Security and Intelligence forces are, that then raises the questions as to 
whether or not that could have been the case with the Brotherhood. 
 
Another interviewee pointed to some key MB officials that, along with al Shater, 
openly collaborated with the Army all the way through the coup, and have not been 
arrested after July 30th despite their key position within the organization. One of the 
“suspects” they pointed to is Mahmoud Ezzat, also known as “Iron Man”, who has 
historically been the leader of the Qutbist wing of the MB, deputy Supreme Guide, and 
historically very close to al Shater, with whom he spent a decade in prison under the 
Mubarak regime. There are allegations saying that Ezzat, who was a key figure in 
coordinating policy decisions between the Guidance Office and the FJP during the 
Morsi’s government, kept supporting the Army until the very last moment, and 
therefore pressuring the government to not give in to the popular protests and to not 
challenge the Army, although given his position he must have had information that 
told him otherwise.677 These suspicions are further corroborated by the fact that, after 
the coup happened, Ezzat was not arrested despite being one of the key decision 
makers in the MB and in the FJP, but rather disappeared for a while before fleeing in 
exile to Istanbul.678 Of course, this is all based on “hear-say” allegations that are 
documented in Arabic media, but absent in the English ones, that are worth flagging 
up as a point for reflection. 
 
While suspicions of Intelligence infiltration of the MB and FJP are almost impossible to 
confirm, it is undeniable that the Egyptian media grew increasingly hostile against the 
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Morsi government in the months leading up to the coup, with reports that very closely 
resembled hate speech. In particular, an interesting example is the increasing 
attention given to ex-MB Tharwat al Kharbawi’s book “The Secret of the Temple: The 
Hidden Secrets of the Muslim Brotherhood”, with which the author claims to be 
denouncing the group’s “hidden radicalism”.679 While the book fails to reveal anything 
original  about the organization, it has been adopted by the media as a tool to lead a 
blatant smear campaign against the Brotherhood, and quickly became a best-seller in 
the months leading up to the coup d’etat. Reflecting on the negative impact that the 
book had on the popular perception of the MB, one interviewee stated “the way in 
which he (Tharwat al Kharbawi) was given a forum was clearly choreographed, it was 
not innocent. Suddenly this book became available to everyone, all classes, everyone 
was talking about it. Even those who did not read it saw the author on every channel 
that was popular in Egypt around that time”.680 
 
Negative propaganda aimed at the MB was not a new phenomenon. For the past 40 
years, different forms of media ranging from TV dramas to cinema have been openly 
anti-Islamist, contributing to the governmental effort to effectively discriminate 
against the organization in a sectarian way throughout the last few decades. This 
shows just how deeply embedded the targeting of the organization was within the 
country’s informal structure, to the point that it could be recognised as an instance of 
cultural violence. This is the case as, because of the MB history as the most organised 
and influential opposition group in the country, they have been perceived as the only 
alternative by the population, which is one of the elements that contributed to their 
rise to power in the aftermath of 2011. If follows that in response, the organisation 
has been consistently attacked by the regime along sectarian lines, in an attempt to 
systematically entrench the idea of the MB being the enemy of Egyptian identity and 
of the Egyptian state, even in the psyche of pious citizens.681 Therefore, during the past 
few decades, each representation of an Islamist character in state-run popular media 
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has been presented as being ugly and suspicious, in line with this narrative aimed at 
reducing their popularity and influence. A clear example of this is the popular TV 
drama “Al Gama’a”, released in 2010, that focuses on the figure of Hassan al Banna 
and on the rise of the MB, portraying them as a mafia-like extremist organization, 
therefore being accused of conforming to the pro-government propaganda.682 
 
It needs to be noted that while these allegations seem to have been widely accepted, 
there is very little in the English literature (at least up to now) that could confirm these 
claims. However, given the well known Intelligence abilities of the Egyptian Security 
Apparatus, and evidence of similar infiltrations having happened in the past, this is not 
an option that should be discounted. Of course, this is not to suggest that the MB 
demise was entirely due to an Army’s plot, but rather, this could be just another 
element that contributed to the lead up to the events of June 30th. As one of the 
interviewees, who is very critical of the MB and in no way affiliated to them, repeatedly 
stated: “I take the idea of the infiltration seriously. It is not conspiracy, but I think they 
(the MB) were not operating in a vacuum, and there were people within the MB that 
were cooperating with the regime for sure, at greater levels than a lot of people 
thought, there was a sabotage from the inside, I do believe that”.683 While these 
statements and allegations might come across as unfounded to outsiders, it is 
necessary to reflect on the importance of the local and historical context in which they 
developed. Neither the MB nor the Army were operating in a vacuum in the aftermath 
of Mubarak’s removal, and historical tensions coupled with the difficulties brought 
about by the transitional period might have led many to believe that such allegations 
might be true. 
 
5.7 The beginning of the end  
After having examined the four main reasons leading to the MB’s deposition, it is 
appropriate to look at specific events and political choices that are thought to have 
triggered the popular discontent and Army’s manoeuvres that eventually led to the 
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July 2013 coup d’etat. The research focuses on three specific events have been 
identified following interviews with both MB supporters and opponents, and are also 
regarded as topical in both the existing literature around the subject and in reports 
released by international institutions and bodies. These three events can be 
understood not only as catalysis for popular grievances and the Army’s intention to 
not relinquish power, but also embody and represent the four main reasons for 
removal that I have identified earlier. 
 
5.7 (1) November 2012 Constitutional Declaration 
Chapter 4 claimed that an event that significantly shifted popular discontent against 
the FJP is the Constitutional Decree released by Morsi in November 2012, and the 
controversial drafting process of the MB Constitution that followed. In a bold and 
troublesome move, Morsi’s constitutional decree expanded the presidency’s 
legislative and judicial authority, essentially granting it extraordinary powers.684 This 
triggered a wave of popular protests and mobilization that would eventually culminate 
in the July 2013 Coup, and is now seen as the beginning of the end of the MB’s 
government.  However, Chapter 4 also underlined that while the consequences of 
these events, such as popular protests and revolts, have been the main focus of 
analysis in the literature on the topic, the reasons behind it have been left largely 
unanalysed. It is therefore necessary to rely on a combination of primary and 
secondary sources to try and make sense of these events. 
 
The reason why the decree sparked such an unprecedented mobilization against the 
MB is the set of questions that it brought about concerning the true nature of Egypt’s 
transition. Critics argued that the document revealed the MB’s intention to bypass the 
democratic process, and their desire to seize the country’s transition and use it as a 
gateway to impose their own authoritarian Islamist regime. However, as analysed in 
Chapter 4, while it is undeniable that such a document came with some troubling 
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implications concerning the nature of Egypt’s institutions, Morsi’s move was far from 
being spurred by “religious fascism” and needs to be understood within the context 
the MB found itself in at that time. 
 
When looking at the reasons behind the issuing of the Constitutional Decree, it is easy 
to classify it as an avoidable and largely unexplained mistake. However, a closer 
examination of Egypt’s domestic conditions at the time, and of the MB’s internal 
struggles, might provide an answer as to why Morsi released such a controversial 
document. To start with, the Constitutional Decree was released to address the fact 
that Egypt was still without an operating constitution 18 months after Mubarak’s 
removal, a condition that was caused by the ever-present struggle for power between 
the SCAF and the country’s other political actors. Moreover, the country’s internal 
situation was exponentially growing tenser, with daily clashes taking place between 
protesters and the police because of popular frustration over the slow pace of change. 
Representatives of secular and liberal parties were also threatening to boycott the 
Constitutional Assembly because of disagreements with its Islamist members, 
consequently adding to the instability of the country’s socio-political conditions.685 In 
addition, in November 2012 the MB was also facing its own internal battles, struggling 
to remain united while its members had split between two main factions that diverged 
on crucial ideological and strategic issues. Therefore, internal turmoil and the very real 
possibility of yet another Constitutional Assembly failing to produce a new document, 
nearly 20 months after Mubarak’s removal, were likely the main triggers behind 
Morsi’s controversial decision. 
 
However, despite the MB’s attempt to justify the decree as the only way to overcome 
the country’s political deadlock, and as a necessary step to achieving “revolutionary 
demands and rooting out remnants of the old regime”686, this move caused large 
popular protests, judicial backlash, and reinforced the already existing doubts about 
                                                 
685 Ahram, “Political Forces sign on El Baradei call for Constituent Assembly Boycott”, in al Ahram, 
(September 2012) http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/54250/Egypt/0/Political-forces-
sign-on-ElBaradei-call-for-Consti.aspx.aspx 
686 Revkin, M., “Egypt’s Untouchable President”, p. 13 
 259 
the true political intentions of the MB. In particular, manifestation of popular 
discontent escalated in what is now know as the “Battle of Ittihadiya”, commonly 
referred to as “the beginning of the end” for the MB government, making the 
Constitutional Decree one of Morsi’s “avoidable mistakes”. 
 
5.7 (2) Mohamed Mahmoud November 2011 Clashes 
The clashes between revolutionaries and police forces that took place in Mohamed 
Mahmoud street on November 19th 2011 hold a strong metaphorical meaning, as they 
have become the symbol of Egypt’s revolutionary spirit, and anti-regime forces gather 
there every year on the anniversary to celebrate its martyrs. Most importantly for the 
scope of this research, it was during this particular event that the first cracks between 
the country’s revolutionary forces and the MB started to appear, with democratic 
groups accusing the Islamists of being on the side of the SCAF and therefore of 
cooperating with the deep state. One secular activist I interviewed, who fought 
alongside the MB in January 2011, told me “(when we were in Mohamed Mahmoud) 
when we realised what the MB was doing, I thought ‘it is done. Now there is blood 
between us and the MB’. Because it was not just a political disagreement anymore”.687 
 
Named after the street in which they took place, which connects the Ministry of 
Interior to Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the clashes aimed at criticizing SCAF’s seizure of 
power and apparent unwillingness to quickly guide the country through a democratic 
transition. Revolutionaries of all backgrounds gathered in Mohamed Mahmoud street 
following the so called “million man march” led by the MB on 18th November 2011, 
when thousands of Islamists gathered in Tahrir Square protesting against the deputy  
Prime Minister Aly El-Salmy’s “supra-constitutional principles,” which gave the SCAF 
complete control over the constitution-drafting process and over the transition to 
civilian rule.688 Similarly, those who attacked the Ministry of Interior, a symbol of the 
police state and the repression that it perpetrated, on November 19th did so with the 
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aim of pressuring SCAF into hastening the presidential elections, the scheduled date 
of which had been moved from April 2012 to June 2013.689 Taking place just 9 days 
before the first round of Parliamentary elections since Mubarak’s removal, the clashes 
went on for 6 days and were the deadliest up to that point, with 47 protesters losing 
their life as a result of police brutality, therefore remaining ingrained in the 
revolutionaries’ hearts and minds.690 
However, a notable absence in Mohamed Mahmoud street was that of the MB, whose 
members had remained active and present during street protests up to that point. The 
MB’s decision to boycott the clashes cost the organization the revolutionaries’ trust, 
as Islamists had already been accused of aligning with the military forces in order to 
ensure the stable handling of the Parliamentary elections, in which they were 
expected to gain the majority of seats due to their strong organizational structure.691 
Indeed it appears that during the clashes the MB took the military’s side, with both 
the organization and the SCAF addressing the protesters asking them to exercise 
“wisdom and restraint” and emphasising the importance of the upcoming 
parliamentary elections, and painting the protests as an attempt to derail the aims of 
the January 25th Revolution.692 In a statement released on November 20th, the FJP said 
“we announce that we will not participate in any more protests or demonstrations 
that may lead to more confrontations and tensions in a continuous effort to bury the 
strife between all parties sparked by the Interior Ministry.”, making their 
disassociation with the protesters abundantly clear. While the MB’s reasons for doing 
so are rather easy to understand in retrospect (after all, the organization had been 
presented with the opportunity to legitimately ascend to power for the first time in its 
troubled history), their actions broke the fragile link that have been developed with 
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the other opposition groups during January 25th, a break that was embodied in the 
mantra “the Brotherhood sold us out in Mohamed Mahmoud”.693 
Several revolutionary groups accused the MB of betraying the 2011 revolution by 
aligning themselves with the military regime, despite the organization releasing a 
statement in which they claimed to agree with the with protesters' wish to remove 
the SCAF from the political scene, while at the same time disagreeing with the means, 
arguing instead for elections.694 However, the MB’s actions marked the beginning of a 
movement that opposed both the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood, which was seen 
as an ally of the then-ruling military forces. Arguably, the population’s distrust of the 
FJP started then, well before the Presidential elections took place, therefore marking 
one of the organization’s top mistakes that would then play a part in the discontent 
that led to their deposition. 
 
5.7 (3) The Battle of Ittihadiya 
The deadly clashes that took place in Ittihadiya in December 2012 are seen in the 
mainstream narrative surrounding the fall of the MB as the turning point in which 
Morsi started being openly contested by the people. However, getting an objective 
understanding of what actually happened between the 5th and the 9th of December 
has proved to be incredibly hard, as competing versions of the facts are put forward 
by those who took part, depending on which side they feel they belong to. Regardless, 
it is undeniable that the FJP’s relationship with the general population kept on 
decreasing after the clashes, witnessing an almost daily escalation of protests that 
eventually led to the June 30th coup, which is why the way in which the MB reacted to 
the Ittihadiya clashes is identified as the last of Morsi’s top three mistakes by this 
thesis. 
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Popular sit-ins and marches in opposition to the MB Constitution started soon after 
the announcement of the controversial constitutional decree in November 2012, but 
started to intensify on December 1st after the confirmation that a Constitutional 
referendum was to take place on December 15th. Thousands of people took to the 
streets to protest against the president’s “power-grab”, aiming to hold a peaceful 
demonstration outside the presidential palace.695 However, that is when things get 
blurry. Over the course of 4 days, large gangs of men violently clashed with the anti-
Morsi demonstrators, capturing and torturing 49 men for over two days, before 
handing them over to the police.696 There were allegations that these were thugs hired 
by the MB themselves, especially  by al Shater, but these have never been 
confirmed.697 
 
Therefore, it is incredibly challenging to understand the MB’s level of involvement in 
the clashes, and to identify who in the organization was aware of what was about to 
happen or not, or to even assess whether this is yet another case of the younger MB 
generation being disconnected from the older, conservative one that was ruling the 
country. Several members of the MB I have interviewed for the scope of this research, 
together with another one who was working in Morsi’s Media Office at the time of the 
clashes, reject the allegations of violent thugs being dispatched against the protesters 
by the MB, and claim that the organization itself was in the dark as to what was about 
to happen in Ittihadiya. While it is undeniable that MB supporters being caught in the 
demonstrations did resort to violence, one must wonder why that was the case, 
especially knowing the organization’s historical commitment to peaceful means. The 
interviewees explained this particular circumstance without denying the violence 
taking place, but emphasising the fact that the reasons behind it were kept hidden. 
They claim that even the leadership of the MB itself did not understand what was 
happening during the first few days, and that no one expected it to be that bloody. 
They also claim that MB supporters in the streets were told that the SCAF, together 
                                                 
695 BBC News, “Egypt Crisis: Islamists rally for President Morsi”, in BBC News, (December 2012) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20564038 
696 Mabrouk, M., “The View from a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution”, p. 2 
697 BBC News, “Egypt Crisis: fatal Cairo clashes amid constitutional row”, in BBC News, (December 
2012) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20605134 
 263 
with the Judiciary and the police forces, had everything in place to forcibly remove 
Morsi from power on the very first day of the clashes, an allegation that despite not 
being confirmed, could explain the MB actions, even if it does not justify them in any 
way.  
 
What can be said is that the profound implications of the clashes, and the MB’s 
mishandling of the situation, arguably played a big part in the building up of a popular 
momentum that eventually culminated in the removal of the FJP’s government. As a 
result of the riot, Morsi’s claim to be a “president for all Egypt” collapsed, while the 
armed forces released a statement on December 8th saying ““The armed forces... 
realise their responsibility to preserve the higher interests of the country and to secure 
and protect vital targets, public institutions and the interests of innocent citizens”, and 
"The opposite of that will bring us to a dark tunnel that will result in catastrophe and 
that is something we will not allow", making it clear that they wished to keep a neutral 
position and would not automatically side with the government.”.698 As a 
consequence, what fragile truce had been in place between the MB and the Army was 
also removed, essentially marking the beginning of the end of the Morsi government, 
as in the following months the presidency’s authority was eroded little by little, 
eventually culminating in the June 30th 2013 protests and in the removal of 
Mohammed Morsi by a coup d’etat. It follows that, despite the fact that the 
circumstances surrounding the clashes are far from being clear, for the scope of this 
research the Battle of Ittihadiya is considered to be the last fatal mistake committed 
by the MB while in power, as that triggered the escalation of the popular protests 
wave hat would eventually lead to their deposition. 
5.8 Conclusion 
To conclude, this Chapter has argued that there is more to the FJP’s toppling than just 
a lack of expertise and a series of seemingly undemocratic political choices. While it is 
undeniable that Morsi failed to be a “president for all Egyptians”, it is also clear that 
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there were other actors involved in the country’s political processes that played a 
considerable part in that being the case. Therefore, the chapter has argued that Roy’s 
account of the “failure of political Islam” is an unsuitable lens to apply to the analysis 
of the MB’s removal from power.  The remnants of the deep state and the Army’s 
historical leading role in both the country’s politics and in Egyptians’ psyches seems to 
indicate what most of the interviewees agreed upon, which is the belief that SCAF 
would have somehow gained power anyway, regardless of who was in charge of the 
transitional government. 
 
Allegations aside, it is now clear that, by beginning to establish what was effectively 
an Islamist government, the FJP alienated a considerable part of the population, and 
was subsequently perceived as having hijacked the 2011 revolution for its own means. 
These perceptions, together with Morsi’s avoidable mistakes reviewed above, meant 
that the progressive escalation of popular grievances and discontent would have 
inevitably led to a clash between the government and its citizens. However, the 
chapter has shown that it would be incorrect to assume that the FJP was violently 
removed because of its Islamist nature. Rather, the chapter has proposed four clear 
reasons that can be understood as being behind the series of events leading to the July 
2013 coup, these being the implications of the MB’s perceived historical divisions, its 
alleged failure to successfully engage with revolutionary and secular groups, its 
misunderstanding of the domestic balance of power, and its miscalculations of the 
SCAF’s aims and intention. Moreover, the chapter has critically assessed Roy’s account 
of the “Failure of Political Islam”, which many claims have been embodied by Morsi’s 
own removal. However, the chapter has concluded that Roy’s account is too 
monolithic and generalist in its views, and that it would therefore be more correct to 









“They tried to bury us; they did 
not know we were seeds”699 
 
 
On June 30th 2013, the day marking the one-year anniversary of Morsi’s presidential 
inauguration, millions of Egyptians gathered in squares across the country chanting 
“the people want the fall of the regime”, echoing the cry that became the symbol of 
the protests that removed Hosni Mubarak in February 2011.700 Two and a half years 
and a free presidential election later, revolutionaries were back on the streets, 
demanding the Islamist government’s removal and asking for early presidential 
elections.701 What would unravel in the days to follow led to the country falling into 
the grip of a military regime once again, to the persecution of the MB, and to the 
further restriction of political space. Just over two years after the beginning of a 
popular movement that led to the removal of the Mubarak regime, it seemed like 
Egypt was back at square one. 
 
At the outset of this research, this thesis sought to answer the question of “Does the 
MB’s deposition equal the failure of Political Islam?”. It answered by arguing for a less 
monolithic understanding of Political Islam, by analysing the MB’s practices and 
ideology within the Egyptian context, and by critically analysing the FJP’s performance 
in government. Ultimately, this thesis has concluded that the MB’s removal does not 
equal the end of Political Islam, but rather underlines the need for an understanding 
of the doctrine that is case-specific and that takes into account different contexts. This 
is particularly important considering the contemporary international understanding of 
Political Islam, which tends to homogenise the ideology and to equate it with violence 
and extremism. In turn, this contributes to the development of aggressive foreign 
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policies against the MENA region. Therefore, the MB example is key to the 
understanding of Political Islam as a modern, ever-evolving phenomenon that is 
inextricably linked to sources of legitimacy and authority, the manifestations of which 
vary widely depending on national and social contexts.  
 
This is a view that is noticeably absent from international foreign policies directed at 
the region, and is therefore contributing to the rise of Islamophobia and to the 
portrayal of Muslims as the “other”. This thesis has challenged this perception by 
bringing together primary and secondary data, therefore adding to the existing 
literature on the topic with interviews with both secular activists and MB members 
and supporters, attempting to do so equally despite the complicated nature and set 
of circumstances surrounding the subject at hand. Finally, this thesis has shown that 
the FJP’s toppling is far from being a proof of the incompatibility of Political Islam and 
democracy, and should therefore be thought of as just a deposition. 
 
The thesis has done so by providing an in-depth analysis of the existing research and 
literature on Islamism in Chapter 1, and critically addressing theoretical positions that 
appear to be too generalist and outdated to be suited to the investigation of the many 
contemporary manifestations of Political Islam, such as Oliver Roy’s account of “The 
Failure of Political Islam”. It needs to be made clear once again that this is not an attack 
on Roy himself. Rather, this thesis has sought to address and problematize a much 
broader trend that homogenises the understanding of Political Islam, ultimately 
represented by Roy’s main work. This is why approaches based on Historical Sociology, 
which take into account the influence of different social, political, and historical 
contexts, are key to understand what a group like the MB means and to examine its 
identity and message. Historical Sociology has also been introduced as the theoretical 
framework supporting the analysis as, moving away from the Realist and traditional 
understanding of “Islam” or the “Arab mind” as explanatory elements of the region’s 
geopolitics, it instead focuses on how institutions of both political and socio/religious 
power are established and maintained, recognising states, ideologies and societies as 
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the core components of political and social order.702 Therefore, it is most suited to the 
study of how the MB’s political evolution has historically shaped the country’s 
institutions, civil society, and politics.  
 
Following this, Chapter 2 engaged with the MB’s genealogy and development within 
the Egyptian context, focusing on the organization’s interpretation and practices of 
Political Islam and on its troubled while still mutually dependant relationship with the 
various regimes. Historical Sociology has shown that the history of the MB is 
inextricably tied to that of Egypt itself, and argued for the need to examine both 
together in order to understand what led to the MB’s rise and fall from power. Having 
provided a genealogy of the MB’s political and ideological development within the 
unique Egyptian context, Chapter 3 examined the role that the organisation played 
during the January 2011 uprisings and at the very start of the transitional period, which 
culminated in the creation of the FJP in June 2011. Understanding such a watershed 
event as the beginning of the MB’s experience in government, the chapter focused on 
the significance of the creation of the FJP and of Mohammed Morsi’s election, by 
analysing the implications that this had for the mainstream organization and for its 
ideology. 
 
Chapter 4 set the framework for the critical analysis of the MB’s time in government, 
focusing on its policies, political choices, and varying relationships with the other 
political actors in Egypt, in order to understand what ultimately went wrong and led 
to the premature departure of Morsi from the presidency. Following from this, the 
chapter proposed four main factors that can be understood as being behind the 
downfall of the MB, which have then be examined in Chapter 5, these being: the MB’s 
legacy of internal divisions, its “arrogance” and refusal to cooperate with revolutionary 
group, its miscalculations regarding the extent of power the group actually held, and 
failure to take into account the prominent and historical role of the Army within the 
Egyptian context. Chapter 5 additionally looked at the events leading up to Morsi’s 
removal and examines the reasons behind popular discontent and perceived failure of 
                                                 
702 Halliday, F., The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics, and Ideology, p. 36 
 268 
the MB. Once again, the legacy of division characteristic of the organisation and 
certain perceptions of Political Islam played a major role in the unravelling of these 
occurrences. Justifications, accusations, and political actions were examined within 
the framework of Political Islam and that of Egypt itself, with the aim of identifying the 
extent to which they were influenced by history and ideology. Ultimately, Chapter 5 
critically engaged with Roy’s account of the “Failure of Political Islam”, and determined 
that it was not applicable to the case of the FJP’s toppling in July 2013. 
 
It is undeniable that the MB was not ready to face the challenges that came with 
democratic governance. Its long history as an opposition movement meant that the 
Brotherhood could benefit from an exceptionally strong organizational strength and 
structure, which gave it an advantage over less-experienced secular and revolutionary 
groups in the post-Mubarak context, but that did not equal political expertise. Its 
members’ inexperience in assessing the country’s balance of power, the permanence 
of the remnants of the deep state, SCAF’s unwillingness to relinquish power and the 
alienation perceived by secular and revolutionary groups have proven to be too much 
to handle for the MB. However, while the MB’s first experience in governance has 
ended quickly and brutally, this does not equal the end of one of the region’s oldest 
and most influential Islamist groups, and it definitely does not prove that Political Islam 
and democratic governance are incompatible by default.  
 
Contributions 
This thesis has argued that it necessary to return to the pre-2011 understanding of 
Political Islam as a modern, ever-evolving phenomenon, that is inextricably linked to 
sources of power and legitimacy within the state, and is therefore slowly adapting its 
narrative and aims to contemporary times, inevitably encountering obstacles on the 
way. As an historical phenomenon, Political Islam in its various manifestations is and 
will remain closely related to the persistent dilemma regarding the role of religion in 
civil and public spaces, and to the highly complex question of legitimacy and the rising 
power of the state.703 Historical Sociology has been used to show that, especially in 
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the case of Egypt, religion also plays a key role in the context of civil society, therefore 
directly shaping characteristics and perceptions of states, societies, and institutions. 
Because of its nature, it is therefore necessary to renew the move towards an 
understanding of Political Islam that is case specific and takes into account the wide 
array of diversity and practices that manifest across the various groups that fall under 
this label, rather than seeking to restrict its comprehension to a monolithic and 
prescribing set of rules. The question of whether the FJP’s removal equals the failure 
of Political Islam as a whole further reinforces the contemporary currency of this need. 
 
On July 3rd, 2013, the region’s first democratically elected Islamist government was 
overthrown by a coup d’etat brought about by an unpredicted partnership between 
Egypt’s Armed Forces and the grassroots opposition movement Tamarod. The speed 
at which these events unfolded and the brutal persecution of MB’s members that 
followed al Sisi’s seizure of power was monitored with stupor by observers around the 
world, while bigger questions regarding the compatibility of Political Islam and 
democracy inevitably arose. While some simply limited their analysis to the study of 
the MB’s unfortunate attempt at governance, many more looked at these events as 
the ultimate proof that Political Islam had indeed failed, as predicted by Oliver Roy in 
1992. However, by examining the MB’s practices and ideology within the Egyptian 
context, and by carefully analysing the organization’s post-2011 politicisation process 
and their time in government, this thesis has demonstrated that it would be more 
appropriate to refer to July 3rd 2013 as the day of the FJP’s deposition, rather than as 
the failure of Political Islam as a whole.  
 
There are several reasons why this is the case. First of all, Oliver Roy’s book was written 
in a very particular historical period, under very specific circumstances, that do not 
reflect those currently characterising events in the region today. In the early 1990s, 
the geopolitical conditions witnessed by Roy might have indeed pointed to the 
assumption that Political Islam was doomed to fail: in Afghanistan, the mujahedeen 
had failed to provide a durable political alternative to the defeated Communist regime; 
Egypt was being ripped apart by daily clashes between the country’s Armed Forces 
and radical Islamist groups such as the Islamic Jihad; Algeria witnessed the brutal 
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suppression of the Islamic Salvation Front.704 At the time, it seemed like Islamist 
groups were struggling to even survive, let alone contemplating the possibility of 
bringing about political change through governmental and democratic structures. 
 
However, what Roy failed to foresee was just how significantly circumstances would 
change since then. The rise of the Turkish model and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
example began challenging Roy’s predictions. In 2011, the region was swept by the 
rebellious wave of the “Arab Springs”, which saw long-standing dictators and 
authoritarian regimes being toppled by popular movements that were chanting about 
democracy, freedom, and human rights. In the political vacuum that followed, Islamist 
groups such as the MB and the Ennahda drew on decades of experience as both 
grassroots groups and opposition movements to seize the opportunity to gain legality 
and legitimacy, and did so through the power of the ballot box. The world watched in 
disbelief as the “Arab Springs” quickly turned into “Islamist Winters”, however, these 
groups’ political projects were destined to be short lived. Nevertheless, such a strict 
framing of events and its deep policy implications need to be problematized. 
 
Following from this, the thesis makes a considerable contribution to the contemporary 
literature focusing on Political Islam in the post-2011 regional context, as it poses it 
position itself at the vanguard of contemporary debates. This literature will be 
summarised below, but it is roughly divided between two main trends led by scholars 
such as Tarek Osman, Quinn Mecham and Muqtedar Khan. In particular, these trends 
develop along the lines of those who understand the post-2011 context as an 
“Islamists’ Winter” and those who instead interpret it as a chance for Islamist groups 
to self reflect and re-invent themselves in the light of the new regional (dis)order. By 
identifying four domestic factors that led the removal of the MB government this 
thesis aligns with the latter of these trends, as it will be shown.  
 
The argument here is that it is necessary to move towards an understanding of Political 
Islam that is case-specific, and recognises its diversity depending on contexts and 
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histories. Of course, this also comes with several policy implications. In an era 
dominated by the trend of equating Islamism with terrorism and violence, and Islamist 
groups with Da’esh, it is increasingly important to challenge generalist currents and to 
acknowledge the heterogeneity of this doctrine. Such an intellectual move would 
certainly have repercussion for foreign policies, and would eventually challenge rising 
sentiments of Islamophobia and the increasing construction of Muslims as the “other”. 
While it is undeniable that it is necessary for Islamist groups to engage in self-reflection 
and reformation following the Arab Springs and the MB’s removal, the same should 
be said for international policy makers and observers. A more comprehensive 
understanding of Islamism as something that is multifaceted and ever-evolving would 
eventually lead to the shift away from a Global War on Islam and towards a global 
effort against authoritarianism, which does not have to see Muslims and Islamists as 
enemies, but rather as allies. 
 
Contemporary Political Islams: Islamist Winters VS Islamic Awakening 
In 2013, following the removal of the FJP by a military-led coup d’etat, an old set of 
questions about the compatibility of Islam and democracy resurfaced, while Roy’s 
prediction about the failure of Political Islam seemed to be embraced by most. Chapter 
1 has highlighted the fact that, following the aftermath of the Arab Springs and the 
rise of Da’esh, the literature on this topic seems to have split between two emerging 
currents. With these new trends in the literature still being in the making, this thesis 
makes a considerable contribution to the study of the subject as it positions itself at 
the vanguard of these debates. Moreover, regardless of which of these binary 
positions one subscribes to, the understanding of Political Islam as a multifaceted and 
heterogeneous ideology is still necessary to make sense of the ideological and 
geopolitical trends currently enveloping the region. 
 
As emphasised in Chapter 1, those belonging to the first emerging trend in the 
literature, such as Tarek Osman and Quinn Mecham, argue that Islamist groups are 
growing increasingly authoritarian in the post-2011 regional context, which has 
strengthened the binary between Arab secularism and Islamism. Mecham claims that 
there are four main trends that characterise Islamism as a whole in the aftermath of 
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the Arab Springs. These are the removal and repression of the MB, the rise of Islamist 
militia-based state building embodied by Da’esh, increasing sectarianism and proxy 
wars, and Islamists’ increased caution in participating in participatory politics and in 
directly challenging their governments.705 He believes that the MB’s deposition came 
with enormous consequences for Islamist groups competing in politics, and predicts 
that exclusion and perceptions of injustice will eventually lead to the group resorting 
to militancy.706 Tarek Osman holds a similarly negative understanding, and states that 
the failure to take power during the Arab Springs “has led not to ‘soul-searching’ in 
major Islamist groups about what went wrong, but instead to ‘antagonism and fiery 
anger’ and a thirst for revenge’”.707Partisans of Political therefore Islam see 
themselves as victims of an injustice whose perpetrators are not just "individual 
conspirators but entire social groups”.708 He predicts that there will soon have to be a 
fight to save the soul of Islamism, meaning that, as Salafist jihadist groups grow in 
numbers and popularity, non-militant Islamist groups and thinkers will have to defend 
the idea of Political Islam against being equated with violence and terror.709 According 
to Osman, this will include a battle over what it means to be an Islamist.  
 
Others, such as Muqtedar Khan, belong to the second trend in the literature and 
instead understand the current regional (dis)order as a chance for moderate Islamist 
groups to self-reflect and re-invent themselves in the light of new regional needs and 
circumstances. As stated in Chapter 1, Khan notes that the MB’s inability to provide 
good governance and unite Egyptian society under a common purpose does not 
directly imply that Political Islam and democracy are incompatible.710 Similarly, the fact 
that the organization is widely considered one of the region’s oldest and most 
influential Islamist groups does not mean that the MB has a monopoly on Political 
Islam, or that its perceived failure is also the failure of Islamic values.711 Therefore, the 
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popular protests that escalated in the coup d’etat were not the rejection of Political 
Islam or of democracy, they were simply a rejection of the MB’s rule.  
 
Similarly, other Islamist groups around the region have not been discouraged by the 
MB’s deposition; on the contrary, the appetite for Islam in the public and civil spheres 
is continuously shifting forms and looking for new ways to adapt to contemporary 
challenges. With these new trends in the literature still being in the making, this thesis 
therefore contributes to the emerging literature on the topic and positions itself within 
the second trend, by arguing that it is necessary to move towards an understanding of 
Political Islam that is case-specific, and that recognises its diversity depending on 
context and history. 
 
In particular, following from both the MB’s and the Ennahda’s experiences, it is clear 
that modern forms of Islamism are still trying to adapt to contemporary challenges, 
which might require them to make a conceptual and ideological shift. While these 
changes are case specific, in the case of the Brotherhood it could be argued that the 
group’s source of legitimacy and support needs to move from “Islamic Identity” to 
“Islamic Values”. The analysis of the troubled relationship between the group and the 
various Egyptian regimes has demonstrated that Islam has been used as a source of 
legitimacy for almost a century, which together with the group’s original anti-colonial 
nature has contributed to the reduction of the Islamic faith to a political ideology. Its 
underlying themes of resistance and identity politics have never really gone away, they 
have just been hidden by the demands of high politics, which the MB was undeniably 
unprepared to tackle.  
 
While engaging with the process of rebuilding the MB, its leaders also need to regain 
their credibility as moral actors who seek to govern for the sake of justice rather than 
power, and the only way to do that is to return to the conception of Islam as both a 
faith and a set of values rather than just an identity that fosters political 
mobilization.712 Since its formation, the MB has primarily been a social movement, 
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whose program depends on bringing about social change as a foundation and a 
condition for political change. This has not changed in the aftermath of 2013 and, if 
anything, its members and supporters are finding themselves needing to rebuild the 
strong organisation they once were. This process will undoubtedly come with 
fascinating implications not only for Egypt, but for the wider understanding of Political 
Islam as well. 
 
To conclude, the question of whether and how Islam could form the basis of political 
legitimacy and a frame of reference for modern societies with Muslim majorities has 
not been settled713, and it likely will not be anytime soon. Meanwhile, politics in Egypt 
in the Al Sisi era is currently in a state of suspension, with the MB being persecuted 
and the forced exclusion of secular activists from the political space. However, this 
does not mean the end of Political Islam. Most of my interviewees, secular and 
religious, agree with the statement that “as long as there is poverty in Egypt, there will 
be Islamism”.714 This suggests that while there is some self-reflection and re-invention 
for Islamists to do, the doctrine is far from being defeated even in the eyes of some of 
its most vehement critics. When asked about the future of the MB, a young secular 
activist stressed once again just how embedded the organisation is within Egyptian 
structures and psyche, by saying: 
 
I think the people will end up reconciling with the MB at some point, it will happen sooner 
or later, to me it is the only thing that makes sense. It will happen because they are part of 
the Egyptian people. You will not be able to completely amputate them or to amputate their 
organization. If the MB became such a bad organization, terrorist and so on, maybe it will 
start reformulating under a different entity and a different name, and present an 
alternative.715 
 
Finally, together with the necessity of moving towards an understanding of Political 
Islam that recognises its heterogeneousness and takes into account different contexts, 
the MB’s deposition also calls for an awakening to take place within current Islamist 
                                                 
713 Osman, T., Islamism: what it means for the Middle East and the World, p. 260 
714 based on interviews with secular and religious activists, and with MB members and supporters. 
715 Interview with a secular activist. 
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groups, one that is based on self reflection and analysis. To some degrees, this is 
already taking place. While younger Islamists would see elections as a part of their 
identity, rather than just a means of political change,716 they are starting to move away 
from the process of equating electoral success to “winning”. The MB’s case certainly 
teaches them a lesson in that. Wael Hallaq writes “for many Islamists (and Muslims 
more broadly), there is a certain measure of dissonance between their moral and 
cultural aspirations, on the one hand, and the moral realities of a modern world, on 
the other—realities with which they must live but were not of their own making”.717 
The current regional circumstances are not what they would have wanted, and they 
are now faced with several competing challenges, such as maintaining unity despite 
disagreement, and the difficulty and sometimes impossibility of separating religion 
and politics. Although the younger generations of Islamists have not yet found 
answers, they have started to ask themselves these challenging questions. This can be 
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Parliamentary Elections 2011 
(Freedom … Justice … Development … Leadership) 
In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
 
This program: 
Pursuant to the blessed revolution of the great Egyptian people, who were able with 
God's will and power to overturn the tyrannical corrupt former regime, and out of 
loyalty to the martyrs of the revolution, and in response to the thundering voice of our 
people and their just demands to complete the demolition of the repressive regime, 
                                                 
719 For the purposes of clarity and brevity, an abridged version of the Freedom and Justice Party 
Election Program is included, with a specific focus on issues discussed in the Thesis. 
Freedom and Justice Party Election Program 
http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/FJP_2011_English.pdf  
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to purge the country of corruption and to begin a new phase of building and 
development of Egypt, we proudly present this program as an integrated vision for the 
next phase with all its political, security, economic, social, cultural, scientific (..) and 
other requirements. This will undoubtedly be an ultra-sensitive phase, for it will 
witness the foundation of what could be called "the second republic" which we – all 
Egyptians – aspire to and endeavour to achieve its goals of building a free, stable, 
strong, leading and advanced country. We stress that reforming what was corrupted 
by the tyrants of the past and rejuvenating the country is a huge task that no political 
party or national stakeholder can achieve on its own. Hence, we call for national 
cooperation, or at least fair competition to serve our people and our families, without 
excluding, removing or accusing each other, and without fear -mongering, treason or 
intellectual terrorism. That is: we should seek a balanced Parliament. 
 
The Egyptian people, in its entirety, is now looking forward to real stability based on a 
security system that provides safety and security, and a political and constitutional 
system that re -builds the state administration, and an economic system that rescues 
the economy and rids the Egyptian citizen of the burdens of unemployment, poverty 
and high cost of living… in addition to a comprehensive system for integrated 
development and national security, foreign policy, culture and the media, as well as 
endowments and religious affairs. 
 
Therefore, our program is based on the priorities of the people and reflects their 
aspirations for practical initiatives and programs that will achieve the freedom, Shura 
(consultation), dignity y, security, safety, justice, stability, development, progress, 
advancement and leadership they deserve. 
 
Thus, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) presents a hand -picked selection of 
candidates with varied specialties and multiple abilities, representing all segments of 
the Egyptian people, including: university professors, professionals, workers, farmers 
and others. We also present a number of female candidates who represent Egyptian 
women in all segments and their respective communities. This is based on our belief 
that women are capable sisters of men, and are just as able to effectively participate 
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in the service of their homeland and their religion “The believing men and believing 
women are allies of one another. They enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong…” 
[Quranic Chapter 9 Repentance: 71] 
 
We strive arduously to be an honest, faithful voice for our people, our Egypt, to carry 
their concerns, demands and aspirations, and work to mobilize and engage all the 
resources and creative energies of the honest, loyal and strong citizens of this nation 
to achieve the following: 
 
- Building a strong democratic political system that safeguards the citizens’ rights and 
freedoms, applies the principle of Shura (consultation), and builds an institutional 
state where the rule of the law is the title of civilized modern human life. 
 
- Achieving social justice that will preserve the citizens‟ dignity, safeguard their rights 
and provide a decent life for all, irrespective of class, status or affiliation. 
 
- Laying the foundation for real integrated development and progress of Egypt, our 
beloved homeland, with all its human and economic resources, its production and 
construction. 
 
- Restoring the leadership which Egypt has long since lost under rule of the former 
regime on all Arab, African, Islamic, international, scientific, cultural, and media levels. 
 
Hence this program is founded on four fundamental principles, which represent the 
great purposes of Sharia (Islamic law) namely: Freedom, Justice, Development, 
Leadership. 
 
With freedom, justice is achieved; and with justice, real development takes place; and 
thus Egypt is launched forth into real progress and proper leadership as befits its noble 
people and great history. 
 
We present this election program to our people, and we are confident that: 
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 Together, we can get our country to safety 
 Together, we can rebuild free strong leading dear Egypt  
 Together, we can protect Egypt’s national unity and preserve its security and 
achieve stability 
 Together, we can develop Egypt’s resources and its economy and perfect its 
rejuvenation 
 Together, we can raise Egypt’s status, restore its vital role and take it to 
leadership position – because we believe that our free people who 
accomplished for Egypt – with God's Grace – the great goals of liberation and 
purging of corruption, are able - with God's help - to accomplish the tasks of 
leadership, construction and development.  
 A quick look at the situation inherited from the corrupt former regime, that 
grabbed Egypt for too long – which was the direct cause of the people's 
revolution on the twenty -fifth of January – as compared with the proper status 
that we seek for Egypt with our great people for the future through this 
program, will highlight the enormous efforts required for Egypt to return to its 













President Mohamed Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration, 
(November 2012).720 
Article I: 
Reopen the investigations and prosecutions in the cases of the murder, the attempted 
murder and the wounding of protesters as well as the crimes of terror committed against 
the revolutionaries by anyone who held a political or executive position under the former 
regime, according to the Law of the Protection of the Revolution and other laws. 
Article II: 
Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president since he 
took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People’s 
Assembly [lower house of parliament] is elected, are final and binding and cannot be 
appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be suspended or cancelled and all 
lawsuits related to them and brought before any judicial body against these decisions are 
annulled.  
Article III: 
The prosecutor-general is to be appointed from among the members of the judiciary by 
the President of the Republic for a period of four years commencing from the date of office 
and is subject to the general conditions of being appointed as a judge and should not be 
under the age of 40. This provision applies to the one currently holding the position with 
immediate effect. 
Article IV: 
The text of the article on the formation of the Constituent Assembly in the 30 March 2011 
Constitutional Declaration that reads, "it shall prepare a draft of a new constitution in a 
                                                 




period of six months from the date it was formed” is to be amended to "it shall prepare 
the draft of a new constitution for the country no later than eight months from the date 
of its formation." 
 Article V: 
No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house of parliament] or the 
Constituent Assembly. 
 Article VI: 
 
The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and 
the goals of the revolution. 
Article VII: 

















Abridged Egyptian Constitution of 2012721 
 
CONSTITUTION PREAMBLE 
We, the people of Egypt, 
In the name of the merciful God and with his aid, 
declare this to be 
Our Constitution, the document of the 25th of January revolution, which was started 
by our youth, embraced by our people, supported by our Armed Forces; 
Having rejected, in Tahrir Square and all over the country all forms of injustice, 
oppression, tyranny, despotism, exclusion, plunder and monopoly; 
Proclaimed our full rights to “bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity,” paid 
for by the blood of our martyrs, the pain of our injured, the dreams of our children, 
the strife of our men and women; 
Recovered the spirit of our great civilization and our luminous history, for on the 
banks of the timeless Nile we established the oldest state that has always known the 
meaning of citizenship and equality, gave humanity the first alphabet, opened the 
way to monotheism and the knowledge of the Creator, embraced God’s prophets 
and messages, and adorned the pages of history with parades of creativity; 
And in continuation of our virtuous revolution which has unified all Egyptians on the 
path of building a modern democratic state, we declare our adherence to the 
following principles: 
                                                 
721 For the purposes of clarity and brevity, an abridged version of the 2012 Egyptian Constitution is 
included, with a specific focus on the Articles that have been discussed in the Thesis. 
Nariman, Y., “Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated”, in Egypt Independent, (November 2012) 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated/  





The people are the source of all authorities. Authorities are instituted by and derive 
their legitimacy from the people, and are subject to the people’s will. The 
responsibilities and competencies of authorities are a duty to bear, not a privilege or 
a source of immunity. 
II: 
A democratic system of government, establishing the grounds for peaceful transfer of 
power, supporting political pluralism, ensuring fair elections and the people’s 
contribution in the decision-making process. 
III: 
The individual’s dignity is an extension of the nation’s dignity. Further, there is no 
dignity for a country in which women are not honoured; women are the sisters of men 
and partners in all national gains and responsibilities. 
IV: 
Freedom is a right: freedom of thought, expression and creativity; freedom in housing, 
property and travel; its principles laid down by the Creator in the motion of the 
universe and human nature. 
V: 
Equality and equal opportunities are established for all citizens, men and women, 
without discrimination or nepotism or preferential treatment, in both rights and 
duties. 
VI: 
The rule of law is the basis of the individual’s freedom, the legitimacy of authority, and 
the state’s respect of the law. No power shall override that of righteousness, and the 
judiciary shall be independent, bearer of the honourable mission of defending the 
Constitution, upholding justice, and preserving rights and freedoms. 
VII: 
Upholding national unity is an obligation, and the cornerstone of building a modern 
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Egypt and the path to progress and development. To that end, the values of tolerance 
and moderation shall be spread, and the rights and freedoms of all citizens shall be 
protected without discrimination. 
VIII: 
Defending the nation is a duty and an honour. Our Armed Forces form a professional 
and neutral national institution that does not interfere in political affairs. It is the 
protective shield of the country. 
IX: 
Security is a great blessing; it falls on the shoulders of a police force which works in 
the service of the people, for their protection and to enforce the measures of justice. 
For there can be no justice without protection, and no protection without security 
institutions that respect the rule of law and human dignity. 
X: 
Unity is the hope of the Arab nation; it is history’s call, the future’s bid, and destiny’s 
demand. Such unity is to be reinforced through the integration and fraternity with 
countries of the Nile Valley and of the Muslim world, both a natural extension borne 
out of the distinctiveness of Egypt’s position on the global map. 
XI: 
Egypt’s pioneering intellectual and cultural leadership is an embodiment of its soft 
power, and a model of the free generosity of original creators and thinkers, 
universities, science centres, linguistic and research centres, the press, the arts, 
literature and mass media, the national church, and Al-Azhar with its history as a 
mainstay of national identity, the Arabic language and Islamic Sharia, and as a beacon 
for moderate enlightened thought. 
We, the people of Egypt, 
Out of faith in God and His heavenly messages, 
In recognition of the right of the country and the nation,   
With awareness of our responsibilities toward the nation and humanity, 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Pledge to stay committed to the principles laid out in this Constitution, which we 
accept and grant to ourselves, affirming our determination to uphold and defend it, 
and asserting that it shall be protected and respected by the State’s authorities and 
the general public. 
 




Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. Principles of Islamic 
Sharia are the principal source of legislation.     
 
Social and ethical principles 
 
Article 9  
The state commits itself to providing security, tranquillity and equality of opportunity 
for all citizens, without discrimination.  
 
Article 10  
The family is the foundation of society. The family’s foundations are religion, morality, 
and patriotism. Both state and society seek to preserve the inherent character of the 
Egyptian family, its cohesion, stability, and moral character, and to protect the family 
as specified by law. The state guarantees mother-and-child services that are free of 
charge and pledges to reconcile the woman’s duties toward her family with her work 
in the public sphere. The state provides special protections for female breadwinners, 
divorced women, and widows. 
 
Article 11  
The state promotes morality, decency, and public order, as well as a high level of 
education and religious and patriotic values, scientific truths, the Arab culture, and the 
historical and civilizational patrimony of the People. All this as specified by law. 
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RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
Personal Rights 
Article 35  
Unless caught in the act, a person can only be arrested, searched, jailed, prevented 
from travel, or in any other way restricted in his freedom if doing so follows a court 
order. Anyone whose freedom has been curtailed is entitled to receive a written notice 
listing the reasons within twelve hours. Within 24 hours of the curtailment of his 
freedom, a person must be brought before the investigating authority. This must 
happen in the presence of his attorney. If he does not have an attorney, one will be 
provided for him. Anyone whose freedom has been constrained, and anyone else, has 
the right to lodge a complaint before the judge in regards to this procedure and receive 
a decision within a week. If a decision has not been issued within that time, the person 
must be released. The law specifies the rules for detention, its duration, its reasons, 
and for the right to compensation either for temporary detention or for the 
completion of a sentence that a court has revoked.  
 
Article 36  
Anyone who has been arrested, jailed, or restricted in his freedom in any form is 
entitled to being treated in a way that respects his dignity. He must not be tortured, 
threatened, or degraded. He must not be harmed physically or mentally. He must only 
be detained or jailed in locations that are hygienic and becoming to a human being 
and that are under judicial supervision. Any deviation from these instructions is a 
crime that will be punished, as stipulated by law. Any statement made under such 
illegal circumstances or elicited under threat of such circumstances shall be considered 
null and void. 
 
Moral and political rights 
 
Article 44  
It is forbidden to insult any messengers or prophets.  
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Article 45  
The freedom of thought and opinion are guaranteed. Every person has the right to 
express his opinion in speaking, writing, image, or otherwise 
 
Economic and social rights 
 
Article 81  
The rights and freedoms that attach to the citizen must not be impaired. No law 
regulating the practice of these rights and freedoms may narrow their intent and 
essence. The rights and freedoms are to be practiced in such a way that they do not 
conflict with the provisions of Part One of this Constitution, which covers the elements 
of state and society 
 
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY  
Section 1: The President 
Article 148  
After consultation with the Government and in accordance with the law, the President 
of the Republic declares the state of emergency. This declaration must be submitted 
to the House of Representatives within the following seven days. If the declaration is 
made while the House is in recess, it must promptly be called back into session. If the 
chamber has been dissolved, the declaration must be made to the Consultative 
Assembly and within the seven-day period stipulated in the previous paragraph. For 
the state of emergency to take effect, the consent of the majority in each of the two 
chambers is necessary. The declaration is valid for a specified period not to exceed six 
months. It can be extended once and for a period of similar length. Such an extension 
requires the prior consent of the People, expressed in a public referendum. The House 







Section 2: Local Councils 
 
Article 188 
Each local unit elects an assembly through universal, secret and direct ballot. The 
assembly’s mandate lasts four years. A candidate for a seat in the local assembly must 
be at least 21 years of age by the date the registration of candidates opens. The local 
assembly includes the local representatives of the executive. These representatives 
have no vote. Every assembly elects its president and his vice president from among 
its elected members. The law specifies other conditions for candidacy as well as the 
election procedures. 
 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE 
Section 4: The Military Judiciary 
 
Article 198  
The military judiciary is an independent branch of the judiciary. It alone decides on all 
crimes related to the armed forces, their officers, and personnel. Civilians may not be 
tried by the military judiciary unless they are accused of crimes that hurt the armed 
forces. The law specifies these crimes as well as other competencies of the military 
judiciary. Members of the military judiciary are independent. They cannot be 
dismissed, and they have the guarantees, rights, and duties that attach to all members 
of the judiciary. 
 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION  
 
Article 219  
The principles of Islamic law (Shari’a) include general evidence, the foundational 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), the reliable sources from among the 
Sunni schools of thought (madhahib). 
 
